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Governmental History Documentation Project
Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

Donald L. Bradley

MANAGING DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGNS, 1943-1966

An Interview Conducted by
Amelia R. Fry
1977-1979

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PREFACE

Covering the years 1953 to 1966, the Goodwin Knight-Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, Sr., Oral History Series is the second phase of the Governmental History Documentation Project begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. That year inaugurated the Earl Warren Era Oral History Project, which produced interviews with Earl Warren and other persons prominent in politics, criminal justice, government administration, and legislation during Warren's California era, 1925 to 1953.

The Knight-Brown series of interviews carries forward the earlier inquiry into the general topics of: the nature of the governor's office, its relationships with the legislature and with its own executive departments, biographical data about Governors Knight and Brown and other leaders of the period, and methods of coping with the rapid social and economic changes of the state. Key issues documented for 1953-1966 were: the rise and decline of the Democratic party, the impact of the California Water Plan, the upheaval of the Vietnam War escalation, the capital punishment controversy, election law changes, new political techniques forced by television and increased activism, reorganization of the executive branch, the growth of federal programs in California, and the rising awareness of minority groups. From a wider view across the twentieth century, the Knight-Brown period marks the final era of California's Progressive period, which was ushered in by Governor Hiram Johnson in 1910 and which provided for both parties the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy until 1966.

The Warren Era political files, which interviewers had developed cooperatively to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated by the staff to the year 1966 with only a handful of new topics added to the original ninety-one. An effort was made to record in greater detail those more significant events and trends by selecting key participants who represent diverse points of view. Most were queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators who possessed unusual breadth of experience were asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. Although the time frame of the series ends at the November 1966 election, when possible the interviews trace events on through that date in order to provide a logical baseline for continuing study of succeeding administrations. Similarly, some narrators whose experience includes the Warren years were questioned on that earlier era as well as the Knight-Brown period.

The present series has been financed by grants from the California State Legislature through the California Heritage Preservation Commission and the office of the Secretary of State, and by some individual donations. Portions of several memoirs were funded partly by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; the two projects were produced concurrently in this office, a joint effort made feasible by overlap of narrators, topics, and staff expertise.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of The Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office.

Amelia R. Fry, Project Director
Gabrielle Morris, Project Coordinator

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Gabrielle Morris
James Rowland
Sarah Sharp
Julie Shearer

Special Interviewers

Eleanor Glaser
Harriet Nathan
Suzanne Riess
Miriam Feingold Stein
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GOODWIN KNIGHT-EDMUND BROWN, SR. ERA ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
(California, 1953-1966)

Interviews Completed and In Process, March 1982

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Weinberger, Caspar W., *California Assembly, Republican State Central Committee, and Elections, 1953-1966.*

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Brody, Ralph M., *Devising Legislation and Building Public Support for the California Water Project, 1959-1960; Brief History of the Westlands Water District.*
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Bonderson, Paul R., *Executive Officer, Regional and State Water Pollution and Water Quality Control Boards, 1950-1966.*

INTERVIEW HISTORY

When election candidates in California speak of Don Bradley, they use words like "wily political strategist," "astute," "gusto," and "cared deeply." His obituary speaks of more than a hundred and thirty political races that he conducted,* from the '40s to the '80s, ranging from quiet local elections to the boisterous battles of ballot propositions. Always he worked his convictions: liberal and Democratic. He was not an armchair strategist. He organized, he raised funds, he wrote press releases. He was, for instance, the key professional in the '50s when the Democrats began capturing Republican seats in the legislature by targeting their resources in districts which, for one reason or another, had to hold a special senatorial election. He was the professional in charge when Edmund G. "Pat" Brown won the governorship in 1958, again in 1962 (against Richard M. Nixon), and for Brown's defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1966. He was also a California organizer for Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson and for U.S. Senators Clair Engle and Pierre Salinger.

Bradley's era began before political success was shaped by how a candidate projected himself on television. Even though that medium became important later in his candidates' campaigns, Bradley's discussion concentrates on daily events and issues as they affected Brown's and other campaigns, and on the fund-raising and organizational strategies developed over the years.

When he was asked in 1977 to be interviewed for the Pat Brown era documentation project, he immediately agreed, and although he had a tightly-packed calendar during campaign seasons, he made time for the sessions before and after the campaigns. Six interviews were recorded, between May, 1977, and January, 1979, usually at 10 a.m., in the offices of Bradley Associates in downtown San Francisco. His offices were hardly the plush luxury decor often attributed to public relations firms. Bradley's was a giant warehouse of an office with a few desks strung along the bare floors under uncurtained windows, more desks opposite them along the other side, and Bradley's own office near the entrance and set apart somewhat with a windowed partition under the high ceilings. This was clearly a no-nonsense working place. Plenty of telephones and coffee, but no excited, staccato dialogue that one might expect from the habit-forming pace of many campaigns.

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* See page xi.

Bradley generally arrived in a cloud of cigarette smoke just before the interview, cracked a few brief jokes to his staff about the morning headlines, made two or three telephone calls in his office and, lighting another cigarette, signalled that he was ready to talk about those prior campaigns on the day's outline.

Most of the time he had been sent chronologies, which his memory did not need, and copies of pertinent letters and papers from the Pat Brown collections in The Bancroft Library. He was as intent on the taping process as he was on the art of seeing a campaign through to victory, and he unreeled his memories in a direct line, with an occasional joke or anecdote to heighten the color of a story. He usually worked his way through the outline in less than two hours.

Somehow, as he leaned back watching the ever-present smoke billow against the window pane, the chair, the desk seemed too small for this ample man with the voice like a bassoon with a broken reed. His hair, shirt, and face were equally rumpled. Pretension was definitely not a part of him, nor was it present in the narration he was giving. This man was a realist, one who could sift and sort priorities in either politics or dress and keep the basics in mind. He was telling it as he remembered it (with one exception, which he told the interviewer beforehand he would not speak to), and the story, like his style, was real.

When a session was over, he set a date for the next session, climbed out of his chair and scrambled himself together to meet the next appointment, usually waiting just outside. After the final session, the transcript was produced and edited, and sent to him for review early in 1980. Bradley worked on questions concerning the transcript as time permitted between campaigns, making no substantive changes. He took time in mid-1981 to help the Regional Oral History Office with unresolved details on the Roger Kent memoir-in-process, another significant commentary on the California Democratic party, after Kent's death. At that time, he commented wryly and prophetically that he wished someone would do the same for his own interviews.

Serious illnesses in his family prevented Bradley from reviewing the last thirty pages of manuscript before his untimely death in October, 1981. His business associates and his family readily agreed to completion of the memoir and returned the transcript to the office for final typing in November, 1981. Bradley's aide Kaye Moore was helpful with arrangements throughout the interviewing and production process and kindly provided the photographs that illustrate the text.

In preserving a record of Don Bradley's energy and ingenuity, these interviews draw a sharp sketch of the politics of the third quarter of the twentieth century, in which he has also provided useful case histories of political strategy. It is quite a bequest for historians, political scientists, and future practitioners of the art of campaigning.

Amelia Fry
Project Director

1 May 1982
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26 San Francisco Chronicle ★ Tues., October 6, 1981

Obituaries

Campaign Manager Don Bradley

By Scott Blakey

Donald L. Bradley, the wily political strategist responsible for the victories of three San Francisco mayors and the successes of numerous Democratic Party causes, died Friday. He was 62.

A resident of Bolinas, he died at the University of California Medical Center at San Francisco after several weeks in the hospital.

An irascible and witty man with a gravelly voice tuned by endless cigarets, Mr. Bradley headed the successful campaigns of mayors Jack Shelley in 1963, George Moscone in 1975 and Dianne Feinstein in 1979.

In a career that spanned four decades, Mr. Bradley ran more than 130 campaigns, some losers and many winners. He was most closely associated with mainstream and liberal Democrats, and his candidates reflected that. He worked to elect Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson and Lyndon Johnson.

He was one of the key figures in three of Edmund (Pat) Brown's campaigns for governor — his 1958 landslide over the late Senator William F. Knowland, his 1962 victory for re-election against Richard Nixon and his bitter defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1966.

He also ran several glamourless campaigns — such as those involving sewer bond issues — with gusto.

When his personal beliefs were involved, politics became a crusade, and a win — such as the successful 1978 drive to defeat the statewide Briggs anti-gay initiative — something akin to moral victory.

"Unlike many in his profession, he was always committed to his candidate or cause," recalled Corey Busch, who was press secretary to the late Mayor Moscone.

DONALD L. BRADLEY
Democratic strategist

Mr. Bradley — a large man with a face creased like an unironed shirt and heavy jowls that testified to his delight in cooking and entertaining — built a reputation early on as an astute behind-the-scenes operator in the world of getting votes.

He first ran a campaign in 1948 when he was Napa County Democratic chairman and headed up the Democrats' push for Harry Truman there.

But his move into the mainstream of California political life — and the engineering of the Democratic takeover in Sacramento that endures to this day — came with the victorious senatorial campaign of Dr. Stephen P. Teale of West Point (Calaveras County) in 1953. Teale won by 75 votes, and he went on to become a powerful figure in the state Senate.

Mr. Bradley was joined in the Teale race and in subsequent campaigns by Pierre Salinger, who later became press secretary to President John F. Kennedy. Mr. Bradley went on to manage the capture of a number of mountain county seats, which gradually shifted the balance of power out of Republican hands.

As much as Mr. Bradley cared about politics, he also enjoyed the good life: travel and sports, good food and fine spirits.

For a while in the 1960s, Mr. Bradley had a part interest in a Bolinas bar named Smiley's. It proved so popular that an ice cream establishment across the street renamed itself Scowley's.

And once after losing a particularly close race, Bradley was heard to growl, "The people have spoken — the bums."

Mayor Feinstein, in Manila heading a trade delegation, said yesterday, "Very few people knew and understood politics and the electorate with the acumen, sensitivity and skill of Don Bradley. Don was a politician's politician with solid organization skills, vast and tested experience in a complex area and a tremendous network of contacts.

"Those fortunate enough to have known him found a leader they could respect, a wily and tough advisor and a man who cared deeply about the overall quality of our political life," the mayor said.

"My heartfelt condolences go out to his family and loved ones."

Mr. Bradley is survived by his sons, Vernon of San Francisco and David of Fairfax, and his daughter, Marsha Gifford of Corte Madera. His former wife, Florence, lives in Novato.

No services are planned.

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND; 1954 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

[Interview 1: May 11 1977]##

Early Political Experience

Fry: How far back would you like to begin? Did you tell me you were working for the Democrats when Oliver Carter was chairman?

Bradley: Yes. Actually I started in the Olson campaign, but I wasn't old enough to vote.

Fry: You were one of those young ones that cut his eye teeth then, right?

Bradley: The Marine Cooks and Stewards Union sent me to the Olson campaign to help. We had waterfront headquarters. We used to distribute the literature in San Francisco. I became known to everybody as "hey you"--I was really well known.

Fry: Where did you distribute the literature?

Bradley: We distributed it in the whole city. They never heard of mail in those days. They didn't have any money, and it was a combination of the longshoremen and other waterfront unions. Mail--they would stuff envelopes at the WPA sewing projects, which was illegal, I suppose. It was a combination of government people and unions.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 217.

Fry: How did you get a lead into the sewing projects?

Bradley: I didn't do that. Bill Malone did that. There had been patronage in a lot of those things. The directors and managers of WPA projects were patronage jobs. So Malone and his people had access to them.

The waterfront unions were very active in those days in politics, as were some of the others, and very effective, which they no longer are.

Fry: What did you do after Olson became governor?

Bradley: I went back to sea. I was a member of the Marine Cooks and I was working. I took a trip off--which was seven weeks, I think, from the Australian run--and worked seven or eight weeks on the campaign. They paid me $30 a week, something like that.

Fry: That was a real contribution to this campaign. They were doing that for all the--

Bradley: Everybody did it in those days. A good part of their staff was paid by the unions or detached from other duties and turned into political activities.

I got to know Jack Shelley then. He was the chairman of the Olson labor campaign. Later my first professional campaign was for Jack when he ran for Congress. That was in '49.

Fry: So you remained a sea cook. Is that what you were?

Bradley: During World War II. After the war I moved to Napa County where I became a county chairman of the Democratic party, I was the Truman chairman there in '48. It didn't mean much. Nobody else wanted to do it.

Fry: Nobody thought he would win.

Bradley: He didn't win in Napa County. It was a very Republican county in those days. It no longer is. But it was, I think, the second most Republican county in the state, only after Orange County.

Fry: How did you campaign for him in Napa County?

Bradley: In national elections you count votes wherever they occur within the state. So we just did the best we could. We had some pockets of Democratic registration. It was a lousy campaign. Everybody thought he was going to lose.

Once I got encouraged. I went to listen to Truman at Roseville. He was coming through on the train and I thought, "This guy's going to win." But I came to the state meeting of county chairmen, and they convinced me he wasn't going to win.

Fry: I always like to get descriptions of pre-television era campaigns.

Bradley: We distributed funny books. That was the first year for funny books. They were comic-type books of Truman's life and times.

Fry: Those have almost disappeared.

Bradley: Nobody uses them anymore.

Fry: They've also disappeared from the archives. People talk about them, but I haven't seen one.

Bradley: I came to a meeting and they had these comic books. They had a whole warehouse full of comic books, and nobody wanted them. I had a laundry and dry cleaning plant and another friend of mine had an ice concession, the franchise from Union Ice Company. So we came down and got two truckloads of the comic books and distributed them door to door in the working parts of Napa--Yountville where the veteran's home is. We took some of the ads. We raised a little money, but it was very hard to raise money.

Fry: Did you organize volunteers to do this?

Bradley: Oh, yes.

Fry: Did you also have to organize earlier in Olson's '38 campaign?

Bradley: Let me tell you that volunteers were no problem. That was a really interesting campaign to people. It was a real crusade at the time. Of course, he didn't do very well; he went way downhill fast, after he took office.

Fry: But he did well in the campaign?

Bradley: Yes, he did, and furthermore the legislative races were won

Bradley: all over the state. The party wasn't really prepared for that. They hadn't gotten good candidates. A pretty ragtag bunch of legislators arrived in Sacramento. Everybody that was on the ballot won. There were some pretty bad ones. They went ahead to make a very bad legislative session and didn't help Olson, who didn't help himself, so they fell into disrepute. That was '38, and by '42 they were in pretty bad shape.

Fry: Are you talking about the Democrats that joined the so-called economy bloc of Democrats and Republicans?

Bradley: That was part of what happened. There was a big battle between the Democrats in the legislature. Some of them were quite radical, and others were very conservative. Especially those who had been there longer were quite conservative. So they got into that battle of the spending and over Olson's attempt to control the legislature. They didn't like Ellis Patterson, the lieutenant governor, so they stripped him of all his powers. The lieutenant governors today don't have any great amount of power or as much as they used to. They used to have a lot more function.

Fry: Are we skipping anything that you did in the '42 campaign?

Bradley: I wasn't here during the '42 campaign. I was in the war that was going on while I was at sea.

Fry: How about the '40 presidential campaign?

Bradley: No, I wasn't involved in that either. It was no campaign at all, anyway. I think I did do some things for the union. The unions used to really keep their membership registered. In the seagoing unions, we didn't allow the people to ship out unless they voted absentee. We demanded that they come down with a slip showing they'd voted. I believe that was later declared unconstitutional, that method. But from time to time I worked on the political action for the union. But it was more internal than external.

Fry: How?

Bradley: In that we dealt with registering and seeing that our own members voted and that their families were registered.

Family Background

Fry: You must have started out when you weren't quite dry behind the ears.

Bradley: My sister and mother had both been politically active though. My sister was very active in the Young Democrats of Berkeley when that was a very conservative group, and they had the Young People's Socialist League and the Young Communist League active on the campus.

Fry: The Young Democrats counterbalanced that?

Bradley: Sort of. I don't think there were even any Republicans.

Fry: You mean the Young Democrats were the conservatives?

Bradley: More or less.

Fry: Was this your older sister?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Could you give me the names of your mother, father, and sister?

Bradley: My mother's name is Eunice Hiller Bradley. My father, who died in 1936, was Carl Elliot Bradley. My sister's name is Eunice Ruth Bradley.

Fry: Are you from an old-time California family?

Bradley: On my mother's side, yes. As a matter of fact, my great grandfather was a delegate to the first Democratic convention in California, but I don't remember the year. I saw his name on a list.

Fry: What was his name?

Bradley: I believe it was Roy Hiller.

Fry: I was going to say that name Hiller really does sound familiar.

Bradley: They're from Santa Barbara. He came out from Esconaba, Michigan right after the Gold Rush sometime and settled. He moved the whole family out on a ship to Santa Barbara.

Fry: What business was he in?

Bradley: He was a merchant. He was in every business in Santa Barbara almost. He founded businesses, got people to run them, and had extensive real estate holdings.

Fry: Is he at all connected to--there was another family that came out and wound up at Oxnard.

Bradley: No. He owned a good portion of Goleta at one time. That was later. What's the area just south of Santa Barbara?

Fry: Montecito?

Bradley: Montecito. He owned a ranch there, and he traded it for land up near Goleta. There were too many trees on the ranch--

Fry: Where the university is now?

Bradley: No, above that I believe.

Fry: So this was your mother's grandfather, I gather.

Bradley: My father wasn't ever active in politics.

Fry: What business was your father in?

Bradley: He was a civil engineer.

Fry: Here in San Francisco?

Bradley: He was really a construction engineer, and he followed the jobs around. He built breakwaters and dams and that sort of thing, essentially hard rock work. So he moved around a lot.

Fry: Were you born in San Francisco?

Bradley: San Rafael.

Fry: Where did you go to school.

Bradley: I went to school in Ross, and then I went to Berkeley High School. We moved a lot. We moved around--Fontana, Long Beach. Then my sister went to the University of California, Berkeley, and I finished junior high school and high school in Berkeley. I didn't really finish high school. That was the end of my education.

Fry: You were living with your sister?

Bradley: My sister and my mother in Berkeley.

Fry: Berkeley High School was quite a different place then. From what I gather it was an awfully good school.

Bradley: It was. It was a very big school. It was one of the biggest high schools in California. Do they have two there now, or they still have just one?

Fry: One, but it's divided into upper grades and lower grades, which makes two schools, I think. Did you like any courses there in particular? Did you get into high school politics?

Bradley: I was in high school politics some, but I used to audit courses at Cal. I was very interested in California history and enjoyed that very much. I also worked all the time, so I didn't have too much time for it.

Fry: Do you remember any of the professors?

Bradley: I remember a man named Gray who I think wrote the high school textbook on California history. He was very good, a very interesting man.

Fry: Did you audit while you were in high school?

Bradley: Yes. Sometimes I even cut classes to go up there. I was fascinated with it. It's very interesting anyway. It doesn't cover a very long span, so you can learn a lot about it. There are still people around who know a lot about the history of California.

Fry: I'm sorry that you couldn't be equipped with a tape recorder and go out and gather some of your own then. You could have annotated our efforts but not by much. Were you able to go on to the university, or did you go right into the cook's union?

Bradley: No, I went to sea. Then the war came along, and then I got married, and I just didn't go back.

Malone and Carter

Fry: All right, so we can start in with your explaining about who was running the Democrats when Oliver Carter was state chairman.

Bradley: Bill Malone was still very, very influential in the situation.

Fry: How did the two divide up their power base?

Bradley: Malone, I believe, still maintained his base, which was the San Francisco County committee. Carter was sort of a compromise that Malone and [Ed] Heller and [John] Shelley arrived at. Mrs. Heller also very strong for Carter. Carter did not run again for the state senate. He was a state senator from Redding. Carter took the chairmanship I believe with the understanding that he would get an appointment to the bench. Carter was only chairman two years I think.

Fry: Did Carter handle any patronage at all, or was that all Malone's?

Bradley: He handled it. He met with the people. I'm sure he and Malone conferred on it.

Fry: Was there any rivalry between Carter and Malone?

Bradley: Oh, no. They worked together. That was all part of the same--John McEnerney, who preceded Carter, was also very close with Malone. Then McEnerney was appointed by Truman to be the Mint director. That's when Carter took over the chairmanship.

Fry: Then there was some big hassle about judgeships. I think maybe Senator Sheridan Downey was a part of that too.

Bradley: The hassle wasn't over Carter. What was the Senator's name from Nevada? [Pat] McCarran. McCarran wanted a guy named Murphy put on the bench. Murphy had helped write the McCarran Immigration Act and other things. He was rank conservative, and he was objected to strongly. But McCarran was chairman of the judiciary committee, and he simply held up all the appointment of judgeships in this area until he got his man Murphy in.

Fry: Yes, I think that went on for a number of years.

Bradley: Yes, it did. It went on for quite a while. So once that log jam was broken, Murphy was named almost simultaneously with Carter to the bench.

1950 Election

Fry: I'm awfully eager to ask you about Sheridan Downey and why he decided not to run in '50.

Bradley: I really believe it was a personal decision of Sheridan Downey. He didn't want to face an acrimonious campaign with Heller, and I think he thought he would lose. I don't know that he would have. I think he wouldn't have.

Fry: Where were you in this?

Bradley: Jack Shelley had been elected in 1949 in a special election and he had to run again for Congress, so I ran his campaign. Shelley had been very active in the party, and I was pretty much involved in all of this. His campaign was pro forma really, but we had to run it. He was a very strong guy in a very strong Democratic district. We didn't have any problem.

But I was able to--I had to really--stay out of the battle between Manchester Boddy and Helen Douglas, as it developed. So afterwards, Shelley won both nominations in the primary. Then I went over to the Douglas campaign as Northern California manager, I think mainly to try and heal the breach between the Boddy people--Malone and all had backed Boddy--and the Douglas forces. It didn't work very well. Nobody wanted to settle it.

Fry: You have to spell out for me why you had to stay out of the breach between them.

Bradley: Simply because I was working for Shelley. I just wasn't involved in it, and he didn't want me to get involved in it particularly. Shelley backed Helen eventually. They were in the House of Representatives together at that time. I believe Shelley backed Helen, but I don't think he did much about it.

Fry: Was Shelley afraid of Malone?

Bradley: Yes. Malone had been his mentor and sponsor, but Shelley was much more liberal than Malone. As a matter of fact, I think there were only eleven or twelve congressmen that

Bradley: voted against a subversive control act, which became a big issue in the Douglas campaign, although Shelley never had any problem with his liberality in his district and also the way he handled it. He did very well with it.

Fry: He wasn't running against Richard Nixon?

Bradley: No.

Fry: So Shelley laid kind of low during the primary?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Did he come out for her then after the primary?

Bradley: He came out for her I believe in the primary too, but he didn't do much about it.

Fry: He didn't want you to do--

Bradley: He didn't want me to get involved in it, no.

Fry: What were you doing for Shelley? Were you in publicity?

Bradley: Our main task was to raise enough money to pay the deficit from the 1949 campaign.

Fry: You had a deficit?

Bradley: Yes, we had a big one.

Fry: I thought you said it was easy.

Bradley: It was, but they just overspent. There really were two campaigns conducted--one by labor. Shelley had been a labor leader. He was the president of the California Federation of Labor and prior to that had been secretary-treasurer of the San Francisco Labor Council. So they conducted a campaign and we conducted a campaign, and there were very poor financial controls, and we wound up with a big deficit that most people didn't know we had. So the major problem in the 1950 primary was to raise enough money to pay it off, which we did.

Fry: How did you do fund raising then?

Bradley: We did the same thing. Fund raising hasn't really changed very much over the years. The bulk of the money was raised by either heavy finance committee meetings or pledges. I think we had one dinner.

Fry: As I understand it, the Hellers were kind of the backbone--

Bradley: Of the financial part--money, yes.

Fry: But who else? There must have been others. Was this too early for Ben Swig?

Bradley: He was just coming into it at that time. Cyril Magnin was, and Harold Zellerbach. Shelley got on the Merchant Marine Committee, and the waterfront people, ship owners, and others supported him fairly heavily. But for the Democratic party itself--most of the money came from the wealthy Jewish community. Malone was a good fund raiser.

Fry: Was patronage the basis for his power?

Bradley: I always said that Malone's power was in convincing the people in Washington that he had a political machine here and convincing the people here that he had influence in Washington. Malone just dealt well with raising money. He kept people together and was able to get them to probably pledge more than they planned to. He was just very good at it.

Fry: As I understand it, he wouldn't give anything to Helen Douglas's campaign.

Bradley: Malone gave some money to it finally. He was very standoffish. There had been a lot of acrimony in the campaign. New people had come to the fore of Helen's campaign. They were much more liberal than Malone and his group, and there was a lot of resentment. But they did try and they did raise some money for her.

She did very little to encourage it herself--maybe, herself, she was all right, but she was surrounded by a group of people who really wanted to throw rocks at everybody. They didn't want to heal the breach. They thought they could win without it, I guess, if they cared that much about winning. I was very distressed with those people.

Fry: Who was that?

Bradley: I noticed one of the names here was Esther Murray and John--no, he was a national committee person I guess. Are those here?

Fry: Yes. There on the other side.

Bradley: John Anson Ford. I don't remember who all of them were, but I was the northern California campaign manager for I don't know how long. I finally got fired. But I never talked to Helen Douglas alone. These people surrounded her.

Fry: Why did you get fired?

Bradley: Because I served them with ultimatums. Is that the proper plural for ultimatum? [laughter]

Fry: I suppose. In other words, on this issue of trying to make friends with the--

Bradley: That was part of it, but the campaign management was horrible. It was run from Los Angeles. It was without consultation. We didn't know what ads were going to run, and hadn't met the payroll for quite a while. But they were spending money on things, so I tried to get some autonomy for the northern California campaign. This really is two states politically, north and south. The northerners couldn't operate properly until they had some responsibility and their own budgets. All this was never forthcoming.

Fry: The campaign was kind of being run from the south. What about scheduling Helen in northern California?

Bradley: Well, yes, there were problems. There were all kinds of communication problems. We didn't know when she was going to be here. We couldn't get agreements on time segments to be satisfied for scheduling. Virtually, the people in southern California were doing the scheduling by veto from down south. They weren't doing it positively. They were just saying, "No, we're not going to do that," or "We're not going to do this." It was a mess.

Fry: Who was running the campaign in the south?

Bradley: They brought a guy in from Seattle. His name isn't familiar. He was a nice enough guy, but he just got swallowed by the southern California intrigue. I very seldom saw him or talked to him. Harold [S.] Tipton.

Fry: He was called Tip. I ran across some notes in Helen Douglas's papers, which are on file at the University of Oklahoma, and it sounded like Tipton was backing out of the campaign along about September. But then I continued to see memos from him, so maybe he didn't really back out.

Bradley: I left in September sometime, but I continued to help because I had many good friends involved in the campaign. I continued

Bradley: to help them in San Francisco. Mrs. Heller was trying to be a bridge between the Boddy forces and the Douglas people, and she kept encouraging me to help. There was a man named Francis Carroll who I think was the San Francisco chairman who was very close to Helen, but who I was very friendly with. He's still around, Frank Carroll.

Bernie Witkin was also involved. He was the northern treasurer. He still lives in Berkeley. He's the authority on California law. No lawyer practices without Witkin's briefings of California law. He was the treasurer. As a matter of fact, Witkin encouraged me to make the ultimatums, but we had lost the fight. He was very much on that side. He's an interesting guy. You ought to talk to him. His wife at that time, who I think he's since divorced, is Elizabeth Witkin. Both of them were very active. She's still around too, I think, in Berkeley. I think she's remarried though.

Trott Defeats George Miller, Jr., for State Chair

Bradley: There were also other problems. Part of it comes up here in that Fred Trott defeated George Miller, Jr. for the party chairmanship. George Miller, Jr. had run for lieutenant governor with Roosevelt, but he did not go through the primary; he lost in the primary. Then he was encouraged really by both Jimmy and Helen to run for the chairmanship. Then Roosevelt and Douglas got together at the last minute and double-crossed him some way or another and elected Trott.

That was another part of my disaffection. I was very strong--George had headed a registration drive right after the primary and had done a very effective job. He was an excellent organizer, and inspirer-type organizer. He was sort of a pied piper, and I thought that was really a dirty trick. They got together in Sacramento after the delegates had left and had some sort of summit meeting in which they decided to go the other way after they had gotten him to get into the race.

He was a stubborn guy in a way, and he didn't do much for himself. He just let it go. He said, "Well, if that's the way they want it, to hell with it." Bert Coffey knows a lot about it. Anyway we became very fast friends, George Miller and I. He was a non-Malone or non-establishment guy. Of course, he took over in 1952 through the Kefauver delegation.

Fry: Ellie Heller's husband, Ed Heller, was a Malone person, right? And Ellie was trying to serve as a bridge here between them?

Bradley: Yes. Ellie was very close to Malone though. They never really separated over there. I think she was a more liberal influence in a way. She wasn't a smashing liberal leader.

Fry: Then I thought Trott was anti-Malone in this chairmanship, right?

Bradley: Yes, very much so.

Fry: So was Miller?

Bradley: So was Miller. Oh, no, wait a minute. Trott was supported by Malone, but then after Trott took office--Malone, Heller, and all took him on at the last minute; they didn't really know him very well--and he became quite independent. He got in arguments with Malone and the Hellers.

Fry: "They" being the Trott forces?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: At the last minute just before the election they took him on?

Bradley: Yes, I think he was running. Anyway, they decided to go with him. They were making the best of a bad situation. They no longer had control of the central committee, so they made an accommodation with Trott that didn't last very long. I knew him pretty well. He moved the office of the state committee down to wherever it was he was from--Visalia or some such place.

Fry: It didn't stay very long, did it? In '52 it was moved up here?

Bradley: Yes. There wasn't any great amount of goodwill over that either. We moved into the Balboa Building, which they're wrecking now--our headquarters which had been the Democratic headquarters for a long time. George Miller took over. Mrs. Heller, of course, had continued to be national committeewoman while Trott was chairman. They moved everything out--records, the whole works. It was really a bare cupboard when we took it over. The party had been defeated when we moved in--no, that's '52. The Kefauver delegation had prevailed, which Miller was a member of. That was the end of the Malone era at that point--'52.

Fry: For the benefit of historians, did those papers and the records down at Visalia stay at Visalia?

Bradley: I don't know what happened to them.

Revitalizing the Democratic Party

Fry: It sounds like in '52 you started from scratch.

Bradley: We absolutely started from scratch. We didn't get anything. I was standing in the office talking to George and there were two file cabinets and two typewriters but no desks or chairs or anything. I said, "Well, at least we've got two file cabinets." We tried to open the file cabinets and they were broken. They were old bad ones. Then somebody came to get the typewriters while we were standing there. [laughter]

So we decided to move out of there. The rent was high. Senator Gerald J. O'Gara, who's now a judge in San Francisco, got us some space from Bank of America for nothing, and we scrounged some furniture from the phone company and odd places and moved in with volunteer help. I was the executive secretary, which was a nice title without any commensurate pay. It went on that way for quite a while.

Then finally Roger Kent, who had been the chief counsel for the Defense Department, came home. We all knew him. He had kept in touch when he was running for Congress. He came home, and George talked him into being the finance chairman. We started to raise a little money, enough to keep a bare-bones operation going. But it was really a start from scratch.

Fry: Yes, I think Kent said that it was on a very low budget. Someone said you were having to live off your savings.

Bradley: I was. I think I went five months without being paid, or at least not paid in full. But it was fun, and we really did have a great time. People were very close, and there was a great sense of camaraderie about it.

Miller was excellent at that. He was great at getting people working hard. He didn't do all that much himself, but he was good at it. He had an excellent sense of priorities. He did know how to move, when to do something and what to do. He had a great sense for that, picking important things out and staying out of the unimportant ones. It was he that gave us the start to run the special elections that do this sort

Bradley: of thing that gives some real service to the other units of the party. He brought it very closely together.

Recently, they've been having all kinds of problems with the people in the valley not getting along with the central operation run from San Francisco. But because we gave them a great deal of service and saw them and went to their meetings and moved around and all that, they became very close with us.

It really was kind of a family operation for a while. Kent carried that out very well. He was very popular. We used to travel a lot. We'd go out and go to these meetings and we would get speakers for their events, and they felt very close to the state committee. We also had a good time when they came to meetings. We would go to parties at Roger's or some restaurant. It was fun.

Fry: I wondered how that strategy developed. Was that one of your earliest things, this business of putting a lot of work into special elections?

Bradley: The vacancies just happened to us. There were only nine Democratic senators at one time. We were down to nine Democrats out of forty! Miller told me when we started, "I'm lonesome up here. You've got to find some people and get them in here." [laughter] So really we started out to encourage people to run for office, and the special elections just came along at the right time. So we would bring all our forces to bear on what there was. There wasn't all that much.

Fry: Did you get Pierre Salinger?

Bradley: Pierre was a volunteer primarily for a long time. He used to take short leaves and work as a press man for the campaigns. He did a lot of moonlighting on the side. He also organized a bunch of other newsmen who did volunteer work for us. Mike Harris at the Chronicle was one of them.

Fry: Oh, yes, Mike was the one who told me that you and he went up to the mountain counties and really had a ball with the old-fashioned kind of campaign--knocked on doors and went person-to-person. Is that right?

Bradley: I don't know how far back you want to go with this. A guy named Harold McGrath, who lived in Santa Rosa, who was my predecessor with Carter and Malone as an executive secretary of the party--a very interesting guy--he and Miller didn't get along at all, so that's really why the change was made.

Brown, Kefauver, and Stevenson: Convention Maneuverings in 1952

Bradley: Miller and I got along so well that when he went with the Kefauver delegation--I had run the Brown delegation in 1952 in the primary and, of course, we lost to the Kefauvers very heavily. But George and I were great personal friends. When they went to the convention--I did not go--we sat down before they left for Chicago. He said, "Look, we're going to nominate somebody for the presidency. I don't know whether it's going to be Kefauver or not, but whoever it is, I want to hit the ground running with a good campaign here. We won't wait for approval; we'll just start one. So you line up a headquarters, and you get everything set. We'll just come back and start the campaign for the nominee, whoever that is. That should solve a lot of these problems." Which it did. So by the time they got back from the convention we already had literature, and we started the Stevenson-Sparkman clubs and doing all kinds of stuff. Pierre and I and Harold McGrath, who had held over, put all that together.

Fry: Before that, was the Pat Brown-headed delegation really kind of a Stevenson delegation?

Bradley: Well, it was. It became that. But starting out, of course, the delegation had been put together for Truman. Truman pulled out, and we had to re-form it overnight practically. It was a real rush effort. But they were much the same delegates. They were the traditional party people. Pat agreed to head it as a favorite son, and we got the signatures in a last minute whirlwind drive. Then we started to sponsor all the other people aside from Kefauver who were considered for the presidency--Harriman, I forget who all they were, Dick Russell. I don't remember doing anything about it.

Fry: He was in the wings I guess.

Bradley: But then Stevenson came out here. Mrs. Heller got him to come out, and everybody was really captivated. So the delegation did become very pro-Stevenson.

Fry: I thought there were some efforts made to get him to actually enter his name in the primary.

Bradley: There were.

Fry: Were you in on that?

Bradley: Yes, but it was short. Stevenson said no, he wasn't going to do that.

Fry: Why didn't he want to do that?

Bradley: I don't know. He held off until he was drafted. He never entered anything. He just didn't want to get into the primaries. He was a little aloof from the political process.

He'd been chosen to run for governor of Illinois on much the same basis. They needed somebody. The party was in disrepute, and they needed to elevate it a little bit. So they drafted Stevenson to run for governor. He won, and he really went into the presidency with almost the same modus operandi [brief tape interruption]

Fry: There's something that isn't quite clear to me about these two rival delegations in 1952. It seems to me that I heard that there was some problem about getting some of the Kefauver people in to work after Stevenson's nomination.

Bradley: Oh, yes, they would. But the Kefauver delegation--he put together the greatest group of malcontents and nonconformist people, who didn't normally work with other people anyway. They took who they could get. When Kefauver entered and started to put together his delegation Truman was in the field, and the loyalists were all for Truman. So he had picked up practically no one that had been in party activity. I'm sure Miller joined it just because he thought it was going to work. But he also knew that most of those people weren't competent to put together a good presidential effort. Miller wanted to heal the breach, but he wanted to maintain the leadership in his way of going. He did a very good job of that. Eventually he settled his problems with almost everybody including Malone.

Fry: Was Malone not behind the Kefauver slate?

Bradley: Oh, no.

Fry: He was the old tried and true one behind the Truman slate?

Bradley: Right. The Kefauver delegates were very bitter about not getting the nomination. They really thought they'd been terribly jobbed by the convention bringing in Stevenson--

Bradley: which I don't believe. I really think that at most conventions in the end the experienced politicians try to find somebody who will win. They didn't think Kefauver could win. They thought Stevenson would bring a new look to the party. And he did, but didn't win. So they went behind him and the Kefauver people thought they were jobbed.

Fry: I have one more question on the Kefauver slate. Was this connected with the '48 group of James Roosevelt and those who had tried to bring Eisenhower in as a candidate against Truman in '48?

Bradley: No.

Fry: One of my notes says that there were a lot of James Roosevelt people on the Kefauver slate.

Bradley: There might have been some. I don't think that there were too many. I'd have to go over the list. Roosevelt himself was for Truman and stayed on the slate.

Fry: I thought he came in afterwards. I thought he came into the Pat Brown slate afterwards.

Bradley: Well, maybe he did. I don't know. He was on the slate anyway. I know that.

Fry: Then Adlai won their hearts at the convention. What changed them?

Bradley: They didn't change the California delegation, let me tell you. They voted dead-end for Kefauver. They never went over. Somebody cast their vote for acclamation, but they weren't happy about that either. A lot of them never joined in the Stevenson campaign. They just stayed out.

Fry: That reminds me of the 1960 delegation that was vice versa where some of the delegates said they never changed their vote from Stevenson to Kennedy.

Bradley: Well, we couldn't in 1960. It was a Stevenson delegation. But there was still a lot of carry-over from that because a lot of them didn't want to buy Kefauver as a vice president either. As a matter of fact, Kennedy moved in and really had captivated a good part of our delegation.

Fry: But Adalai did not captivate them in '52 at the convention? A lot of people at the convention from the other states were

Fry: swept up in an excitement after Adlai's initial speech.

Bradley: Yes, but not the Kefauver delegates of our state. They just met and grumbled. They were no influence at all in the convention, but they would not switch.

Fry: There were some alternate spaces after the primary on the Kefauver delegation, I think, that were filled by some from the Brown delegation camp.

Bradley: Yes, they took some. Again, that was Miller trying to bring some of the people together.

Fry: Did you go on that delegation?

Bradley: No, I stayed here, as I said, and got ready to run the campaign.

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Bradley: Kefauver came out here to visit the National Guard who were in camp down in Monterey County. I arranged for him to speak at the Commonwealth Club and meet with some of the Democrats while he was here. I arranged that trip for him, and I was totally captivated.

Fry: Then you were what in the Stevenson campaign?

Bradley: I was the northern California campaign manager for both of them.

Fry: Can you remember what some of the problems were in that campaign?

Bradley: In '52?

Fry: Do you remember the Nixon fund problems?

Bradley: Of course, in presidential campaigns you don't do much about handling national problems from a state level. We just arranged the schedule and this sort of thing, but we didn't have great problems. We attracted a lot of volunteers, and we were getting a lot of help. We raised enough money to get by pretty well.

Miller and I thought Stevenson was going to win, which shows you how crazy you can get. We had a rally at the Cow Palace. They broke the fences down. There were tremendous crowds and all this, and we were translating enthusiasm into votes, which was a mistake. We'd been involved in the Truman campaign and other things. Our experience showed us that this kind of enthusiasm would lead to victory, but it didn't

Bradley: work that way.

Fry: Do you remember when the story of the Nixon fund broke? In southern California it was broken to the press. I'd like to get some firsthand information on who discovered that.

Bradley: I don't. I think I heard stories about it, but I wasn't privy to any part of it, nor were any of us that I know of.

Fry: It could have been disgruntled Republicans. That's one theory.

Bradley: Of course, again it was Nixon's own fault. Actually the fund wasn't such a terrible scandal. It was the way he conducted it that was so bad. Clair Engle, who was our United States Senator, didn't have enough money to do the same things that Nixon was doing, Christmas cards and extra travel. So the party did it for him. Engle helped the party raise money, and the party very legitimately paid for these things. Had Nixon done that and been in the open about it, it would have been fine. But it was a secret fund, and it was administered secretly, and it was done by special interest people involved in it themselves. That's what was wrong with it. Had he been the same kind of guy as Engle, it wouldn't have happened. We did that for years. We always helped our officeholders when they needed it, and it was perfectly legitimate.

Fry: What about efforts to get out the vote in the Stevenson campaign? Was there any big push?

Bradley: Yes, there was and a very successful one. We did very well with it in northern California. We didn't lose because we didn't turn the vote out, let me tell you. We lost because we didn't have enough supporters. However, that was a lesson that you should pre-canvass. If you don't find out who's for you and turn out just those who are for you, you make a terrible mistake.

Fry: In other words, you were getting out all of the Democrats or everybody?

Bradley: We were getting out all the Democrats, and we were helping Nixon along.

Fry: Because the Democrats were for Nixon?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: This was still back in the days when California wasn't really very partisan.

Bradley: No, it wasn't. California, although the registration maintains itself as being strongly Democratic, goes back and forth. I think we're pretty much aware of when the state's normally Democratic and normally Republican. It wasn't very Democratic at that time. We hadn't done well in our state elections either. Warren was the governor, and he was very popular then. Roosevelt didn't do anything to distinguish himself from the party as the nominee for governor. The Douglas-Boddy fight had just caused a bifurcation of the party. So we were in bad shape.

Fry: What were some issues that seemed to be difficult to handle in the Adali Stevenson campaign?

Bradley: I don't think we had issue problems with it. I don't recall them anyway.

Fry: Was there an anti-Communism factor that you had to worry about?

Bradley: Oh, there was a holdover of having Communist problems, yes, in the participation of the Democratic party of some of these people who were considered to be--they were often branded Communists. Nixon didn't help anything along. He kept his forces active branding people as Communists and ex-Communists and one thing and another. We did have a problem with that. Our own regular party people were very sensitive about the issue. The McCarthy era had gotten to them, and they were saying, "Oh, gee, you can't have this guy be a congressional chairman because he was too close to So-and So." That nonsense was going pretty strongly in '52.

Miller himself had been accused of being a Communist or being in a Communist meeting when he was running for the state senate. He proved he was in a church meeting. They tried to build a new Catholic church out where he lived. The time he was supposed to be at this meeting he was in the church. But he still had a very liberal label, which he deserved.

Special Elections, 1953

Fry: Was it '53 when you really started having this big push for the special elections?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: I ran across an interesting document--Pat Brown, the attorney general, had filed an opinion about whether or not the governor could delay or neglect to call a special election until the board of supervisors in that county voted for it. Did you have trouble getting the Republican governor to call special elections?

Bradley: Yes, we did. We did all sorts of things to put pressure on the governor to call special elections because it was often to their advantage not to. They weren't ready to go; they didn't have a candidate; they didn't want an election.

Fry: They had a better chance, I guess, during the regular election when you couldn't focus your artillery on a single target.

Bradley: That's right, when we couldn't concentrate our forces.

Fry: This way the small amount of money that the Democrats had, as I understand it, could be focused on just one campaign.

Bradley: In a special election all the resources, money and other things--we wrote statewide letters asking for $5 and $10, and we financed special elections with that too. We didn't get any really big money. The Democrats weren't too popular with the lobbyists, so most of the money came from this.

Stevenson had brought in all these people in '52. The CDC was really Miller's recognition of trying to keep those people in close. They were the ones who were coming up with the money. They were holding parties down south for special elections in the northern end of the state. People had fund raisers for them, and clubs would send money. It was really very impressive.

Fry: All of this was happening after the Adlai Stevenson defeat. So, although it may have been a defeat for Adlai, it really coalesced Democratic efforts.

Bradley: It certainly did. He did a lot for the party in terms of giving it a new look and bringing in new people. He would come out here occasionally. He helped us. He was very fond of Roger especially. He helped us with the fund raisers and giving inspiring speeches to a lot of the volunteers.

Brown helped. Brown wanted to run for governor, but he was very receptive. We used to book him into small counties. He was in all the special elections. I think he endorsed every one of them.

Fry: He went down to campaign?

Bradley: Oh, yes.

Fry: How did you handle those little weekly and local daily papers in special elections and get them behind you?

Bradley: We didn't always get them behind us, but we tried. The major thing in the small senate districts--and we had some very small ones, three little counties in most cases--was to get someone who was a good candidate who did have some other claim to the vote other than just being a local Democratic politician. So the candidates were able to command a good deal of the vote. It was simply a matter of telling them how to do things and getting their organizing done.

Fry: Before this, as I understand it, there would be one Republican run, carefully selected, and then maybe five or six Democrats would kill each other off by splitting the vote.

Bradley: Right. In the small counties we began immediately to use the central committees, because there were no clubs to speak of at that time. We would have the three central committees of the district meet and select a candidate. We got a lot of screams about it being bossism, among other things. But it was effective, and even though some others ran, we were able then to concentrate on one guy. We had the approval of the three county central committees in the district involved. We would then marshal all the forces we could and say this is the Democratic candidate recommended to you by your Democratic committees. They hadn't run partisan elections. Everybody tried to get as far away from the party as they could so they could get both nominations. We just changed all that.

Fry: That was pretty daring when crossfiling was still in existence.

Bradley: We got criticized roundly for it. Some of the papers didn't like it at all. When Steve Teale ran in 1953 we had a long and rather acrimonious convention. It was chaired by George Miller. There were eight candidates or something like that, a terrible amount. There still were six other Democrats who ran. We were able to concentrate enough on Steve to win, but he was a supervisor from Calaveras County and had a constituency. That's really where he won the election. We were able to help him, but he had a base.

Fry: Could you just give us a story or two about you and Salinger campaigning for Steve Teale?

Bradley: Salinger wasn't really involved in the Teale election. I think he may have helped us with a tabloid. But the first time Pierre really got deep into the special elections was in the Stanley Arnold election in Modoc, Lassen, and Plumas counties. That was sometime later, because I had already run one up there. I can't remember what year that was. Pierre moved up there with me and Van Dempsey. The three of us were there for quite a while. We didn't have the support of all the weeklies. As a matter of fact, I think we had very little. We did have the local paper in Lassen County. The Lassen Advocate was for our candidate, but the other papers mainly weren't. So we put out a tabloid which we were able to mail to box holders and rural route patrons. We put out two editions of it. We called them the Northern Mountain Messenger, and we got sued by a paper called the Mountain Messenger some place down in the mountains in Sierra County.

Fry: You didn't know?

Bradley: No. We thought we had invented the name. Maybe somebody just had it in the back of their head. Anyway, the effect of that was pretty good. People read more in rural areas than they do in cities--they don't get as much mail anyway. It was quite effective there.

Fry: Who was the editor of this tabloid?

Bradley: Pierre was, although all of us wrote it and had a lot of fun doing it.

Fry: You had to have many talents, didn't you?

Bradley: We did a lot of special mailings. We used the mail pretty extensively. There isn't much other way to go, because you don't have dailies. We did have a radio station in the Arnold campaign, but usually you don't have any radio station.

Fry: So what did you do? Prepare spots?

Bradley: For that one we did, yes.

Fry: Who was your spot announcer?

Bradley: We used the candidate. You have to use the candidate on spots in order to get the political rates. However, the station had a strong nighttime signal and a not so strong daytime signal, so we used different spots during the day.

Fry: Because you had a different audience?

Bradley: Yes. We appealed to their parochial interests during the day, and at night we would generalize the spots a little more.

Fry: It sounds like the people out there really had these three counties psyched out.

Bradley: Well, we did. We weren't getting much opposition either. We got some in that campaign. But we were able to marshal--there are small pockets of labor unions in the mountains, usually the mill workers and teamsters, very seldom anything else, no culinary workers or anything like that. The railroad people had their unions. We tried to have them vote absentee. With railroad men you never know where they're going to be at election time, so we would try to get a good-sized absentee vote in.

We did actual precinct work, which had never been done in those areas. You couldn't do it all because on the country roads the residences are too far spread, but in the little towns like Susanville we actually went door to door.

Fry: Did you have the organizational part of this?

Bradley: I'd handle it overall.

Fry: Sort of everything?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Did <u>everybody</u> do a little bit of everything?

Bradley: Pierre was a specialist. He would do the writing. But Van Dempsey, who was also on most of the campaigns, was an outside organizer. He was the one that slogged around and lined up people in small towns. He did it very well. He was excellent.

Fry: It sounds like it was a good education for you, too, although at that time you were getting pretty experienced, weren't you?

Bradley: Yes, I gathered some. But we were pioneering. It was all new techniques and new areas. It's always a challenge to go into a place from the outside and try to understand it. It's very important in the rural areas to understand what

Bradley: are the local issues and how people think about things. We didn't advertise our presence there in most cases because of the resentment for outsiders and machine politics and all this. We fairly successfully stayed out of the press usually.

Fry: You stayed in the background with the local workers in the foreground?

Bradley: Yes. You find it fairly easy to recruit people. They don't really have all that much to do. If you lay out simple tasks for them, it's pretty easy to get participation.

Fry: Are the mountain counties quite different from the valley rural counties?

Bradley: The valley has some fairly good-sized towns and cities in them, and they can be more like the larger cities. In the small mountain towns it's all word of mouth. Everybody knows everyone else. Actually they're pretty good about who they choose for office. They know their candidates pretty well in those small areas. Not so much in the valley. In the valley your campaigning was different. You did have big newspapers and you did have radio and TV stations. Candidate travel is very difficult in those mountain counties. They're small population-wise, but they're not small geographically. There were terrible schedules. Like in Modoc, Lassen and Plumas, the candidate would stay away from home for two or three days at a time on tour because the distances were so tough.

Fry: Yes, that's a big area. That's as big as some of the eastern states. For the record I guess we should mention that this effort of getting people in the senate really did pay off. A number of seats that the Democrats have now--

Bradley: Well, at the same time we were winning special elections we were also recruiting and helping candidates in general elections. We concentrated on districts we thought we could win, and we encouraged candidates and encouraged a pre-selection process of some kind. Before the CDC took that function over, it was all done by the central committee. We did manage to find and bring forward a lot of candidates for office. Whether the races were good or he had a good chance or not, we tried to field a good candidate because he would enhance the statewide vote or the congressional vote. We were quite successful with that. Of course, having won a few of these things, we were able to convince more people to run.

Fry: Roger Kent mentioned something about the difficulties when

Fry: somebody wanted to run in a county who obviously was going to be a loser because of the heavy Republican registration and you didn't want to put your money and your effort and time in on those people. Do you remember any of those?

Bradley: Yes, I remember a lot of them. We encouraged people to run. We did help them some though. Despite the fact that we weren't able to give them large sums of money, we held seminars and gave them techniques and told them how to raise money and consulted with them. We didn't ignore them.

Once in a while one of them would win, surprisingly. Tommy Rees in Los Angeles--who I encouraged to run simply on the basis that we needed somebody to be in the race for assembly--his opponent was convicted of bribery, I believe.

Fry: Was that something you brought up in the campaign?

Bradley: No, it just happened. The Republicans then panicked and ran a write-in candidate, and by their splitting the vote that badly Rees won by 77 votes I think. So occasionally you would get a surprise. He was an excellent candidate, and he held the district for a long time.

Fry: At that time that district had millions of people, right? It was the most populous district.

Richard Graves's Campaign for Governor

Bradley: Right. The Graves campaign in '54 helped a lot. Dick was very good about encouraging people to work. He really did a lot of good for the party too. He lost badly, but in helping the organization he was tremendous and very popular.

Fry: That brings up my question on how was Graves selected. Did Pat Brown want to run for governor?

Bradley: Pat fooled with the idea of running, and he didn't. He decided not to, at which point Miller--Miller really came up with Graves. We were looking for somebody to run. The field looked very unpromising. Laurance Cross wanted to run, the mayor of Berkeley. He was a pretty poor candidate.

Fry: He was not a good campaigner?

Bradley: He used to have a philisophical program on the radio called

Bradley: "Crosscuts from the Old Saw" or something of that kind. He was corny. [laughter] I don't know how he got to be mayor of Berkeley, to tell you the truth. He'd never survive today, I'll tell you.

Anyway, we didn't think he was capable of mounting the kind of effort that we thought ought to be made, even though we weren't in great hopes of winning that race. Miller knew Graves because he was the head of the League of California Cities, and he talked him into running.

Fry: So it was mainly just a holding operation for Brown?

Bradley: Pretty much. Well, I don't know if it was for Brown. It was a holding operation. We knew that the party was building and things were getting better. We certainly wanted the head of the ticket to be somebody who would continue to attract people and hold them, and Graves was very good at it. He was another pied piper.

Fry: So it was a build-the-party operation primarily?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Even though the candidate didn't win.

Bradley: We weren't able to find anyone with a big enough name to really do any good running in that race. Graves was not an established politician.

Fry: Pat Brown was the only Democrat in statewide office at that time, so I wonder why he didn't run?

Bradley: He didn't think he could beat Knight.

Fry: Because Knight by that time had labor support?

Bradley: Pretty much, yes. He made a real effort to get labor and he'd been pretty successful with it. The state wasn't Democratic yet. Of course, Pat made some deals on the side and got newspaper endorsements and other things. He ducked out on the Graves race. He went to Europe.

Fry: His newspaper endorsements were in '52?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: I didn't realize Pat went to Europe.

Bradley: Well, he did. He announced, as he was leaving, that he was going to vote for Dick Graves and left. But I think he promised along the line that he wouldn't get too active. I know he did. He told me he did. So while Pat had been active in building up the party, he didn't do much during the campaign.

Fry: So other than his endorsement--

Bradley: He didn't do anything. He didn't do anything to hurt us either though, so that's half a loaf.

End of Crossfiling

Fry: Maybe we better set the stage for this campaign. So much seemed to happen in 1953, the year before, when CDC was formed. A lot of things happened in the aftermath of Adlai Stevenson's campaign. So do you want to start in and tell your story of why the Asilomar meeting was called, whose idea it was, and how it was born?

Bradley: Miller, in his simple way of stating things, said, "We've got to do something to keep these people involved." He was talking about the Stevenson volunteers. He was very impressed by that campaign. He worked hard in the Stevenson campaign, he was in the headquarters a lot, and he could see this building up. He really had a good party sense.

So we were kicking it around, as we used to do occasionally with some of the close-in participants--Roger, Dave Friedenrich, and a guy named Eric Nielsen who was an activist--actually he was a lobbyist for the architects' association. It was his idea to go to Asilomar. He said, "Why don't we have a big conference, say down at Asilomar and we'll bring all these people together and see what they want to do." It was not a formulated idea. It wasn't, "We'll form this thing." It was to get them all together and just have a weekend and talk about what we were going to do to build up the party.

Bradley: So we thought that was an excellent idea. We got into it without really knowing what was going to happen down there. We called the conference. Miller was state chairman. We got ahold of every list that we could and every known club. There were some clubs, but there was no federation of them at all. We went over the Stevenson list and invited everybody there.

Liz Snyder, the southern chairman, was very suspicious of the operation and really felt that any effort to bring these people under the party would weaken the party. She was sincere, I'm sure. But the party structure was so weak. It didn't have any people in it. They were elected to county committees or small groups. The state convention was held with about a third of the people that go to it now. It was a very small group, and there wasn't room for many participants and she felt that this was a diluting of power to bring those people in. The Southern California Central Committee types were really opposed to it although they came. They all came to Asilomar, but they were not in favor of the formation of the CDC.

So there was great cooperation between the CDC and the northern section of the party, and there was none in the south, although the official party members as they formed the CDC were delegates and voted in the CDC. The south fought over it all the time. They had rival plans that didn't work, and they had rival fund raisings and things like that. There was a long fight with the CDC and the southern Democratic state committee. That continued for years. Carmen Warschaw was anti-CDC--although they'd go. They would participate. They'd go and vote.

We felt that the selection process of the preprimary endorsement was essential, and it was. We had crossfiling, and we had all these problems. It worked very well until we got an incumbent party. Then, of course, the endorsement was pro forma, or pretty much pro forma, and the real function of the CDC overall disappeared. They became more issues oriented as time went on too. In '54 they were a real force. They really turned out a lot of manpower. But after '58--they were in '58--they started to go downhill in terms of telling how many people they would turn out and how well they would organize in their own districts.

Anyhow, the state committee had no money, so at Asilomar we charged a $10 registration fee which went to the state committee. I recall that's the most money we ever had probably.

Bradley: We were amazed at the turnout. We just did not expect that many people. We overflowed the facilities of Asilomar and used hotels in Monterey and Carmel. It was a smashing success.

It was there that Alan Cranston really started to come to the fore of the thing. He had the ideas of the organization and then went to work forming clubs. They had a guy in Stockton who formalized the organization. He saw the need to go out and organize clubs so that they existed in most of the political subdivisions. The CDC was always weak in the working class districts and strong in the upper middle income areas because it was essentially an intellectual movement.

Fry: I read one paper on it that distinguished it as being primarily idealistically motivated.

Bradley: That was the weakness of it. When they were able to turn people out, it was very helpful in the statewide elections. But they would have a tremendous organization in Berkeley, and even then they wouldn't have anything down in the flats. It would all be up in the hills. Trying to get people to work other places was a difficulty. Labor participated in it fairly well, and then they dropped off. Trying to meld those forces was a difficult job.

Fry: It was difficult locally and statewide?

Bradley: Yes, it was.

Fry: If labor wasn't really involved in the CDC, did this mean that labor worked mainly with the Democratic county committees?

Bradley: In some places. It varied. The relationship between labor and the local committees was good in some places and terrible in others. In some places labor dominated it. Alameda County was dominated by labor, but they had strong labor leadership and fairly effective political action. In odd places like Eureka it was fairly strong. In Los Angeles it was essentially very weak.

Fry: Labor was strong in Eureka?

Bradley: Yes. It's a mill town and a railroad town. So it depended on their own political action, their own strength.

Fry: Did this make much difference in the north if labor was strong in the Democratic party or in CDC? It sounded like you had a pretty good integration of the two up in the north.

Bradley: We did. Labor, overall, participated in the CDC selection. They used to have labor caucuses down there [southern California] and the labor people would scramble for appointments. In other places it worked very well, like San Diego which had essentially a weak labor movement. But they worked very closely with the clubs and the central committee. It really was a melding of the three forces. So it had varying degrees of success.

But it was always leadership in the party structure. We had some pretty good leadership in San Diego for a while, and it disappeared. We worked continually on that. One of the things that the central committee tried to do was to bring about this working relationship and find good people to be chairman of the party.

Fry: You said that Cranston really started coming to the fore at the Asilomar meeting.

Bradley: Right. He'd been active in the Stevenson campaign, but he really arrived at Asilomar with a thought-out plan. He'd done some planning ahead of time. He and the people from Santa Clara County were strong Stevenson people and strong in the Democratic organization and had done some caucusing I presume or just brainstorming. Anyway, they seemed to have a plan that prevailed with variations.

Fry: Why was the emphasis given to a separate organization in the structure of Democratic clubs? Why wasn't this just done through the existing party framework?

Bradley: One, the party was prohibited by law from preprimary endorsement.

Fry: Was that the main motivation?

Bradley: Yes. At least that's what Miller and I thought it was. I don't know what other people's motivation was, but Miller was very strongly in favor of the abolition of crossfiling and, barring that, a preprimary endorsement, as being the only way to pull the Democrats together. This was easy for us to do in the special elections because in them there was no primary. Those were sudden-death elections. There was no question about the right of the party to endorse. The question was raised but there was no legal question to it. The ethical and moral question was raised often, especially when we started to win.

Fry: So that made it look like your endorsement and help was pointing the finger of God at the chosen candidate?

Bradley: That's right. We were criticized roundly for it in many cases. Then we were "bringing the outsiders in." We would bring Pat Brown in and have him speak.

Fry: That was "carpetbagging," I guess.

Bradley: Oh, we'd catch hell for it. But we knew it was good. Pat was popular, and people were willing to accept the Democratic leadership role from him, and he was willing to take it.

We ran other state senators in and all sorts of things which hadn't been done before. The senate had been terribly nonpartisan, and it got more and more partisan as time went on. Fred Farr ran in Monterey in a special election, and we got every Democratic senator to sign an ad for him. I'm sure most of them didn't know him, but they were able to do that anyway. So we got more control and more cooperation from our own legislators, who had been notoriously nonpartisan for a long time.

Fry: In 1954, concurrent with this, you have the ballot proposition to attempt to eliminate crossfiling, which lost.

Bradley: But the countermeasure, the one that was put on to confuse people carried. It was allowing party designation on the primary ballot.

Fry: That meant that a person had to run as a member of a particular party even though he could still run on both Democratic and Republican ballots.

Bradley: That's right. That was opposed by a lot of incumbents. They didn't like the idea at all. They liked the system the way it was.

Fry: Yes, they were already in as nonpartisans.

Bradley: Yes, they all have a certain amount of self-preservation. They were winning under the system, so they were for it. But we were able to build up enough organization in a number of their districts to where they would go along reluctantly with these positions of the party. We were able to get the Democratic caucus, which we also formed, to take a position in favor of these reforms. So finally when Brown got in we were able to get the bill through both houses of the legislature, although they were coming up to me and saying, "We're going to rue this day." A lot of the legislators really voted very reluctantly for it.

Fry: Including some of the senators you had put in the special elections?

Bradley: No, they were pretty good. They were the new ones. That was the liberals' line.

Fry: But it sounds like this might be the one point in history when this could have happened, and otherwise crossfiling could have gone on forever.

Bradley: I think it was. It's to Miller's credit. He recognized that. He and Richard Richards, who was a senator then from Los Angeles county and was a strong party guy. I believe there were a couple of other senators involved. We had to run that vote very early before there was a disillusionment or the honeymoon was over. We needed every bit of muscle we had to do it. He had to run it in a hurry.

Fry: While you were still approaching your peak in power? Is that what you mean?

Bradley: Yes. Both Miller and Richards had a bill for eliminating crossfiling. Richards, who was an infamous nonprogrammer at times, took this bill up before the Senate Elections Committee and lost it one morning. Miller was furious with him for doing it, because we had to get the bill out that day because the rules of the house carry a deadline to get it onto the floor in time to vote for it in that session. So the committee meeting adjourned until--no, I guess it was still in session. It all happened during the morning.

So Miller got his muscle going. He got enough votes to get the bill out, at which time he took it up. I remember the chairman, who was a Republican, asking him, "Isn't this the same bill we just heard?" He said, "No, it has several differences, like three more votes." [laughter] So we got the vote out. We got it out by one vote. We just really had to pound heads to get the votes to pass it on the floor. We had the governor's support too. This was when we finally eliminated crossfiling. It would have been the '59 session after the election.

Of course, the party designation on the ballot had a marked result. The result was that everybody got his party nomination almost without exception. I think without exception, where we filed a candidate, he would get through the primary. Then we would get into a general election, which we never did before.

Fry: My notes say that it was the first time that the Democrats had won a complete slate of candidates after a primary.

Bradley: That's right. Of course, George Miller was very interested. He'd been eliminated by crossfiling from the lieutenant governor's race. He lost both nominations, and he just didn't think it should happen. In 1948 Roger Kent had gotten the most votes of anybody in the district and still lost his nomination. He couldn't run.

Fry: He told us about that. That's a real heartbreaker.

Bradley: So they were both pretty dedicated to that.

Fry: Who first approached Graves and asked him to run?

Bradley: Miller approached him and then brought me into it because Miller had gotten Graves's permission that he would run. But we had to get Graves through the CDC, which was not easy.

Fry: Was he still a Republican?

Bradley: Yes. He changed his registration. What we didn't know is that he had changed his registration about five other times. Maybe it was six, but I know it was at least five. He didn't ever really offer any decent explanation why he'd done it. He went from Republican to independent to Democratic, and then he switched back to Republican to support Warren which was understandable. He and Warren were very close friends. But the rest of the switches--we had a terrible battle over that because the people who were for Laurance Cross in that area brought it up and circulated it all over. Nobody had ever heard of Graves, so we had to move him around the state very quickly. We'd go to club meetings, district meetings. We finally won overwhelmingly at CDC.

Fry: He came as the executive secretary of the League of California Cities?

Bradley: Right. That gave him a little help. There were people around who did know him, not a great number but lots of local officials--councilmen, sheriffs, and fire chiefs, many of whom were very strong, very supportive, and liked him very much. They would be involved some little way. At least we had some endorsement of him from those people.

Fry: How did the south take to his candidacy?

Bradley: It was tougher down there, but both contenders were northerners. I'd done a lot of moving around in the south. I was able to call people there and ask them at least to hold off their decision until they had a chance to hear him.

Fry: For the CDC convention meeting?

Bradley: At the prior local meetings. They all had their local meetings to elect delegates. We made a good part of that schedule, and we did recruit a few speakers for him, Glenn Anderson and some others who he knew and had confidence in him.

Fry: What about the Elizabeth Snyder group?

Bradley: Probably she was very active during the whole period. I think she was for us, as I recall. I think Miller convinced her; she liked George. Although they had philosophical differences, she liked George very much. He was quite a personality. So I think we were able to convince her. That was a hectic period. It was very close to the CDC convention time, and we really had to move quickly.

Fry: At the preprimary endorsing convention in February you had Laurance Cross running against Graves. Did Rex Nicholson or George Killion also run against him?

Bradley: No. They made noises about running, but they didn't. Miller finally put Killion on the spot. He said, "Either you're going to run, or you're going to have to get out of it, because you're really hurting us." I don't think Killion ever spoke to George again, but he did decide he wouldn't run. He had enjoyed several periods of being mentioned as a candidate. He loved it. He didn't really want to run. I think Rex considered it seriously for a while and then couldn't get the backing that he felt he needed.

Fry: What was Rex Nicholson at that point?

Bradley: He was just a business man. He had a tractor and implement company over in Richmond. He had been something of a fund raiser.

Fry: Was this campaign a northern-focus campaign?

Bradley: It certainly was northern-instituted, but we spent a great deal of time in the south. I moved down there. I always did in statewide campaigns. You have to run them from the south. There's too many people and too much of the activity takes place down there--and all the trouble. The north

Bradley: historically was more stable, I think, from the Democratic party standpoint than the south.

Fry: Less fission and fusion?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: The money was more in the south at that time?

Bradley: No, at that time I think we probably raised more money in the north. But that changed. Now, of course, about three-fourths of the money is raised in the south.

Fry: Beverly Hills.

Bradley: Beverly Hills and West Los Angeles.

Fry: I wonder why it wasn't then.

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Fry: You were telling me why you didn't have as much money coming from Beverly Hills in that period as you have now.

Bradley: I don't know that I know the answer. We just had not made the inroads into that community that we later did.

Fry: What was the role of John B. Elliott in the '54 campaign?

Bradley: None. John B. was getting old and getting out of it. I think he endorsed us, but I don't really remember.

Fry: When John Ford resigned from his post as national committeeman, somebody wanted John B. Elliott to take over and fill out the term. He declined. Was this because he was old?

Bradley: Old and crotchety and miserable. Micki Ziffren said he was turning blue [laughter], but he wouldn't die. He was a pretty conservative man, John B. Elliott. He was an oil man, and that affected his approach to things.

Fry: When Graves was running against Knight, I think Knight's campaign was run by Whitaker and Baxter. Is that right?

Bradley: I think that's right. They don't do partisan campaigns anymore. They stick with issue campaigns. But I believe they ran his campaign.

Fry: Do you have any comments to make on the kind of campaign they ran?

Bradley: It wasn't a bad campaign. We never gave them any trouble. They're competent people; they know what they're doing pretty well. We didn't make that much of a dent. I'm amazed we were able to put on as good a campaign as we did financially, because really it was altruism. Nobody in their right mind gave us money because they thought we were going to win, I don't think. Maybe some people did.

Fry: Do you think Graves thought he was going to win?

Bradley: No, I know he didn't. I think there were times when he was encouraged and thought he was making headway, which he was. But he knew. He was a realist.

U.S. Senate Race: Richard Richards and Clair Engle

Fry: Did you have anything to do with the endorsement of the U.S. Senate candidate at the preprimary endorsement convention? That was Yorty and Odegard and Richard Richards. Somebody got Odegard to step down. Do you know how that happened?

Bradley: Yes. Odegard really set the terms for it himself. He was down there campaigning for the nomination but really hadn't made up his mind whether to run or not. He talked to Ed Heller on the telephone and asked Ed to make a commitment to him to raise some amount of money--a considerable amount--and Ed wouldn't do it. Anyone who knew Ed as well as Odegard did should have known that Ed wouldn't do something like that. He wasn't a guy who'd say, "I'll guarantee you $100,000." Ed would always say, "I'll do what I can." It was just his way. He was not a boss type guy. He was a very mild man. He wouldn't agree to do that, so Odegard withdrew.

Fry: So it was just the money then?

Bradley: Really, yes. But Miller and I were told by the people who were for Yorty that if we didn't support Yorty they were going to move to withdraw the endorsement for Graves who was already endorsed by the convention. The next day they were going to endorse for the U.S. Senator. So the labor people down south were very tough about it. Miller told them to go to hell, and that was the end of that. They didn't do anything about it. But we sat it out, which in effect nominated Richards.

Fry: What do you mean you sat it out? You didn't vote?

Bradley: No. We had our own problems getting Graves through, so we tried to stay away from that. Our support crossed those lines.

Fry: Were there a number of Graves people at the convention who sat it out, or was it just the leaders?

Bradley: No, just the leaders. Just mechanically we didn't go to work on gaining support.

Fry: How did you line up Graves's support? I hear that there were quite a few working people working for him.

Bradley: Graves was a persuasive man, given the opportunity, and he got into the game in a hurry, But he learned fast. We met labor leaders individually and collectively and were just a whirlwind of activity, and he was able to convince these people that he was a creditable candidate.

We had a terrible fight in labor though on an endorsement. We didn't get the endorsement of the California Federation of Labor.

Fry: Yorty got a COPE endorsement from the AFL-CIO.

Bradley: Oh, Yorty got a COPE endorsement easily. He had been in Congress, and he had a very good labor record at that time. Yorty changed quite a bit many times; he ran the whole scope. When he was in the assembly he was a very liberal guy and was accused of being a communist. Then he went to Sacramento and he formed a little Dies committee, under Olson, investigating everybody for communist activity in the State Relief Administration.

Yorty pretty well stayed with that, but he was very pro-labor because that was the force in the Democratic party in his congressional district. He took over the congressional district Helen Douglas had had. Then Jimmy Roosevelt ran for office from it. None [of them] ever lived in the district. [laughter] John Ford had had that district too.

Fry: Later on in the general election campaign you had Knight, who also had taken over a certain section of labor support.

Bradley: Yes, he got the endorsement.

Fry: It's all hard to understand how a Democrat could run at all without labor support.

Bradley: Well, we got some labor support. We split that thing badly. We had a big labor committee who, incidentally, put up quite a bit of money for that campaign.

Fry: What union primarily was it, or was it individuals?

Bradley: I don't know. It was some unions. The machinist unions supported us statewide. They were very politically active. The steelworkers, who were not part of the labor endorsement, and the auto workers who were not part of the labor endorsement, were for Dick. We had George Hardy's hospital and public unions for it. Then after Graves got the nomination we were able to get a no endorsement position, as I recall, from labor.

Fry: From AFL-CIO?

Bradley: Yes. In the primaries was our problem. I think we got a no endorsement. I may be wrong on that. I know we had a tremendous fight over it.

Fry: I think that primary was run primarily between Graves and Knight, with crossfiling. Right?

Bradley: Right. There was a question whether we could make a primary. This was the first gubernatorial election after ballot designation.

Fry: Knight had a very bipartisan aura.

Bradley: Oh, and he tried hard to get the Democratic support. There were all sorts of ad hoc Democrats-for-Knight groups. They made mailings. They really put on quite a campaign in the primaries. I was in doubt myself about whether we were going to make it through the primary.

Fry: The Democratic primary?

Bradley: Right. It was on the ballot. Then it surprised us that we were able to bring through a full slate and that we were able to nominate in the district elections to it.

Fry: It's easy to lose sight of that as a major triumph in 1954.

Bradley: Right. Miller again predicted this very accurately, that this was going to bring all these nominees into the party. A lot of people doubted it. I must say that I was in doubt about it myself. He was sure it was going to work. When that ballot designation thing passed he said, "They've out-

Bradley: smarted themselves. They ruined themselves in trying to defeat the overall end of crossfiling." He was a very perceptive guy.

Fry: He must have been. How did he get so perceptive? I was postponing asking you that question until the end, but what was his experience that made him such an expert?

Bradley: I think it was mainly just that he was a bright guy. He entered the scene and beat an incumbent in Contra Costa County for office and had done some organizing himself. He just had a good ear. He knew what people were talking about and what would sell and what wouldn't. He's as good a politician as I ever ran into. He's a very practical guy, but he wasn't venal at all.

He also was a great persuader. He could persuade people to go against what they thought was their best interest in a lot of cases. Between he and Roger [Kent] we talked people into running for office--that was just amazing. Roger went up and talked a guy named Carl [L.] Christensen in Eureka into quitting a superior court judgeship to run for the senate. [laughter]

It was sort of fraudulent almost. We would get somebody mildly interested and then take them to Sacramento. Miller would escort them around and tell them what a great job it was and the help that they were going to get and everything and persuade them to run.

After Christensen won, he used to say to George, "Tell me again about all the benefits here." He was only making $500 a month or something like that. [laughter] But we did persuade an awful lot of very good people to run for office. There was a senator named [Joseph A.] Rattigan from Santa Rosa who we talked into running and encouraged to take part in party activities in order to get known so he could get a nomination, and a guy named [Virgil] O'Sullivan. These were the people that we really promoted into running for office. I sent Van Dempsey up to O'Sullivan's district at Colusa to find another candidate, because O'Sullivan wouldn't say whether he'd run or not. He got so mad he ran. We were very good friends though.

Fry: It sounds like you used a different technique on every one of them.

Bradley: We kept going over them saying, "What are we going to do? We have to have a candidate in this area. We have to find

Bradley: somebody." Van would go down and nose around and find somebody who had some prominence and was a Democrat. We would work on him and try to get him to run and offer him some assistance, because the process of a normal average citizen going out, deciding he wants an office, and putting it all together himself is a difficult thing for them to do. They don't know how, and they're not sure how they'll be received. That we could help them with. We could help them with getting other people in the party to support them, that sort of thing.

Fry: It obviously worked. Was Clair Engle beginning to get active at this point in the Graves campaign? What was he doing?

Bradley: Clair didn't really surface running, but he helped us in the Graves campaign. Clair was a party guy although he won both nominations all the time.

Fry: As congressman?

Bradley: He was a partisan congressman. He was the only congressman who would travel with Truman on the train. He got on the train when Truman came into California and introduced him as he went along. Then when they got to the next district, nobody showed up. It had a Democratic congressman, but he didn't show up. So Clair rode the train all the way through California with Truman introducing him, which Truman never forgot. Clair had a great relationship with Truman after that.

Fry: This was 1948?

Bradley: Clair was a brand new congressman at the time, but he had that kind of feeling about it. He was very helpful in some of the special elections because a lot of them were in his congressional district. He had all those mountain counties. He always helped. Without fail he would talk people that supported him into supporting our candidates and would show up for a fund raiser or something, and he'd really help. In some cases we put out a complete mailing signed by him, to help our candidates.

Fry: Speaking of mailings, Yorty, who after the primary was Senatorial candidate against Kuchel in '54, mailed 8 million campaign pamphlets at the taxpayers' expense. Then when this came up as an issue I guess he mailed more, explaining why the first batch was franked. How did you handle something like that?

Bradley: Most of us were not very enthusiastic about Yorty. The relationship between Yorty and Graves was strained all during the campaign. I did my best to keep it from coming out in the forefront.

Fry: Who was behind Yorty?

Bradley: Mostly Yorty, but he did fairly well with the more conservative elements of the party. He did pretty well in the Valley, I think. Southern California labor was strong for him.

Fry: Do you know of anybody in the party structure that was especially for Yorty?

Bradley: Yes, Liz Snyder was very strong for him. He got pro forma support from the party, but nobody was really enthusiastic about him. There were no serious breaks. Nobody went for Kuchel that was responsive to the party, that I know of. I remember I had trouble talking Graves into voting for Yorty, I was afraid that since Graves lived in Pleasant Hill or some very Republican precinct where nobody would vote for Yorty, that it would be identified that Graves didn't vote for Yorty.

Fry: Kuchel had so many Democrats supporting him.

Bradley: He did in the public, but as I say there was no serious break with the party.

Fry: That, too, was a victory, I guess.

Bradley: It was. Holding the line on it and holding your nose at the same time was a very difficult thing. [laughter] When we got together afterwards a hell of a lot of our people hadn't voted for Yorty. They kept the public facade of being for him, but they didn't vote for him. Roger hated him, couldn't stand him. It was understandable. He was a really abrasive guy.

Fry: It's funny Yorty stayed in power as long as he did.

Bradley: One of the things that was helpful a little bit to keeping the relationship going was that Yorty had a campaign manager named Walter Lefwitch down south, a statewide campaign manager. We all got along very well with Walter. Walter had been active in the CDC movement, and he was accessible so I could get hold of him and solve some of these problems as they started to break out. Yorty wouldn't participate in mail

Bradley: orders and things like that, and I could usually con Walter into doing it or talking Yorty into doing it.

Fry: So that was your link.

Bradley: It was just personal relationships. Walter was really very supportive of us. He really was a pretty good guy, and that helped a little. But left to his own devices, Sam would have blown the whole place up.

Fry: You had two other embarrassments. You had two congressional candidates running--Jimmy Roosevelt, who had just got a scandalous divorce--

Bradley: And Robert Condon who lost. Yes, they were problems. They weren't problems for Miller. He was four square in supporting Condon and Roosevelt. The national committee sort of rejected them as candidates. I forget who the national chairman was--somebody from Chicago, a Stevenson guy--Dave Mitchell. Miller blasted him publicly telling him "to keep his nose out of our trouble." [laughter] I remember that. Of course, Roosevelt won overwhelmingly, but Condon went down.

Fry: Condon's problem was that he maybe had been a member of the Communist party.

Bradley: What brought it to a head, was that he was barred from viewing a test of an atomic weapon or an atomic blast of some kind. The government had refused to give a congressman a security clearance. The was just unheard of. Condon either was a member of the [Communist] party--either had been or was very close with them. His partner, Truehaft was. They never proved Condon was a member, but he may have been. He was very much involved in the movement, as others were too. Bert Coffey was a member for a while.

Fry: When both of these issues came up, did you try to deal with them as issues or did you just state that you were behind these persons?

Bradley: We just tried to cool it as much as we could. I really think the national party made a mistake in lumping the two guys, Roosevelt and Condon, together and then trying to disassociate themselves from them, because the two cases didn't belong together. Roosevelt's divorce wasn't really a valid reason for not backing the Democratic nominee. The other one you could question whether the party was still trying to prove to McCarthyites that it was clean. No, I can understand the motivation. The other was a mistake.

Politics and the Press

Fry: You still weren't getting much press support in the newspapers.

Bradley: Oh, very little, none to speak of. The Sacramento Bee on occasion would go with us. One of the reasons that we dominated rural California was because of the Bee, because it was a normally Democratic paper. But when they did endorse a Republican it was very hurtful to us. I don't know if the newspapers in San Francisco have any influence or not. I would be hard put to prove they did or they didn't. But we knew the Bee did. So we made great efforts to keep them with us, by always informing them and trying to explain the process to them of where we were selecting candidates, and always making sure our candidates were strong on public power, which was the Bee's traditional interest. I used to send special releases to them from the little campaigns and always talked to their reporters and, when I could, to Walter [P.] Jones, who was the managing editor, to try and get his support. The party had just never done this sort of thing before. Miller used to talk to them and explain what we were doing. So they never took after us for being a "boss" or kicked up that hue and cry.

Fry: Was Pete Phillips helpful at all, the political writer for the Bee?

Bradley: I think so. I think Pete was sympathetic, but he'd never tell you. I used to talk to Pete all the time. I told him exactly what we were doing and that we were trying to dig up good candidates, and I asked him for suggestions. He never gave us any as I remember. But just explaining to him that we were trying to develop good candidates and take over the legislature helped. He thought that was all right.

Fry: I'm told that Pete always had lots of suggestions for Earl Warren.

Bradley: He had lots of suggestions for Pat Brown, too. So did Walter Jones.

Fry: When Brown was in office?

Bradley: Yes. I think Pete did have some suggestions, but he never had any candidates in mind. He never recommended any candidates.

Fry: I'm intrigued by which political reporters on these papers crossed the line from the role of a simple reporter of what was going on to the role of actually participating in trying

Fry: to influence what was going on.

Bradley: There was quite a bit of it. The L.A. Times was great for getting involved in these campaigns, giving phony publicity to candidates. Pierre Salinger used to go around with a copy of the L.A. Times when Kuchel was running. The first time, I think, that Kuchel had to run, after he was appointed by Warren, the Times had him in three sections of the paper. They had him on the front page, in the financial section, and a big interview with his wife in the social pages. The lead story on the front page was absolutely no story. He opened a headquarters or something. The lead said, "Thomas H. Kuchel (no matter how you pronounce it, vote for him) today got his campaign in high gear," some hoax story like that. It was on the front page. "Kuchel Campaign in High Gear." [laughter]

Earl "Squire" Behrens used to play a game with the Chronicle, and we caught him one time and got the management to reverse it. It's kind of an interesting story. We were running a guy named Dale Williams for senate from Modoc, Lassen, and Plumas counties. It was the first special [election] that I worked in. A copy boy on the Chronicle called me when I was home over the weekend. I had come down for Thanksgiving, and for over the weekend. He read me a story. Squire, who had also taken some time off, had written this story in advance. He used to have the power to mark where it went in the paper. So he had written, "Must go front page" in what they call the sheep herder--that's the edition that goes out to the mountains.

It was a horrible story about how Senator George Miller, Jr. and a guy named Porky Flynn, who was a lieutenant to lobbyist Arthur Samish, had gone up to Modoc County and chosen this guy personally, interviewed him and got him to run for the senate. It was a whole-cloth story. Miller didn't get along with Flynn or Samish particularly. They knew each other but, no, he wasn't one of his boys.

Then I found out that the Chronicle had ordered extra copies of these and were going to have a great number of them delivered up there. They were going to circulate them in this election. Squire wrote--it was a great poison-pen operation--he wrote, "Miller joined Flynn in denying these charges."

Bradley: So I called Scott Newhall, who was the new editor of the paper. We got him on Thanksgiving Day. There was a parade sponsored by the Chronicle every Thanksgiving. I think they still have it. We got Newhall to give us an interview. We told him that we knew the story. He was incensed. He was unhappy that we knew what the paper was going to do.

But he didn't know the rest of the story. So we convinced him that, one, it was untrue and, two, that it had been done for partisan reasons. And he agreed to pull the story out.

Squire got furious about it. He also threatened us and said he was going to put reporters on it and if he could prove that his story was true, he was going to run us out of the state. He did put reporters on the story. But it wasn't true, so he didn't have any chance to prove it. He used to play games like that.

Fry: Wasn't there a reporter on the Examiner too?

Bradley: Yes. He later quit and went to work for the Republican party and now runs campaigns. Jack McDowell--is that who you're trying for? No, there was another one on the Examiner. He was terrible. I don't recall the name. He was very partisan. When the Call was in business, they had a retired general as political editor who was terribly partisan. He's dead now.

They say the first sign of old age is that you can't remember.

Fry: I hope not. I've never been able to remember names. But I can look up this Examiner name if he's still alive.

Bradley: Yes, he's still around some place. I can picture him, but I can't remember his name. He was miserable though. Gee, he really gave us a lot of trouble. Jack something--no, it wasn't.

Graves's Campaign Funding; Later Career

Fry: Were you able to use any television? [tape interruption, telephone call.] I wanted to ask you about the Graves-Roybal labor committee, or the Roybal labor committee.

Bradley: It was Graves-Roybal. I don't think there was a separate Roybal committee.

Fry: Was that primarily made up of the people that you were referring to before?

Bradley: Yes. They were one of our big sources of financial support too. They worked very well by us.

Fry: They were the fund-raiser types?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Did Graves have trouble getting money from any of the traditional Democratic sources?

Bradley: Yes, he had some because a lot of people felt he had no chance to win, plus they didn't give any money. On the other hand, he made pretty good inroads and made very good friends with a lot of the people. We got enough money to get by with a very poor campaign actually.

Fry: Was this the Hellers and people like that?

Bradley: They were very good about it, yes. The southern California financial community didn't do as well by Graves, which is understandable. He wasn't theirs, and he didn't really have any chance to win.

Fry: Next time, do you want to start with the Stevenson campaign?

Bradley: All right.

Fry: Do you have anything else that you want to add about Graves?

Bradley: Not really. He continued to be active after he lost, and later he supported Brown vigorously. He was very good. He's still down south. He's pretty old now, I think. I don't know how old he would be.

Fry: He was still very active when we interviewed him, maybe not politically, but he's started a new business.

Bradley: Yes, he was making some money for a change. I was involved with him right after the Brown campaign. I was in business with him for a little while.

Fry: What was he doing then?

Bradley: He was developing office buildings. I didn't like it very well, but I like him very well. He's a great guy.

II 1956 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

[Interview 3: June 3 1977]

Paul Ziffren and Elizabeth Snyder

Fry: We left you last time with the '54 campaign. Did you start gearing up then immediately for one of the delegates for the '56 presidential?

Bradley: The '56 presidential wasn't a contested delegation.

Fry: Was there any problem in getting Adlai Stevenson to file in California?

Bradley: No, not that I recall. Maybe there was. I don't remember it anyway.

Fry: Here's the national Democratic convention pamphlet that was given to everybody.

Bradley: Yes, I know. I wrote this.

Fry: I notice your name as the person to come to if anybody has a question.

Bradley: Right. I remember I wrote this letter for Pat, and he read the letter and said, "That's very nice. Do you write?" [laughter] The only problem we had is that everyone wanted to be on the delegation.

Fry: The telegram that was sent to Adlai Stevenson?

Bradley: Yes. This was sent with the idea of creating the draft-Stevenson movement. He was willing to do it, as I recall.

Fry: There were some Kefauver people, weren't there?

Bradley: There wasn't a Kefauver delegation in '56, was there? Oh, yes, there was. There was a Kefauver delegation. At least Kefauver was out here, I remember, campaigning.

Fry: The Stevenson delegation won out. That was the year--didn't you have some kind of meeting after Stevenson won the primary, around June 23 in Monterey, in which there were some difficulties getting Kefauver people to willingly come into the Stevenson delegation and take up the extra slots.

Bradley: Yes, I remember that. We did do that. There was a Kefauver delegation because I remember Stevenson had lost in Minnesota and then won in California. We had a really tough primary campaign here, but Stevenson won pretty handily as I recall. Stevenson spent a lot of time here.

Fry: In this June 25 [1956] story sent out over Associated Press it says, "Edmund G. Brown held firm control today of California's delegation pledged to Adali Stevenson." It sounded like the underlying struggle there was between the Democratic state chairman Elizabeth Snyder--

Bradley: Here is Stevenson's margin of 450,000 over Kefauver in the unofficial returns. This was right after the primary.

Fry: Do you remember the Snyder and Ziffren battle?

Bradley: I guess Snyder had been for Kefauver. I didn't remember that. I know they were very opposed to Paul Ziffren becoming national committeeman. There was a Snyder-Ziffren feud of long standing.

Fry: Do you know what the basis of that feud was?

Bradley: Yes. It really had to do with Ziffren's having been for Stevenson the first time around, in '52. Paul came from Chicago and had worked in [Jacob M.] Arvey's firm and was strong for Stevenson. Jake Arvey really did put together the draft-Stevenson movement in '52. Despite the fact that he and Stevenson were not on the best of terms, Arvey felt that the party needed something other than what was being offered and that they should bring Stevenson into it. Paul had gone along with that. Mrs. Snyder did not.

Fry: There were a lot of complaints about Ziffren being close to a machine politician like Jake Arvey.

Bradley: Yes, that's right.

Fry: How close was Ziffren to Arvey out here in the actual operations?

Bradley: I don't think very close. I don't think that they maintained a strong relationship after Paul came out here. But Paul got credit for it, and his detractors used it. Arvey was a machine name, and Paul's detractors hit him pretty hard. But Paul had been very strong in the Helen Douglas campaign--not exactly an Arvey type of operation. As a matter of fact, Paul mortgaged his house to put up his money for something for her. He was very close to Helen, and still is, as far as I know.

Fry: What about on the other side, Elizabeth Snyder and her connections to the William Bonelli scandal on the liquor license.

Bradley: That was very obvious. Her husband had been involved with Bonelli, and she put up with quite a struggle in the party. Bonelli changed his registration to Democratic during the controversy over Bonelli's activities. Then he got some kind of a fund together and gave Democratic candidates money. The fight over that within the party was pretty tough. I think we went over that during our session on '54. Graves had objected to the Bonelli presence and got into an argument with Mrs. Snyder, and this went on. Actually Ziffren, rather than being a machine politician, was more of a liberal and recognized the clubs and more people than Mrs. Snyder. So there was a liberal-conservative split there, with Paul being on the liberal side.

Fry: In her functioning as the Democratic state chairman, how did she do? How would you evaluate her?

Bradley: When she was chairman? I know she fought the formation of CDC. She was always waging a battle against the liberal elements and was very close to the incumbents. As you recall--we went over that--there were very few incumbents, and they were very strongly entrenched in heavily Democratic districts. Labor was a big factor in the party and with these legislators. She was quite close to labor. It created a big split in southern California which we didn't have as much of here. Where does she come in here? She was woman's chairman and she became--when did she become chairman here?

Fry: Fifty-four to fifty-six.

Bradley: Of course, it always was two states. The state committee never really operated on a statewide basis, and Snyder was almost never up here except for meetings. She and Roger Kent didn't get along too well. Roger was also one of the

Bradley: liberals in her book.

Democratic National Convention: Bradley's Role

Fry: What was your specific role in the convention?

Bradley: I was the executive secretary of the delegation. We made all the arrangements for the delegation and provided the transportation. I think Fred Dutton was the actual secretary of the delegation, but I was in charge of polling the delegation and all that sort of thing. I was present at all the caucuses and arranged for them.

Fry: You'll know what problems there were on the civil rights resolution.

Bradley: I was also involved in the selection of the delegates.

Fry: How was that done?

Bradley: We had caucuses in the districts that made recommendations from which the delegation was chosen.

Fry: Something from Liz Snyder's papers said that the California congressional delegation was proposing a three-man committee to select delegates, and then in place of that she and others--maybe you--were proposing a much wider committee for selection of delegates.

Bradley: Which won out. There was a fairly wide committee that selected delegates, although congressmen were represented and we did make an agreement to clear the appointees with the congressmen in terms that weren't totally objectionable to them. I don't know that it was a binding agreement, but we did talk to them about each district.

Fry: Then you had caucuses in each district, and you had a certain number of slots that you could fill after the caucuses?

Bradley: Yes, we had a large number of slots.

Fry: Which ones did you have them reserve until after the primary, to fill with Kefauver people?

Bradley: I don't know that we reserved them actually, but there were

Bradley: quite a few alternate delegates. I don't think we left any delegates out, because to comply with the law you had to have the proper amount of delegates from each district. But we did have resignations afterwards, and we encouraged a few in order to make room for people to come on board so that it would be a more universal delegation. And we got some of those. So we met again afterwards and filled vacancies. I think that's what you were referring to about slots so Kefauver people could come on board.

Fry: What else did you want in your delegation? Did you foresee this struggle on the civil rights resolution?

Bradley: I don't think so. I think that was a natural outgrowth of the fact that we had--of course, California had fought the civil rights battle in '48.

Fry: Yes, every year. There's an August 16 Associated Press story that sums it up. There was a civil rights plank in the national platform that was at issue. There was one very liberal version of it. Then there was a version that was more of a compromise that they hoped would not alienate the southerners.

Bradley: Yes. Our delegation backed the more liberal version, as I recall.

Fry: Well, Richard Richards had a lot to say about the liberal version at the time. Do you remember his impressions?

Bradley: Yes. We did have an internal fight over that. I remember Holifield and Moss and the congressmen. We also had something of an argument over who was going to be vice president. The delegation was overwhelmingly for Kefauver, although Kennedy had come and met with the delegation and had quite a few supporters. At the time of the vote it was impossible to poll the delegation, due to the fact that Pat Brown hadn't enforced the seating arrangement in the delegation. We couldn't get a quick poll on the floor. So when Pat cast the vote he didn't really know how many votes were for Kennedy. We discussed it for a few minutes on the floor, and he decided he would cast some votes for Kennedy. He upped it a little bit and he went on national TV and said, "California's delegation casts seventeen and a half votes for John F. Kennedy." Then he said to me, "How many does that leave? [laughter]

Fry: Pat talks about that in his interview too.

Bradley: We had seated the people according to rows, and they had row captains. That's the normal way to poll a delegation.

Bradley: But Pat was very gregarious and he liked to be surrounded by his friends, so his friends were all around him in a circle, and the row system went to hell! Fred Dutton and I were trying to enforce it, but Pat wouldn't back us up in it. So we just couldn't poll.

Stevenson had said that he wanted hands off on the selection of the vice president and turned it over to the convention as a whole. But actually Stevenson didn't like Kefauver very well. It's understandable. They had been in several contests. But the thinking was that Stevenson really had to have Kefauver rather than Kennedy. If Stevenson wanted to have any chance to win, he had to do something about the South. Kennedy was certainly no sop to the South. So at the last minute the Stevenson floor managers started to work for Kefauver to make sure that he got the nomination for vice president.

Actually there is still a discussion as to whether or not Kennedy didn't go over the top in the polling. It was the first time they had the electronic vote-counting. The electronic counter was off, and then in Stevenson's trailer in the back they were keeping track manually of the vote with machines they had, I think, four different machines counting the vote, all of which agreed that Kennedy had gone over the top. But the votes were switching at that time because the Stevenson people were out on the floor getting Kefauver support and the vote was never announced. Normally when it goes over, the switches aren't allowed.

Fry: But nobody knew it had gone over.

Bradley: No, at least they didn't know that on the floor. I think it did go over. So did Hy Raskin who was really in charge of that operation for Stevenson. Hy Raskin and a man named Finnigan from Philadelphia were in charge. They were both real pros, and I really think they were right about it.

Fry: What did they try to do? Did they try to correct the count?

Bradley: No, no, they wanted the nomination to go to Kefauver, so they were out pushing for Kefauver votes. So they wouldn't say anything about it.

Fry: So if Kennedy had been vice presidential candidate then and had gone down with Adlai--

Bradley: It might have changed a lot of history. That's an interesting speculation.

Fry: Before that vote there were some newspaper articles about a secret poll in the California delegation for the vice presidency. If you were the pollster I thought maybe you knew about the secret poll. I don't quite inderstand why it was secret.

Bradley: Because there was no official caucus to take a vote. It was just a check. It was not all that secret. I think I took it, as a matter of fact.

Fry: You mean you had to go around individually to each person--?

Bradley: Yes, rather than bringing it up as an official matter of business with the California delegation. We were trying to maintain our position as being supportive of Stevenson. Stevenson hadn't yet indicated a choice, and we thought that he had the right to make his choice, which is still recognized in conventions.

We had a group of people headed by Glenn Anderson, as I recall, within the delegation who wanted Kefauver. They wanted us to go on record for Kefauver. So we had some battles within the delegation, but we never took a vote.

Fry: So this was just trying to know what the delegation was feeling without coming out publicly and officially for anybody before Stevenson did?

Bradley: Right. I recall that as a sidelight of this convention it was very difficult to get floor credentials. Chicago in its typical style had opened up the galleries at the stockyards and issued tickets, but the tickets were no good because the policemen sold all the seats out. Credentials were very hard to get. So Dick Tuck was there, and he manufactured some.

Fry: Is that the convention where he made the phony--?

Bradley: Yes, he made the badges. They were so much in demand that there was a picture on Life of Jim Finnigan, who was the national chairman of the Stevenson campaign, on the floor with one of Dick's manufactured credentials.

Fry: Were they easily recognizable?

Bradley: No, they were a very good job, [laughter] a very good job.

Fry: On that civil rights plank the stronger amendment was known as the Lehman amendment, according to my notes, and that was

Fry: backed by Snyder, Richard Richards, and James Roosevelt. The so-called majority version was backed by Holifield, Moss, and Ziffren.

Bradley: Mrs. Snyder did back the stronger version?

Fry: That's what I have down here.

Bradley: That's interesting because Holifield was in favor of the weaker version, and she was close to Holifield. I'm sort of amazed at that, but I don't remember that.

Fry: Elizabeth Snyder's position, as it's described in this paragraph of the AP story, sounds a little ambiguous; she had changed positions.

Bradley: I don't remember that. I think she was on the platform committee.

Adlai Stevenson's Primary Campaign in California

Fry: What was Dutton doing in this?

Bradley: Dutton had been the southern California manager of the Stevenson '56 campaign. He was a big manager of it. At that time he was working with the Southern California Gas Company; he was on leave to do that. I was northern California campaign manager. He was secretary of the delegation, as I recall.

Fry: Were there any other polls that you took that you want to talk about?

Bradley: Not that I remember. I remember we were busy trying to stop the rump group of the delegation from meeting to endorse Kefauver. We had a hospitality room, and every time they scheduled a meeting in the morning before the convention started we'd keep the hospitality room open late the night before, and nobody showed up at their meetings. [laughter]

Fry: That sounds like a very simple way to scuttle the whole thing.

I guess we can move on then to the campaign in California.

Bradley: The primary campaign was the interesting one. Of course, we won that pretty handsomely. In the general election there were only two states in the United States, as I recall, in

Bradley: which Stevenson bettered his run of '52. One was California, and the other was Missouri. So he did have an excellent campaign here. All the work that we'd done in including people from both sides paid off in the campaign, so we didn't run into any major opposition to Stevenson's candicacy in the Democratic party in '56. I think we ran a very good campaign. We didn't make it, of course.

Fry: You said the primary was the really interesting campaign.

Bradley: We had a real tough fight, or we thought we did, with Kefauver. Actually that wasn't a very close vote. Just before the California primary, Adali had lost Minnesota to Kefauver. California was the next major primary. There was a primary in Oregon and one here. Stevenson won both of those, which really sewed up the nomination for him. But he campaigned in this state very hard in the primary, which I think resulted in his getting a better vote in the general election. A lot of people knew him, and he'd been all over the state. He started handshaking, which he disliked. He really didn't care much for that type of campaigning, but he did it and the results were pretty good.

Fry: What were you doing in the primary?

Bradley: I was running the campaign in northern California.

Fry: So you went around with Stevenson when he came here. What did you think about his campaigning then?

Bradley: As I say, he had this great reluctance to do the pressing of the flesh bit. He disliked it. He really felt that you should be able to write major speeches and make major pronouncements and run a campaign that way. But he took it all fairly well.

He was a little grumpy about how hard he worked. I remember the day after the election he called me. Bill Blair put him on the phone. He said, "Well, I must say you were able to expend more of my energy than anybody was ever able to do before." [laughter] So that's his thank you.

So I said, "I can show you, Governor, in the results where you campaigned the way you did."

He said, "You mean there are places I <u>didn't</u> campaign? [interruption in tape]

Fry: You did get Stevenson just about all over the state?

Bradley: Oh, yes. The result was that when we went into the general election we got great support. He had gotten to know people, and he was very popular with them.

Fry: How did the crowds respond to him in northern California?

Bradley: Very well, very well, even in the rural areas, which we were afraid of. We thought Kefauver had more appeal there, but actually Adlai did very well.

Fry: With the Kefauver group taking some of the Democratic money, did this present problems in the primary?

Bradley: I don't think the Kefauver group did to a great extent. Kefauver had his own appeal, and he found people. They didn't have much money, and I think we outspent them quite a bit. I don't think he cut into the regular sources very well. But Kefauver served a purpose for Stevenson that pushed the conservative Democrats into the Stevenson camp where those Democrats might not have been if they'd had a different choice. They didn't go much for Kefauver, so most of those people came along with us too.

Fry: I notice that there was a big fund raiser at Kentfield at Roger Kent's place on Memorial Day at $10 a head. Did that make much money?

Bradley: Oh, no; I don't know. Yes, they made some money. That was a traditional Kent event, to have people over there. He had a tremendous following, so they would load his place up. I imagine we made some money out of it. You don't make much from $10 events.

Fry: Did the Democrats ever have the $100 dinners?

Bradley: We used to have $100 dinners. We had a $100 dinner for Stevenson, and I recall we had a buffet. In the run-off in the general election we had a very successful buffet dinner before Stevenson made a speech at the Cow Palace. It was in the closing days of that campaign.

General Election Strategies

Fry: In the general election, as you look back on it now, you had Eisenhower coming into the state and giving some pretty hard-hitting partisan speeches. Some authors that we've read say it was rather uncharacteristic of Eisenhower, and Nixon came in and did his thing, too.

Bradley: It was. Evidently his strategists scared Eisenhower into the more partisan position. I guess they were worried. I don't know why. Looking back over it, it doesn't seem to me they should have been.

Fry: Did you feel that this campaign was particularly any rougher than other campaigns?

Bradley: Well, I never felt we had much of a chance in the campaign. We'd kind of get worked up occasionally when Stevenson was here and we'd get a big crowd response, but we'd been through that in '52 and it didn't result in any great amount of votes. We were quite confused in '52 because we thought the response we were getting was indicative of voter support. It was, but not to the point where we had anything close to a majority. But we didn't lose the state by a lot in the '56 Stevenson campaign. It was fairly close, as I recall. At least it was better than it had been in '52.

Fry: Did you work in the senatorial campaign that was also going on? That was Richard Richards.

Bradley: No. We were cooperative. Richards was a strong Stevenson supporter and all that, so we got along very well. But I didn't have any part in it.

Fry: Did he run a loner campaign essentially?

Bradley: No. He tried to wrap himself as closely with Stevenson as he could.

Fry: There were also the things that sort of came in from outer space, like the Suez crisis that hit a couple of weeks before the end of the campaign. How did you handle that?

Bradley: I don't remember that it had any great effect. The thing I remember most was the speech Stevenson made here about banning nuclear testing. That caused a big ruckus. There was a big debate, which I was privy to, in his suite over at the Claremont Hotel. Even the day before the speech at

Bradley: the Cow Palace it was still undecided that he was going to do it. Several of the national leaders were here at the time. I remember Albert Gore encouraging him to do it. We had a sort of a circus the day of that event--I guess it was the day before--where we used governors and senators, and we covered the whole state with small airplanes.

Fry: Sort of campaigning?

Bradley: Yes, a sort of a fly-off operation. Stevenson was in Berkeley when that was going on. Stevenson then participated in that the next day, and then they all met at the Cow Palace. So there was a discussion over that speech.

Fry: Stevenson wanted to give it, and who else?

Bradley: No, Stevenson was indecisive about it at first and then decided to give it. I don't remember entirely who was part of it, but he was being encouraged to do it by Schlesinger who was there.

Fry: Arthur Jr.?

Bradley: Yes. I think he wrote it. I can't remember whether he or one of the other writers had written it. The speech was in existence but the debate was over whether to give it or not. I think John Bartlow Martin wrote it, but they'd all been over it. Stevenson rewrote everything anyway, so it didn't make any difference who wrote it. It's only a departure point with him.

Fry: He really did write his own speeches?

Bradley: Oh, yes, and he was a compulsive rewriter whether it was needed or not. John Bartlow Martin, who'd written for him for years, was a supremely good writer. He was just excellent. He'd rewrite it before he read the speech. He'd start in with a pencil and rewrite the whole script. He spent most of his time doing it.

Fry: This supposedly put him in a position to be the object of a red smear by Richard Nixon in the campaign.

Bradley: To what?

Fry: His advocacy of the nuclear test ban treaty put him in a position to be smeared by Nixon and others?

Bradley: Oh, yes. They knew that at the time. They knew what would happen, that this would be somehow un-American. We were worried about the issue, and we had a statewide broadcast later with some prominent scientists explaining what fallout did. People didn't really know that much about it--what strontium 90 was and that sort of thing. So we did battle with the issue. There was definitely a down side to it as well as an up side.

Fry: It sounds fairly technical.

Bradley: It was. One of the things we were trying to do was to explain to people this very complicated issue, which later became very well known. I think the public was on the side of banning it later, but at that time I think it probably was a downer.

Fry: What about the way your campaign team worked together on this? Did you have any problems?

Bradley: No, we didn't. I don't remember that we had many problems at all. As campaigns go, I think it was excellent that way. That's my general recollection of it. We were able to raise enough money to conduct a pretty decent campaign.

Fry: What about getting out the vote? Did the CDC do that?

Bradley: In this one campaign they did help a lot in getting out the vote. That's when CDC really sort of proved their merit, was in '56. They would work, and they worked hard. Then '58 was kind of their biggest effort.

Fry: This was the 212 Sutter Street office operation?

Bardley: I don't think we ran the campaign from there. No, as a matter of fact, we had a Market Streeet headquarters someplace.

Fry: Could you tell me who the main persons were around you?

Bradley: Of course, Roger Kent and Libby [Smith Gatov] were both working hard on it. Engle was campaign chairman, and he worked at it. He was in the primary, and he was in the general. The staff was pretty much the staff of the central committee with some additions. Pierre Salinger worked in it. We had developed a pretty good team of county leaders, and we were getting very good results from it.

Fry: What were they doing? Ringing doorbells?

Bradley: Yes, they established headquarters in every place, and we worked the get-out-the-vote drive through them. I remember we were besieged for materials, and they were really doing quite a job.

Fry: It was the grassroots approach. Did you have much television?

Bradley: Some of it national. They placed most of the television nationally, but we supported the shows. They had a lot of half-hour stuff, and we supported those with ads to build up the audience. We replaced some of their television and radio, as I recall. We would augment the national program.

Fry: How did you keep up with what the Eisenhower-Nixon side was doing?

Bradley: That's never a problem in a presidential campaign. You always know what they're doing. You sort of watch it like everybody else. The local units usually have very little control over the national campaign. In this case, however, because we'd been through that primary, and also the same people had been essentially involved in '52, we were well acquainted with the management of the Stevenson campaign nationally. So I think our communications were probably better than anybody's. Hy Raskin, who was the national deputy campaign manager, had spent a lot of time here. We were very friendly with him. I knew all the staffers very well. So I think we had maybe more input into it than normal campaigns, and that's probably why we were more satisfied with what they were doing.

Fry: You felt you had more autonomy with the decision-making process?

Bradley: Well, yes. They had confidence in us and let us go ahead with it pretty much. We were helpful to them. We produced materials here that we distributed around the West Coast to the other Stevenson units. They used us for a lot of things. They used us for pilot programs. For instance, that fly-off I was telling you about was a national idea that we executed here.

Fry: Then it was used in other states too?

Bradley: They were going to. I don't know whether they did or not. I don't think they did. It's a very complicated thing.

Fry: Was some of your printed material used?

Bradley: Yes, but they were mainly reprints that we did of their material. They were having distribution problems, which is always a problem of national campaigns, getting enough material fast enough. We started to do it here. I think some of it was ours too. We had buttons and bumper strips and banners here and sent them to Oregon and Idaho and places like that. We just placed the orders for them so we had sort of a subdistribution point for their material. Then I used to get calls all the time from Finnigan and Raskin and others asking what we thought of ideas. I would bounce them off Roger and Libby and other people--get a little consensus. So we had regular input.

Right after the convention I went down to New Mexico and put on a southwestern conference for Stevenson and then worked on another one here and then went to work on the state campaign. Then we did our scheduling in conjunction with people in Oregon and other things so that we really had a very good campaign that way.

Raskin spent a lot of time here in San Francisco using our headquarters. I think the western states was his area of responsibility. So he spent most of the time here.

Democratic Clubs: New Party Strength

Fry: Did you get any new blood that came into this campaign?

Bradley: Lots of it. Lots of it. Of course, we got quite a bit in '52, but there was a lot more that came in '56. The clubs got a lot more membership through it too. Anyhow, I think it's no question that Stevenson was a great general uplifting factor in the Democratic party. People tend to forget how Truman left it. He left it in very bad shape with the public sort of down on the Democratic party. Adlai was a general uplifter and a tremendous recruiter of people who later got into the state campaigns.

Fry: How did you see him? As somebody who could elicit great faith and devotion on the part of his followers as opposed to the rather ho-hum candidates of the past ten years?

Bradley: He certainly did. He engendered a tremendous amount of loyalty and support. He was a real pied piper. The people that found him really got the message, and they were tremendously faithful. They'd come anyplace to a meeting at any time. We were always assured of a base attendance at a rally or

Bradley: anything else. You'd see people in chauffeur-driven cars coming to a street rally. That's the kind of spirit he engendered in them.

Fry: Does that imply too that you were able to fund-raise among some of the more well-to-do people?

Bardley: Oh, sure, we certainly were. We put an ad in the Wall Street Journal asking for money. Really that was a product of Jim Keene and I spending a late night--we thought it was kind of funny to put an ad in there, that it might irritate some people. [laughter] It got a tremendous result. Usually newspaper ads asking for money don't pay off. But this one did. It made quite a bit of money. So we were hitting high income people. Of course, Stevenson did the best in the upper-middle areas in terms of organization and in terms of votes to a certain extent; he'd done better than any Democrat had done in a long time. But he also didn't get through to the blue-collar majority voters too well. That's why we lost it.

Fry: In spite of the symbol of the hole in his shoe.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: That was 1952. Was that reused in 1956?

Bradley: Yes. They sold those little pins to make money. They made a lot of money with them.

Fry: Yes, I think you had to donate $10 at least to have a hole-in-the-shoe pin. There was Dollars for Democrats organized somewhere along in the summer and fall. Do you remember that?

Bradley: There were two things. There was Dollars for Democrats which really started here and was statewide. But at some point Liz Snyder initiated something else called Dime-a-day for Democracy. There was a fight over that. I remember when that was. We raised money for Stevenson with $5 script books. We put the books out and that was very successful. They got a little receipt and we had a lot of collectors out doing it, raising money for Stevenson at $5 apiece.

Fry: What would the person get who donated the $5?

Bradley: He got a piece of paper saying that he was a member or contributor to the Stevenson campaign.

Proposition 4: Regulation of Oil Production

Fry: There were some propositions on the ballot. There was one for oil regulation, Proposition 4.

Bradley: Oh, yes, I remember that.

Fry: Proposition 10 was state work for private architects. There was a water plan.

Bradley: There was a water plan on the ballot in '56?

Fry: That's what my notes say. [Proposition 15. Public Water Supplies: Mutual Water Companies]

Bradley: I doubt it.

Fry: At any rate, how did that oil-regulation proposition--

Bradley: Well. it just created a general flap that maybe turned out some people. It was a very expensive campaign. As I recall, it had to do with limiting the amount of oil that could be extracted from the pooled area. The oil companies were opposed to it. They won didn't they? I can't remember who won. I'm sure it did.* The unitization of oil fields.

Fry: I think even the oil industry was split on that.

Bradley: Some were. Some independents felt they would get frozen out or that they were frozen out by the big ones. So there was a small oil, big oil split.

Fry: What side did the Democrats take?

Bradley: I think we were for the unitization generally speaking, although there was a lot of money kicking around from that campaign.

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*Proposition 4 in the 1956 general election was defeated 1,208,752 to 3,950,532.

Bradley: The legislative candidates on either side could get money if they were included on literature on one side or another of this controversy. And they would get help with their mailing, their tabloids or whatever they were doing. So it entered into it that way. Superior Oil was one of the independents that did that kind of thing.

Fry: Were you able to use this, or did you choose to take sides in your literature sent out for Stevenson?

Bradley: No, we didn't do it.

Fry: Did you try to stay away from it?

Bradley: Yes, I think so. As I recall, we did. You very seldom tie the presidential candidate up with local issues anyway.

Fry: There was a researcher in our office yesterday who was hunting for examples of very sensational advertising for or against propositions.

Bradley: That was one of the campaigns where they had a pig wallowing in oil. That was Harry Lerner's contribution. It was so atrocious the billboard company finally decided they wouldn't take it, or some of them did.

Fry: What do you mean it was atrocious?

Bradley: It had very little to do with the issue. It was just a blatant example of proposition advertising where you simply try to scare people with the advertising. It had nothing to do with the subject matter.

Fry: Which side was Lerner hired by?

Bradley: He was against it, I think. That was a cartoon about the big oil companies. He also had a big fish swallowing the little fish in a pond.

Fry: Yes, it sounds like the small independent oil companies' point of view.

Bradley: Yes, I'm sure that's who he was working for. The most blatant one I remember was on the crossfiling. We discussed crossfiling before. Artie Samish was still around kicking, and he put out billboards against crossfiling. The message on it--they had an American family standing in front of a house surrounded by a picket fence. There's a big X through the

Bradley: whole family. It said, "Don't let this happen here; vote no" on whatever the proposition was. A beautiful scene. The X wiped out the American family. I saw Samish. He said, "Did you see that?"

I said, "Yeah."

"What do you think of it?"

I said, "What does it mean?"

He said, "That's the idea." [laughter]

Fry: Can you think of any other examples? You can never document billboards; they can vanish instantly and historians never know what's been used.

Bradley: Samish was a master of that misleading-billboard thing. He did that all the time. They were always sponsored by something called the Happy Land Committeewhich was he, his bookkeeper, and the chambermaid at the Senator Hotel and things like this. I don't remember other specific things.

Fry: There was another document up here that I wanted to ask you about that looks like it was a set of instructions for the campaign and page one is missing.

Bradley: We had Kennedy come out and speak for Stevenson. I remember this.

Fry: Yes, you had a big Kennedy dinner and I guess that must have been one of your fund-raiser things.

Bradley: That was one of the outgrowths of the '56 convention, that Mrs. Heller and others became enamored of Kennedy and they got his promise at the convention to come out and campaign for Stevenson and do this dinner. It wasn't long after the convention. So we came back from there and started to put that together.

Fry: Bill Malone was chairman of the dinner committee. Was Bill Malone anything at this time? I thought his star had kind of been eclipsed.

Bradley: It had a little, although he was still an excellent fund raiser. Then, of course, Bill Malone epitomized the more conservative forces, and we were trying to pull everything together for Stevenson.

Fry: What was it like the night that Stevenson lost?

Bradley: Pretty sad. That's when George Miller, Jr. came up with "The people have spoken, the bastards." [laughter] It's been attributed to me, but that's not really true.

Preliminaries to 1958 Campaign

Fry: How did this campaign then contribute to the Democratic sweep in '58?

Bradley: Simply by creating better organization, more people. It's really what gave the weight to the CDC. Their performance in '54 and '56 was good. It was better in '56 than it had been in '54 for a kind of nondescript Democratic slate. They really came through in '56. The '58 convention was tremendously well attended and there were a lot more clubs and that sort of thing--the CDC convention in '58 when they endorsed for governor and senator.

Fry: Was Jess Unruh active at all in this '56 campaign?

Bradley: Yes, he was active in it.

Fry: What did he do?

Bradley: I don't remember what he had a position in. I know he was involved pretty deeply in it. If you're going to see Dutton, he knows more about southern California than I do. He's in Washington. I see you're going back there.

Fry: Yes, I hope that he'll have time to see me. There were some things in the Roger Kent papers.

Bradley: I wish I had been a saver like Roger. He saves up things.

Fry: I wish you had been, too. At any rate, we have talked about some of the smears and innuendos in the campaign--

Bradley: In the '56 campaign?

Fry: Yes.

Bradley: I don't remember it as being a particularly rough campaign that way. Outside of rumors of Stevenson's homosexuality I don't recall much.

Fry: What did those emerge from?

Bradley: I don't know. It wasn't that organized. It was just talk because he was unmarried.

Fry: If you want to we can start with the early organization of that '58 campaign. There was some consideration I think early for Pat Brown to run for the Senate.

Bradley: I think some people were urging him to do that, but no one was challenging the incumbent Senator at that time, and I don't think the prospects looked very good. If Knowland had stayed where he was and had not pushed Knight out of running for re-election for governor, the Democrats probably wouldn't have elected either governor or Senator in '58. The switch around--from the day that happened our polling showed that the people did not buy that move at all. Brown was known, Engle wasn't, but both of them were leading from the minute that happened. As a matter of fact, it was very unsure that Brown was going to run, and Engle had predicated his candidacy on Brown running for governor, so it could have fallen through at any time. They weren't that solid about running. A lot of preparatory work was put into both campaigns, mostly Engle's, so we worked hard to get Engle into some kind of shape to run for the Senate.

Fry: Were you primarily in the Engle campaign?

Bradley: I was in the Engle campaign exclusively but we worked closely together with the Brown campaign. Dutton was the campaign manager for Brown and I was for Engle. Of course, Engle had told Kent that he wouldn't run unless I would run his campaign. It was a very complimentary thing; there wasn't any question about that, because Roger was very interested in Engle's candidacy. He really wanted him to run.

Fry: In view of the fact that we don't know quite how long we're going to record today, it might be better at this point for me to just run through some pick-up questions to polish off this pre-'58 period, since '58 is kind of a turning point; and then we can go into '58 next session and you can talk about it with some continuity.

To go back to 1950, I wondered what you were aware of in the Helen Gahagan Douglas campaign and Nixon's strategies and techniques against her, and if you could comment any on the value of his red scare tactics.

Bradley: I think it was devastating. I think he really scared the people away from voting for Helen. But part of it had been started by Manchester Boddy in the primary, in all fairness, and Nixon just picked it up. The pink-lady thing that they talk about so much was really started in the Boddy campaign.

Fry: Who was his advisor in that?

Bradley: Boddy? I don't know. But Helen in the meantime had cast some votes--they had a subversive control bill up in congress and I think only fourteen voted against it or something. Nixon's comparing her to Marcantonio was widely circulated in that campaign. I think that came out of the Manchester Boddy thing too, although I'm not sure of that point.

Fry: So it was really the Democrats again--

Bradley: Well, we're always able to provide better ammunition when we fight each other because we know each other better, we know where the soft underbelly is.

Fry: So you point it out to your enemy for the general election.

The Korean War also started in the middle of that campaign. I wonder how you feel about that affecting her defeat.

Bradley: I think it had something to do with it. Roosevelt had polled rather well right following the primary, which he had won handily. Then the Korean War came along and that started a drop right away in his polls, and Helen's did too. I think it had an effect. The rallying around patriotism and one thing and another tended to accentuate their charges that she wasn't patriotic enough. I think it had an effect.

Fry: Another pick-up question relates to the lack of funds that the Democrats always had and what oil sources the Democrats might have had for funds besides Pauley. That seemed to be a good pool of money--

Bradley: I don't remember that we had any other sources. Pauley was the Democratic oil man. He also was an independent and there was some differentiation between majors and independents. We never had major oil support in California that I recall. Occasionally you'll see a contribution listed where Standard Oil Company bought two tickets to something, or five, but we never got major money from the oil companies.

Fry: Yes, you do see some contributions from various oil companies

Fry: listed in the official expense and contribution report that's turned into the secretary of state.

Bradley: But that was generally the result of somebody like George Miller, Jr., who had three refineries in his district asking for some support and getting a minimal amount. But we never got major oil companies. Superior Oil Company, an independent, occasionally contributed to Democratic campaigns. They were kind of a switch-over thing.

Fry: Were they also contributing to the Republican campaigns?

Bradley: I don't know. I think not. I think they occasionally went Democratic.

Fry: Superior--that was Keck's wasn't it?

Bradley: Yes, Bill Keck. He was a Republican, but he occasionally backed Democrats. I think when he did it, he did it all the way. I don't think he went both sides simultaneously. But I may be wrong. I don't know.

Fry: I'd talk to him, but he's dead.

Bradley: He's dead, yes. He was a major influence here in the legislature though. The Kecks put money into a lot of legislative campaigns.

Fry: In California?

Bradley: In California, yes. For some Democrats too. They were always protecting the asphalt as opposed to the concrete highways and things like that. They were vitally interested in state government.

Fry: So most of their money went into lobbying do you think?

Bradley: That was the net effect. Even though it went into campaigns, it was still lobbying.

Fry: I have a question on 1952 when there was again the Kefauver vs. Stevenson delegation battle, although I think the Stevenson delegation was called the Pat Brown delegation.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: We talked about that. But I wondered if you knew who talked Pat Brown into risking his reputation by leading a delegation against the Kefauver delegation, because it occurred to me

Fry: that the outcome just didn't look that certain at that time at all.

Bradley: Well, Pat made the decision very rapidly after the drop-out of Truman. I guess all of us had a hand in encouraging him to do it. We were very wrong in terms that we said we didn't prove any strength that way. But especially the people that didn't like Kefauver particularly were pushing for a favorite son delegation to be formed. Some of them were already pro-Stevenson. Stevenson came out and made a visit and we picked up some support, Mrs. Heller for instance. They were anxious that Kefauver not run off with California's delegation. I don't know that Pat was all that reluctant. I think he thought he could win.

Fry: Of course, now as we look back on it, the defeat didn't seem to hurt Pat Brown very much, unless there was a temporary setback--was there?

Bradley: I don't think so. I think that the media generally understood the difficulty for a favorite son candidate to win against the oppostion of a live candidate. It's always been that way. I guess maybe it always will be.

Fry: Someone, and I can't give my sources here because I didn't write it down at the time, felt that it was probably Salinger who talked Pat Brown into running as a favorite son so Kefauver wouldn't take over the Truman delegation.

Bradley: That's not true. Pierre hardly knew Pat. I brought him into that primary campaign.

Fry: He was kind of your sidekick.

Bradley: Yes, we'd worked together. We were involved in the ADA and other things together. Pierre was quite young then, considerably younger than I. I think he met Pat but he had no influence over him.

Legislative Representation: Crossfiling and Redistricting

Fry: My other question is on the congressional patterns of support in congressional races in California through this period of the fifties. There was not as much success in getting Democrats into congressional seats as there was in other offices.

Bradley: No, but the congressional delegation had been more Democratic than the legislative delegations. We held more congressional seats. We weren't in that bad shape.

Fry: Yes, to begin with. But as the end of crossfiling drew nearer, designation of party on the ballot first came in, and you had your individual concentrated campaigns to fill seats in the legislature that came up for special elections; you got a lot of Democrats in the legislature that way. There was a big increase in Democrats in the legislature, but not that big in Congress and still not as big as the overall registration would indicate.

Bradley: We didn't have any special elections for Congress that I recall. We began picking up a few congressional seats, but not too much. There wasn't any big shift in that delegation. But I think that the congressional delegation had to maintain itself more Democratic than the legislative all the way through. Truman won in California, for instance, in '48, and made it possible for them to either save or maybe pick up a couple of seats. I don't remember exactly. But they also weren't as deeply involved. The congressmen were still running away from the party until ballot designation showed that it was important.

Fry: What about the redistricting which occurred in '50 and then was about to occur again in '60?

Bradley: I wasn't really part of that redistricting thing. Of course, it's done by the legislature and we had just a handful of legislators. I presume the Republicans didn't do us very much good with that redistricting.

Fry: Yes, there's been a lot written on that in the '50s, that it wiped out a lot of Democrats.

Bradley: I remember a little bit about it but not a lot. I remember it was so bad that a congressional committee came out here and held hearings and they got the Republicans to admit that they did the redistricting by partisan registration, which wasn't any great revelation. I think everybody knew that. But the congressmen obviously were stunned that the Republican redistricting gave us so little advantage. But the assembly districts were small enough and the small senate seats that redistricting didn't have any effect until it got to the redistricting brought about by the one-man, one-vote decision; then it had a big effect.

With Gina and George Moscone, ca. 1977

With Roger Kent and Pierre Salinger, ca. 1958

Campaigning in 1960 with John Kennedy

With Pat and Bernice Brown, 1958

III CAMPAIGN MANAGER'S VIEW OF CLAIR ENGLE'S 1958 SENATE RACE

[Interview 3: May 2 1978]##

A Review: Party Frictions in 1956

Fry: To start with, just to add something to 1956, I didn't ask you about Harry Truman, who was scheduled to speak both in Los Angeles and San Francisco. He cancelled, and there was some talk that this was because of a Pauley problem. Do you remember anything about that?

Bradley: Yes, but I think he cancelled because of health. I really don't think Pauley was the problem. It was Truman's health which was failing pretty badly then. He came out again--

Fry: Truman's was?

Bradley: Yes, he went up and down and I think he wasn't up to it.

Fry: Why do people think it was Pauley?

Bradley: I don't know; rumors were flying, I guess. I don't know. That's my recollection anyway, because I knew the people that worked for the Truman library and they usually booked him and everything. I don't think there was a Pauley problem that would cause him not to come; he didn't do things like that.

Fry: The other thing that we didn't pick up anything on was that Yorty battle when he was in the primary against Dick Richards. Were you at all familiar with that?

Bradley: Oh, when Senator Kuchel had a short term. He was appointed and then he ran for two years, and then he ran again. I remember the second round, when Yorty went to the CDC and castigated them for being stacked and whatever.

Fry: Yes, he wanted to withdraw his candidacy from a vote at CDC. I was wondering why Yorty and Richards were both running in the primary, why someone couldn't talk one or the other out of it.

Bradley: Of course, Yorty wasn't acceptable to the CDC after having run once. They had really had it with him. So you'd have to talk Yorty out of running, and he was the most independent man in the world, did his own thing.

Fry: He went ahead and ran anyway even though CDC didn't support him.

Bradley: Right, and Richards beat him.

Fry: Yes, in the primary. I wondered if he didn't draw off a lot of money and everything else.

Bradley: It was different money. That money wasn't really coming to Dick Richards. Yorty is a very conservative man and he just got different sources of funds. I don't think he got anything that Richards could have gotten.

Fry: There was another thing going on at this time with the Bonelli indictment that was running parallel and had its spin-offs on Liz Snyder, because her husband was one of those indicted with Bonelli. This caused a fracture within the party and it must have taken a lot of work to--

Bradley: It heightened the fracture in the party. The fracture was there already because Liz Snyder and others had fought the formation of the CDC and they fought back. So then to them that proved that she was a machine politician and corrupt and all the rest of that stuff. Bonelli had been trying to save his skin, so he had been around supporting Democratic candidates and that did widen the breach. There's no question he gave money to them.

Fry: Yes, I read that he re-registered as a Democrat after his indictment.

Bradley: Was it after? Yes, I guess, or around the time of; I'm not sure which.

Fry: That must have been a blow to the party. This was Snyder's group then against the Ziffren group and all of those who were in CDC?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Did you have to handle any of that and do some patching up work?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: What did you do?

Bradley: Well, I always got along well with Liz personally. I don't know. We arrived at some working conditions. Liz really was a pretty good party person and once there were nominees she always went along. Bonelli, of course, wasn't really a big factor personally. Nobody knew him very well.

Fry: Was this made a lot of by the opposition?

Bradley: Yes, quite a bit. There was a lot of mention of it.

Fry: So you did have to defend it.

Bradley: Yes. But they were having trouble zeroing in on whether we were the party of the radical CDC or the corrupt party of the Bonelli machine. In '56 Stevenson was here and campaigned hard and vigorously and that helped the image, the party image. For that purpose, he did the Democratic party an awful lot of good, sort of lifting it out of the Truman image. The party itself, the party machinery under Truman, was considered to be old school and corrupt and all these things. So our people, as the CDC wing and the liberal wing, were all enthusiastically pro-Stevenson and really it didn't work very well to try to hang Bonelli on us. He was a latter-day Democrat anyway. Most of the nominees refused any help from him. So it wasn't a big factor.

Fry: Maybe you can explain to me why Bonelli changed to Democrat and began supporting campaigns.

Bradley: Well, he had always supported some campaigns but, no, I don't know his strategy. He wrote a book and published it in that time; he was trying to prove that he was persecuted because he really was kind of a Robin Hood, I guess, and maybe thought his image was better in the Democratic party, or maybe the Republicans wouldn't support him; I don't know. His strategy wasn't very good anyway, and he disappeared to Mexico shortly after that.

Fry: There was also a spin-off from Bonelli in the '58 campaign that we'll pick up when we get there.

Fry: The other thing was on that oil proposition which we mentioned in our previous session. Afterwards I found out that the people who were hired by the Proposition 4 people--which was to unitize the oil industry--were Whitaker and Baxter, and Lerner was running the antis' campaign. As a PR man yourself, I wonder if you could tell me something about what each of them did.

Bradley: Well, first it had a lot of fall-off into the candidates, because both sides were helping candidates if they would include them in their literature and talk the issue for them. There was a lot of money around. Then they had a tremendous public PR battle. Lerner had some billboards I told you about, which were refused by the billboard companies, depicting a pig wading in a pool of oil and another one with fish. He had a little fish and a bigger fish swallowing him, and a bigger fish swallowing him, and a bigger fish swallowing him.

Fry: Do you mean those never saw the light of day?

Bradley: Oh, yes, they did. Some billboard companies turned them down. I think Foster and Kleiser turned them down, or maybe it was the southern California one. Anyway, there was a big argument over it.

Fry: Did this give them some funds for their literature?

Bradley: Yes, some of them.

Fry: I think the way this usually happens is that they get money for the publication of literature.

Bradley: That's right. That's generally the way it happens. It still happens. It still goes on.

Fry: What did Whitaker and Baxter do on their side? Do you remember?

Bradley: I don't really remember. It doesn't stick in my mind, anything spectacular that they did.

Stevenson and the Press

Fry: Then I didn't ask you about Adlai and the press. His lack of press support in 1956 has become one of the phenomena in journalism history.

Bradley: Yes, and he was very antagonistic about that too. He was very unhappy that the press wasn't treating him better than they did, although here he didn't do too badly with the press. He improved over '52 in two states only: in Missouri and California. Although he didn't win it, he came very close.

Fry: Do you mean that some if this was because the press coverage was better in '56?

Bradley: It wasn't bad. He came out and he was news, though. He came out here and really campaigned, which he hadn't done before--I mean really head-to-head, eyeball-to-eyeball campaigning, which he wasn't used to and didn't like very well, but he did it and he came out quite well. I used to say he ran like he was running for sheriff. He was every place.

Fry: Someone on the Chron staff told me that at one point in that campaign, I think where he had just packed the Cow Palace in San Francisco, that story appeared way back on the inside pages of the Chronicle, and a nonstory about something Eisenhower did back in Pennsylvania was run as the headline on the front page. That made a number of Berkeley subscribers send in a petition saying they were dropping their subscriptions unless they got more fair coverage for Adlai. Do you know of other things like that that might have happened?

Bradley: No, I don't really remember. I remember that at that time they were analyzing column inches applied to candidates and this sort of thing, but those are difficult yardsticks; because if one candidate makes news and the other one doesn't, equal coverage isn't really a fair criterion. They had practically frozen Dick Graves out in '54 from the press; he didn't get anything. In '56 the battle was still underway. The L.A. Times was still very bad. The L.A. Times was very biased in their coverage, and the Chronicle was pretty bad. It improved some after that, but I don't really remember that battle very well.

Fry: I just want for the record to say that on the oil proposition that antis' won almost two to one. I think it was two to one--one million to four million.

Bradley: They told me they were for it. Which side were the independents on?

Fry: The independents were against it.

Bradley: Most of our people were against it.

Fry: Were on the side of the independent oil companies?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Why was that?

Bradley: Probably because of our tenacious stand for the underdogs. The little oil companies like Superior--

Fry: Which was Keck.

Bradley: Which was Keck, which was probably as big a political corruptor as there was in the United States; but nonetheless we were on the side of the little guy. It didn't make a lot of sense, a doctrinaire position.

Fry: Somehow I have Harry Lerner connected with Keck in my mind.

Bradley: That's right. That was the side he was on.

Fry: Was there another issue? Maybe he was their PR man for something else too.

Bradley: Possibly, possibly. I don't remember that.

Engle and Brown Decide to Run

Fry: After that election was over there was already a lot of talk about who was going to run for the U.S. Senate. I'd like for you to start at the beginning of all that.

Bradley: Clair Engle had made the decision to run for the United States Senate in 1958 and was the chairman of the Stevenson campaign in 1956.

Fry: Do you mean he made the decision in '56?

Bradley: He made it before that.

Fry: He did?

Bradley: Yes, and he started to move around. He came to Roger and me and Libby Gatov and others and said he wanted to run and he needed to get better known and would we cooperate and we agreed to do that. So his being chairman was really part of his move to get better known to Democrats. He did an excellent job as chairman. He was a fine chairman, and Stevenson liked him very much. They're very different kinds of people, but Stevenson for some reason or another was very attracted to Clair. As a matter of fact, he personally contributed to Clair's campaign when he did run, and Stevenson was not known to give money away really freely. Stevenson came out and campaigned for him too.

Of course, Clair had made a vote for Taft-Hartley, and there really wasn't much else in his record that was objected to.

Fry: That must have given Kent pause, and you.

Bradley: Well, we'd been over the ground with him and accepted his explanation and regrets. He always said he wouldn't do it again and cited other votes that were very much pro-labor. But he was a small-town boy, and it took a little education on some issues. But anyway, he was quite popular where he was known. But he got a lot of opposition for CDC endorsement in 1958 from Peter Odegard, who turned out to be the important opposition candidate. Kenny Hahn was also involved in it, but he faded early. He was even less acceptable than Clair to CDC types.

Fry: Thus these were his two competitions. Odegard was a professor at UC-Berkeley, a professor of political science. Who was Hahn?

Bradley: Ken Hahn was and is a supervisor in Los Angeles County. Kind of a Truman Democrat. He tried to run again in later years when Cranston ran, I think.

ry: Was Odegard more, or less, liberal than Engle?

Bradley: More, I guess. It depends on how you define liberal issues but he quarreled with Clair, more on the 160-acreage limitations for irrigation water than he did on the Taft-Hartley. Clair felt that the acreage-limitation ought to be modified and he had instituted a plan as chairman of the interior committee to charge more for water for greater acreage than the 160

Bradley: acres, which he said made federal reclamation plans feasible. Clair was a dam builder but Clair also wanted to build projects and they [Engle and Odegard] tangled over that pretty heavily.

Fry: What was Odegard's view?

Bradley: He was pro-160 acre limitation position.

Fry: For outright enforcement across the board?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: I wanted to show you something here. It will just take a minute for you to read it. This is from page 181 on States in Crisis; see what you think about that as an accurate story on how this happens.

Bradley: [Pause to read text] It's all relatively accurate, except that I don't think Pat had any problem making up his mind, once the Republican switch-around took place, that he would run for governor. I don't think Pat ever had an interest in running for the Senate. Pauley may have advised him to do that, I don't know. But there's no question that he ducked the previous gubernatorial race with Goodwin Knight in '54, Pat did.

Fry: Why?

Bradley: Because he just thought he couldn't beat him and then made some sort of a deal not to be active in the campaign and sort of disappear. He did announce he was going to vote for Richard Graves, but he didn't really campaign for anybody but himself. [pause] Clair did condition his candidacy for the Senate on Pat running with him.

Fry: Why was that?

Bradley: He felt they needed a head to the Democratic ticket. I don't know that that was right, but that was his condition.

Fry: He had another condition too, didn't he, that you handle his campaign?

Bradley: Well, that had been accomplished.

Fry: How was the final decision made? There seemed not to have been a definite decision until October 1957. Other indications

Fry: had come from that meeting in Hawaii between Pat Brown and and Pauley; Clair Engle's wife told me that Clair in California, talked on the phone with Pat Brown while he was in Hawaii with Pauley, and they decided that Brown would at that point run for governor and Clair Engle for Senate.

Bradley: Maybe, I don't know. I'm not privy to that phone call. I don't know anything about that. There was a lot of conversation between Brown and Engle on this subject, though.

Fry: Yes, it must have been a continuing conversation.

Bradley: I don't remember when they made their announcements.

Fry: Pat made his in October then, after that.

Bradley: Clair was very funny about it. He kept saying that, "By the time snow falls in the Sierra, we'll have made a decision," when everybody was after him. Then I remember he said, "Now, it's either Senator and governor, or it's Brown and Engle, attorneys at law," he used to say. [chuckles] Because they both were going to lose their jobs.

Fry: You had one more person in this picture and that was Alan Cranston, who had actually started beating the bushes for support for his race for senator, particularly among labor people.

Bradley: Not too successfully. But anyway, that's true, and he agreed to run for controller rather than Senator. I think a lot of us convinced him that it was better, that Clair had better resources and probably was better known. Cranston wasn't know by anybody at that time.

Fry: He had no name recognition at all?

Bradley: Hardly any, only as president of the CDC, little previous exposure. He was national president of the World Federalist movement, but that wasn't considered to be one of the better recommendations for running for office.

Fry: Of course, Engle didn't have very good name recognition either, coming from Red Bluff.

Bradley: That's right. Our first poll showed him with three per cent, which is shocking; we had thought it was better than that. But Engle did have an aquaintanceship with the political

Bradley: world, and that is always helpful. We considered the CDC nomination tantamount to getting through the primary. He would not have run if he didn't get it.

Fry: But everything you're telling me about Engle would also have been true about Cranston.

Bradley: Not really. Cranston wasn't an accepted politician. He came from way on the left side of the sprectrum.

Fry: Oh, Engle had proven his campaign ability?

Bradley: Engle was something of a local legend politically. He represented the biggest district in the country.

Fry: Geographically.

Bradley: Yes, and was very colorful--flew his own airplane around to campaign and always had the salty quotes for the press and this sort of thing. The press respected him very much. His local labor people supported him vigorously. He'd already made his peace after Taft-Hartley with them, and they were very enthusiastic about him. Labor wasn't really all that wild about Cranston.

Fry: Why? Just because he had no record at all?

Bradley: Well, no. The things they talked about were, "We'd been through Helen Gahagen Douglas and other campaigns where the candidates were considered too liberal, and they lost in the general election," so they felt they wouldn't win with him.

Fry: With a candidate too far to the left?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: The name I don't see in this line-up is George Miller, Jr. and I wondered why he wasn't included in this election to run for something statewide, because he had name recognition and everything else.

Bradley: He didn't want to. At that time he didn't have any--he had run for lieutenant governor when Jimmy Roosevelt ran, and he just didn't want any more of it, any part of it. In later years he decided maybe he wanted to run for governor when Reagan ran. He made an ill-timed run, and he also was considered too liberal and all that. He was involved in electing a governor. He wanted to elect one; he didn't want to be one at that time.

Fry: His ill-timed run was 1950 that you're talking about, with Helen Douglas and Jimmy Roosevelt?

Bradley: Yes. He didn't make it through the primary.

Preparations for the Primary Election

Fry: We ended the last interview with you saying there was a lot of preparation for the 1958 primary election. I wondered if you had done a lot of travel to make those CDC local caucuses before their convention in January, I think it was.

Bradley: We made their caucuses, but they were so much at one time that we had to get people to put on events so that we could meet the potential delegates and the other club members who selected them to try to get support for Engle. So we really killed ourselves getting around the state.

Fry: It was pretty well lined up then I guess.

Bradley: Yes, it was. Then there were accusations that Clair had stacked it because there was such a big vote from his congressional district, but that really wasn't the story. There had been a lot of clubs for him there, because Pauline Davis, who was assemblywoman, and somebody else had traveled through and encouraged the formation of clubs two years before. But they did vote full strength, I'll say that. [chuckles] Cranston had traveled up in there forming clubs too.

Fry: That was such a big district, large and hard to get around in, that it seems like it would take more than one person to call on a lot of clubs there.

Bradley: Well, they had area meetings and decided to form clubs.

Fry: As your campaign got off the ground, did you find that Pat Brown's campaign (which was, of course, the top name on the ticket and a kind of glamour campaign) snapped up a lot of the talent and money that might have detracted from a bipartisan aspect of Engle's?

Bradley: It did. We were having trouble getting money and we had trouble because the organization was primarily interested in the governor's race. We really leaned on party officials to put their time into the Engle campaign--Libby and Roger, and others down south, were more involved probably in the

Bradley: Engle campaign than they were in the Brown campaign.

Fry: When you say "the organization" maybe you better explain what the organization was.

Bradley: Primarily in the north it was a mix of CDC and the official party and officeholders. Officeholders were very good to Clair. That's one of the things he wound up with good support on.

Fry: The incumbents?

Bradley: Assemblymen, senators, yes. Miller was also influential in that. Miller did his best to get all the incumbents to think that the Senate race was important too. Of course, Clair had great personal relationships with these people. They liked him, they liked to campaign with him, and all this.

Fry: What was the position of the congressional delegation since he came from Congress?

Bradley: They were all for Clair.

Fry: What could they do to help? They were busy with their own campaigns.

Bradley: Most of them weren't. We were down in our ration. Most of them had very safe districts and they could help, some more than others. It depended on how good they were in their own districts. The safe ones, the ones who were really safe, never were very strong in their ability to help somebody else in their district. It was the ones who had to campaign who could help you.

Fry: Because the safe ones didn't want to--?

Bradley: They never campaigned. They stayed in Washington and didn't really know what was going on. So some were great and some weren't, but at least they were all for him.

Fry: This kind of unique cooperation between CDC and the Democratic party looked like a centralization of funds and organization and everything as the campaign structure--hit its peak in 1958. I wondered if this didn't take away from the autonomy of a candidate like Engle in his campaign. Did you find that it was difficult sometimes and that maybe some of the allocations of funding and things like this didn't come in like you wanted it to, when they were distributing it?

Bradley: Not really. The CDC people, the people with money (clubs and others that raised money) were probably more helpful to Clair because they thought he needed it more, so the rub didn't come from that. Besides, both candidates liked each other very much. If there was any friction, it was always pretty well taken care of.

Cooperative Campaign with Pat Brown

Fry: Did they? Because I--

Bradley: Yes. Fred Dutton was running Pat's campaign and we could always settle everything without too much of the normal jealousy and one thing or another. Of course, other influential people--Roger, Ziffren and everybody was trying to sit on the lid of any problems that came up. So we didn't have any troubles that way. We had trouble getting money. Incidentally, Richards had been talked out of making another bid for the Senate at that time too. He wanted to run for this seat and then I think he came to the conclusion that he couldn't, that the two losses were too recent in people's minds and it wouldn't be good. But he did make sort of a deal with Clair that if he wanted to run for anything that Clair would support him. So he ran again. When was it? In '60? Whenever it was?

Fry: Yes, I guess it was '60.

Bradley: Whenever it was, Clair supported vigorously. Clair did everything in the world for him, raised money and did everything he could. But Engle remained very sort of CDC-oriented and kept up with the organization--always went to their conventions, never missed one. He always used to say he'd been to every one except the first convention. He hadn't been to the formation thing at Stockton.

Fry: He was another one that was in the same position in the political spectrum as Cranston, wasn't he? Richards?

Bradley: Richards, yes, he was.

Fry: How do you go about talking a man out of running? Do you offer him something else in exchange?

Bradley: Not really. You try to discuss it on the basis of what's best for the party and who had the best chance to win. Often

Bradley: it's settled with a poll.

Fry: Is this a poll that the party--was the party running polls in those days?

Bradley: No. I think we might have done it a couple of times to settle arguments, but we didn't run polls. There were some--the California Poll or one that people felt was honest would be very influential in it and then, of course, the money, the backers of the party. It's more fable than fact. Pauley, who had been a big fund raiser, shouldn't have wielded that much weight as he did in later years, because he wasn't that much of a producer. But it was considered important--

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Bradley: --tried to run against Dick Graves at the CDC convention, the first one. He was due at the last minute because he thought he had Heller, and Ed wouldn't agree to back him. It was a base which we had covered by going down and having dinner with Ed Heller beforehand; although he hadn't made any pledges, he had said he would support Graves.

Fry: It's this race for the money guys that really kind of decides, I guess, who sees that he can run.

Bradley: Of course, the fight in CDC over Engle and these other guys wasn't nearly as difficult as the one with Dick Graves in '54. We really had trouble. But Engle was never in any serious trouble in '58. We'd done our preliminary work and we had a lot of support.

Fry: Everybody had some experience by that time too. Really, I keep seeing the same names crop up--Ellie Heller, Bill Malone, you, Dutton, Roger Kent, Ziffren.

Bradley: There were others.

Fry: All of these had been through the '54 and the '56 campaigns.

Bradley: Of course, Clair Engle was a great bridge between the CDC and the regular party because the ones like Liz Snyder and others, they loved him. They were pretty happy with him. They considered him more conservative than he was.

Fry: Why did they think he was more conservative?

Bradley: Because he was a country boy. I don't know why. These things are oftentimes how people perceive more than they are in fact where they stand politically. Steve Teale was a senator

Bradley: from up in Calaveras County who had a much more liberal voting record in the state senate than Dick Richards did; yet people never really thought about it that way, because Steve didn't express himself in the language of the liberal. He was just there, that's all.

Fry: And responding to each issue.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: There was a big pot for candidates I understand at this time through the AFL-CIO and I think that each union member gave five cents of his pay envelope each month and this amounted to a kitty of about $900,000.

Bradley: In the state?

Fry: [laughs] That's what I read. You look incredulous.

Bradley: I don't think so, no. No, I don't think that's true.

Labor Endorsements

Fry: At any rate, they did have a large kitty and this must have made it very important for a candidate to get the labor establishment on his side.

Bradley: Yes, we had battles over that too.

Fry: I think I've got some notes here on what happened with the labor thing. There was a funny endorsing record for this particular year. The advisory council of the endorsing convention was seven to five for Engle, but the executive committee had voted twelve to eleven in favor of Knight.

Bradley: Right. A lot of work was done between those two things.

Fry: Oh, tell me about it.

Bradley: It's just that the executive committee--Knight had been quite pro-labor and some of them were appointees of his to boards and commissions. All of them felt they knew him well, and had he run for governor he would have, without question, gotten the AFL-CIO support. But running for Senator, he came up against the natural barrier of their mainly supporting Democrats for national office, and we just had to go back

Bradley: to, not really the rank and file, but to other leaders who were not on the board. What was that guy's name who was the head of it? Neal--

Fry: Haggerty.

Bradley: Haggerty was very pro-Knight and the executive board was pretty much selected by him and had been for years. We had ample votes by the time we got down to the lower level of business agents and secretary-treasurers of unions, and we had all the Machinists. Some big [ones] were totally with us.

Fry: Of the individual unions?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: On the very last week of the campaign, on October 29 in some papers in The Bancroft, there's a letter that was sent out in a mailing that was signed by Haggerty, Jack Goldberger, and Sol Magnin opposing Engle and asking everybody to vote for Knight. Those were pretty big names at that time.

Bradley: Of course, the real import of the abolition of the institution of ballot designation hadn't really sunk in. The old technique of running campaigns in California had been to get as many of the other party's votes as you could. So they had done their best and that's what they came up with. They put out a statewide mailing, as I recall--at least it was a very big one.

In the meantime, we had really benefitted quite a bit from the CDC, who put out a statewide mailer of a tabloid that supported all the candidates. It was pretty good co-operation in terms of selling a ticket and the ticket was Engle and Brown. Some of this is what Clair had anticipated when he conditioned his running for the Senate on Brown running for the governorship.

Fry: So your united front helped you?

Bradley: Yes. In many, many cases our chairman in the counties would be the county chairman and we leaned harder on organization than Pat did. Pat's campaign was more bipartisan-oriented and not as party-oriented as ours, his personal campaign. But the CDC carried the slate thing on their level and an awful lot of candidates for the first time came up with slates in their own districts--"Vote for X for assemblyman" and then all these other people.

Fry: Yes, that was very unusual in California.

Bradley: It was, and when some of them were a little bit scared of the CDC, all of a sudden there was this strength in their district. Most of them decided to go along with it in terms of enlightened self-interest and take advantage of it, so they joined forces in the slate concept. I was pushing slating because that was of great advantage to Clair. We didn't have that much money. We didn't spend a lot of money.

Impact of Republican 'Big Switch'

Fry: We haven't set the stage here yet on that whole big switch thing. I think Knowland way back in January '57 had made the announcement that he was not going to seek re-election for the Senate, and then he didn't really switch until October according to my chronology. Is that the way you remember it?

Bradley: I think it was October. I'm not sure of the date.

Fry: In other words, there was about nine or ten months there when he wasn't running for anything officially.

Bradley: There was a lot of maneuvering going on during that time though.

Fry: Yes, what were your perceptions during that long period?

Bradley: We kept getting these rumors. It wasn't until later in the game though that he really tried to start to push Knight to get him out of it. He did that fairly late. The rumors were that Nixon was deeply involved in it, and I guess he was.

Fry: Yes, I wanted to ask you what you knew about that.

Bradley: We heard it at the time. We didn't know whether all these things were true or not.

Fry: In a newspaper (in fact, it was in the San Diego Union but it was probably in all the newspapers at the time), Pat Brown comes out with a statement that Nixon was pushing this on behalf of Knowland because he had made a deal for Knowland to support him (Nixon) for president in 1960. Does that make sense to you?

Bradley: Yes, it does. It makes sense. As a matter of fact, Earl Warren knew that was the case, or he said that was the case.

Fry: Earl Warren did?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: To whom?

Bradley: To Pat. They were always friendly.

Fry: That's right. They were very close.

Bradley: Pat had been attorney general under Warren and they got along very well. Warren had been his predecessor as attorney general and they had a lot in common. Warren was a notorious nonparty man except at convention times. So he told him that, as I recall, and I think Pat would confirm that. Ask him today when you see him.

Fry: Oh, I will.

Bradley: If you can get him talking about Warren, it's an interesting story.

Fry: Oh, we do. He talks about Warren a lot.

Bradley: As an aside, in 1962, when Pat was running against Nixon, the Warren support was very evident to me from where we were getting money and newspaper support. His son, who was campaigning for us, when asked would say, yes, he had discussed it with his father and this sort of thing. Pat saw Warren several times and Warren said he personally just hated Nixon, couldn't stand him. He was very helpful to Pat.

Fry: One of the theories was that the reason for the switch was that Knowland wanted to run for president in '60 and he felt running from a governorship would be better than running from the senate.

Bradley: I really don't think that was the case. I think Knowland wanted to get out of Washington. There was some truth to his marital problems and this sort of thing, and I think he decided that being governor would bring him home and out of that scene and things would be better for him.

Fry: Do you think his wife demanded it?

Bradley: I think so. I don't <u>know</u> that.

Fry: At any rate, when that happened, then after about a week Knight agreed to switch and run for the Senate instead.

Bradley: Yes, I remember that. He was down in Arizona some place and he was sick. From that date, when we polled, Engle was never behind even though he only had the small name recognition. People just didn't buy that switch around. Both Engle and Brown were ahead in the polls; the results were pretty much the same as the early polls: that people just rejected it and decided they were going to take Brown and Engle.

Fry: The name recogniton was very low, like eighty per cent of the people knew Goody Knight and only twenty per cent knew Engle. This was after the campaign got underway.

Bradley: It was always that way.

Fry: But only 50 per cent of those 80 per cent said that they were going to vote for Knight, even though they didn't know Engle at the time.

Bradley: That's true. That's right.

Media Campaigns: Developing Name Recognition

Fry: So how did you handle the name-recognition problem?

Bradley: Well, we did our best to establish it. Did I tell you the story about the first poll that showed three per cent recognition and of the three per cent, twenty-seven per cent identified him as a woman because his name was Clair? I saw you had a piece of Engle's campaign literature there. We had this drawing. We couldn't get a decent picture so this is an artist's rendition, not a picture. We used a billboard campaign heavily just to get the name recognition. Goodwin Knight later complained that this picture made Clair look like he was a tall man, a big man, when actually he was quite small. He showed it on TV and complained about it bitterly. So they got Clair in a press conference in Los Angeles and Dick Bergholz in the Times said, "The Governor is complaining about your advertising. He says it's false and misleading. It purports to make you look large when actually you're of quite small stature." Clair says, "You know, Dick, where I come from they measure from the neck up."

Fry: So that was when he said that! I thought that was such a good response.

Bradley: Well, that was a typical Engle response.

Fry: He sounds like a PR person's dream in the way he could handle the press.

Bradley: Actually he was quite well thought-out. When things became important he thought of things to say about them. What he tried to do was to say something, as he called it, "salty" first and then show some knowledgeability about it to show that he wasn't just a country bumpkin, and he would do that. He came down here to the Press Club in San Francisco before he was running and he had a bill in Congress to take away Hetch Hetchy or to allow a district in his congressional district to build some power drops on what were really Hetch Hetchy sites dedicated to the San Francisco water system.

Fry: What?

Bradley: Power drops. Dam sites. The irrigation districts were going to create electricity and make a little money for their irrigation. It was a really parochial plan. He came down to the Press Club and he said, "Now, I want you fellows to understand something. I don't want a bucketful of your water, I just want to put a little wheel in front of it!" [chuckles] Everybody was roaring. He always had a good-humored way to start things. So he was very popular at press conferences and things like that. The press always showed up because they knew they were going to get something from it.

Fry: Some good quotes.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: How did you get the billboards?

Bradley: We spent everything we had at the moment on billboards.

Fry: Billboards have to be contracted for a long time in advance.

Bradley: Not really. We kept them up for a month. We took them early. The competition for them wasn't great when we put them up, because we went into it early. We didn't wait until the last month when everybody else had theirs up. We took painted billboards as well as paper ones, and we placed them around the state and tried to cover every major

Bradley: artery and everything. It had two effects. It created some name identification, and it also convinced other people that we were going to put on a vigorous campaign and maybe got us some money. Anyway, we gambled. We put everything we had into it.

Fry: Would you have done that if the campaign had happened today with television as much in front as it is?

Bradley: It depends on the availability of funds. Billboards, really, the main purpose of them is name identification for a candidate. You can't tell a story on it. But we felt we got a double shot: we showed he was a man and a rather attractive one at that and people picked up the name from it.

Fry: Yes, and it says here, "Engle will make a strong U.S. Senator." Why did you choose--

Bradley: A lot of thought went into that.

Fry: Why?

Bradley: Because Knight was weak. I don't know if other people understood it or not, but the reason they were turning away from Knight was because he let Knowland push him around. They felt that wasn't a good qualification for a United States Senator or we hoped they did. So we were trying to establish that. It was also true. He was a strong Senator.

Fry: The artist's conception of him here is sort of a firm-jowled man. Now, over here you did use a photograph on the other side. Did you try to have the artist bring out that quality?

Bradley: We had the board designed first and told the artist to make it look strong. I never met the man. He worked off a photograph.

Campaign Leaders and Budget

Fry: There's some names here on who's running his campaign, but none of them mention your name.

Bradley: I never put my name on anything.

Fry: Because you're the paid pro?

Bradley: I feel that anonymity is a tool in political campaigns. The people who should know, know who you are and if you're there. As far as getting into the public eye, it only makes a target of you, and you're taking publicity away from whoever you're working for.

Fry: Dan Kimball was the state chairman. Who was he?

Bradley: He was the head of Aerojet General, the president of Aerojet General Corporation; a previous Secretary of the Navy under Truman, and a very nice guy and a very strong guy.

Fry: Was he a southern Californian?

Bradley: He was from L.A., although they had a big installation in Sacramento too. A highly respected guy. He did an excellent job as Secretary of the Navy under Truman.

Fry: Was he a working state chairman or was he one of those honorary people?

Bradley: He sure was. No, no, he worked hard at it. He called people for money. He presided over meetings. But he was a party activist anyway. He had been on every delegation for quite a while. He would come to CDC conventions and things like that.

Fry: Then Al Gatov is on it. That's kind of a new name in the state campaign at that time.

Bradley: Yes, it was. That was my doing. I knew Al fairly well. I had known him here in San Francisco, because he and Jack Shelley were very friendly. He headed up the maritime or whatever their association is here, and then he went back as chairman of the Maritime Commission under Truman. I wanted him to help us raise money with transportation people and business people. Clair, being from a small area, had very little connection with business generally. Some with lumber or cattle people or something, but he didn't really know anything about the people involved in transportation or oil companies or anything like that. His business connections were thin. Al came out of that background and also was was a knowledgeable guy and was a working chairman; we had decided on working people if we could get them.

Fry: I have here some notes that there was some money from Pacific Far East Lines and American President Lines. Are these Gatov connections?

Bradley: Well, actually, yes; I think he probably stimulated them, but American President Lines was George Killion who was an oldtime Democrat. But he liked Clair, he was very fond of Clair. A guy named Tom Cuff headed PFE at that time. I'm sure Al influenced him. He also was a Kentfield resident. Al had created the first cargo containers, and his business was renting those. He rented them to Pacific Far East Lines who were real pioneers in the containerized-cargo business.

Fry: It turned out to be a union issue, but later fortunately than this election.

Bradley: Yes, much later.

Fry: My notes say that there were $600,000 raised for the general election, which seems like peanuts today. Does that mesh with you or was it higher than that?

Bradley: No, it really wasn't much higher than that, because I remember we didn't go over the $500,000 mark until we already had TV on the air. We were scrounging. We transferred our television account to a week-by-week basis so that we had to have the money twenty-four hours before air time, and this started on Monday. So we were around with checks early Monday mornings at TV stations and just barely making it. We did get some support on that from the national committee and from the senatorial campaign committee. But it was really hard and we raised a lot of money in smallfund raisers—little ones, ten dollars, cocktail parties, and things like that. [tape interruption: Bradley responds to intercom]

Fry: On the people that you were working with in the campaign, the other Northern California chairman was Helen Milbank and that's another name that isn't familiar to me except as a writer. Did she used to be a journalist?

Bradley: I don't really remember her well.

Fry: That's probably irrelevant by 1958. She must have been in charge of women because you had one man and one woman as co-chairs.

Bradley: Yes, I don't think she was that active though. I don't really remember her well.

Fry: In the south, you had Tom Carroll?

Bradley: That was more window-dressing. He was a conservative office-holder and never functioned well. We tried to make a working

Bradley: chairman of him but he didn't really do much.

Fry: Who did handle the south for you then?

Bradley: Well, Kimball was very helpful, but I was down there myself all the time. I moved down there.

Fry: Was this when you moved south?

Bradley: No, but I moved down there for that year or most of that year.

Fry: That sounds like you were running at a pretty breakneck pace.

Bradley: Oh, yes, it was a hard one. We had a very small staff. It was a very modest campaign--$600,000 is really not a lot of money, and as I recall we put eighty per cent of our money into the media. So we really reduced it. But we were getting an awful lot done for nothing. We were really getting a lot of help, and most of the office work was done by volunteers so we had some pretty good regular ones.

Campaigning by Plane

Fry: Did you get help on transportation costs for you and the candidate to move around?

Bradley: Yes, we borrowed an airplane. That was prevalent practice in those days. Flying Tigers had a small plane that we used a lot.

Fry: But you rented that one, didn't you, or was that a loan?

Bradley: It was really a contribution, along with the pilot. Clair flew part of the time himself but he didn't fly when he was really--he'd land the plane. But it was a little too taxing to go on the kind of schedule he was on and then fly. It scared all of us, so he didn't do that. But we did run a campaign of hitting airports and getting people to come out to the airports. It made a very vigorous-appearing campaign and we could cover a lot of ground. I think we were in every town that has an airport close to it in California.

Fry: I gather that was not your big city centers.

Bradley: No, but we made publicity through it. Oftentimes, campaigning, especially daytime campaigning in the city centers, is very difficult. You can't draw crowds. You can work supermarkets a little, but there's never a big concentration of people. But if you got to a town the size of Ventura let us say, you can draw quite a crowd out there in the middle of the day, and we would do that. We would work hard to get the media out there. As a matter of fact, he wound up on the front page of almost every nonmetropolitan paper in California doing that. Only the Stockton paper, the Stockton Record, didn't put him on the front page when he arrived. All the rest of them did.

Fry: For flying his own airplane?

Bradley: Well, it was just an interesting event. That was part of it. But they wouldn't come out and interview him, and we would run the things only about fifteen or twenty minutes. He would have coffee and doughnuts with his local supporters and do interviews for the local radio or TV if they were there. Occasionally, we branched off and went into town for a lunch or something, but mostly we kept moving. He liked that.

Fry: Did you travel with him or did you have to travel ahead of him.

Bradley: Oh, some of both. We had to keep ahead of him. Somebody had to. But they were pretty standard arrangements. They were the kind of arrangements that were set enough so we could ask local people to do them and check with them by phone. We had Van Dempsey here who was very good and knew everybody in the valley. Of course, Clair's own district was always easy. Then we would go to the metropolitan areas at night and there were times when we had the chance to attend set meetings. Clair wasn't really drawing big crowds.

Fry: He wasn't?

Bradley: He was in the sticks, but he wasn't in the cities. It's very hard to draw big crowds in the city for Senate candidates or even governor candidates.

Fry: Did this discourage him at all?

Bradley: No, no, he had pretty good spirits through the whole thing.

Fry: Of course, you had all been through the '56 Stevenson campaign

Fry: where the crowds were just enormous and Stevenson had lost.

Bradley: They weren't enormous during the primary. They started to pick up toward the end of the primary.

Fry: Do you mean in '56?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Who rounded up editorial support in all of the nonmetropolitan papers and the rural weeklies and things like that?

Bradley: That was all part of the campaign process. We talked to publishers. In the early stages of the campaign we'd concentrated on newspaper support, visiting editorial boards and publishers and things like that.

Fry: Did you have one person to do that?

Bradley: No, we never had one person to do it. Jim Keene, who was our PR firm, did some of it. I did some of it. Clair did a lot of it himself. He had spent a lot of those two years, almost three years, that he was preparing to run, in getting to know some of these people. It was a very well thought-out campaign. Most of them are put together in a hurry and this was covered in a long period of time.

Fry: On the results of the primary, I thought I'd read that into the record, because it really didn't look on the surface very hopeful for you who were running a largely partisan campaign, although he had crossfiled. The result for Goodie Knight was 1,176,109 total. Then you also had another Republican, George Christopher, running in the primary, and he got 780,028 and that on my handy computer comes to 223,670 votes more than Engle got. What did you think about that?

Bradley: We were somewhat concerned, but some of the Christopher support was available to us and we got it. Christopher had quite a following on his own. As a matter of fact, I think he supported us in the general.

Fry: I think he did.

Bradley: I don't know whether he did it publicly. I know he did it. I think he did come out for Clair.

Fry: What good would his support do if it weren't public? What kind of support?

Bradley: Money and some organization. I think he did come out though. So that was not all an anti-Engle vote, because we didn't have a large turnout in the primary either, did we? I think it was rather light.

Smears, Splits, and Ballot Measures

Fry: It couldn't come to more than three million, so that's pretty light. There was also a lot of talk then after the final election got underway about a lot of smears. There's a memo, which I think is from Roger Kent, about the smears that occurred in this election; it was one of the worst elections to date on that; that it would be a good time to put in an election ethics bill. That national Fair Campaign Practices Committee said that there were more complaints about smears from California than any other state, after the election was held. Was this your concept at the time that it was going on, that you were getting a lot of smears?

Bradley: I think so, although I think they were fairly traditional ones. For instance, Knight put out a mailing to the Jewish community at the last minute using the name of somebody named Rosenthal, which was not the Rosenthal who had been the head of the Jewish community down there forever--the same name, he found somebody with the same name--and put this mailing out. Things like that, which are not the worst kind of campaign smear, but that indicated that Clair was anti-semitic. I remember that one very well.

Of course, Knowland was running. I think a lot of it was coming from that side because Knowland was busy, and the right-wingers in his party busy, trying to prove Pat was a communist of some kind which didn't work very well. I wasn't terribly concerned with them.

Fry: Later after Engle was elected, he sort of chose to make his specialty in Congress our relations with the People's Republic of China, ultimately aimed at getting business and trade established and recognition of China. But during the election was this an issue?

Bradley: Not really. Clair was looking for a--

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Fry: Knowland had been the Senator for Taiwan.

Bradley: Right, and I think that Clair's field which had been interior, there were a lot of people ahead of him so that he wouldn't be "the guy" and--

Fry: Do you mean in foreign relations?

Bradley: He wanted to expand anyway, and he, of course, was always active in interior affairs and always would be, but he thought he'd specialize in something else.

Fry: I'm really asking you about the chronology of this. If at the time of the campaign, Clair Engle had already announced anything about this particular thing, because it seems to me that Knowland would have really jumped on it at the time when it happened.

Bradley: No, I don't remember that we stressed it. I don't think so, although Clair had done a lot of homework in foreign affairs, which he was not too familiar with. The House specialized more than the Senate anyway, and Clair had a good deal of issues homework to do, most of which he got done before the CDC convention, because they put him through his paces.

Fry: That must have been a real examination on all of the events of the day and issues of the day.

Bradley: He, as usual though, handled that quite well and came up with a lot of his phrases. I remember him saying about urban renewal, he said, "Why I'm for that. That's just reforestation in my district." [chuckles]

Fry: Did you have any trouble with Engle feeling uncomfortable in a let's say upper-class, establishment, urban environment?

Bradley: A little. He didn't really care too much for the fancy dinners and cocktail parties that were necessary for fund-raising. But he handled it well. Those people liked him. He was a man's man in a lot of ways and was never too comfortable around the totally social situations. But he didn't show it. He never showed his discomfort. He always handled it very well.

Fry: I wanted to ask you about Eisenhower's speech. He came out here and, according to the Western Political Quarterly, he

Fry: gave a pretty partisan attack on everybody.* Do you remember that?

Bradley: Not particularly.

Fry: Then on the Democratic State Central Committee meeting on September 8, there were two contests that threatened to widen the breach. One was Jane Marsden, who was Kent's candidate, versus Frances Shaskan, who was Phil Burton's candidate, and who lost for women's chair of Northern California.

Bradley: There was also Ann Eliaser, who always saw the breaches widening. It always took place over minor offices, but I don't think that was very important. Phil and Clair were close friends and they got along fine, so I don't think that was going to hurt our candidate. Both were fairly liberal women.

Fry: I thought that there was a breach between the Burton element and the Kent element.

Bradley: There was. There always was a distrust sort of thing, but not on issues; just on who was to hold office and this sort of thing.

Fry: The power thing.

Bradley: Yes, although Phil usually came out on Kent's side because he would find himself confronted by the right wing of the party or really conservative elements and he couldn't handle that.

Fry: So there was no place else to go?

Bradley: No.

Fry: There was another one that I heard about. It was the Byron Rumford versus David Friedenrich election and there Kent lost. Kent's candidate was Freidenrich and Rumford won for secretary. Was there some flap over that? My impression is that Rumford, even though he won, wasn't happy or something

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*Totton J. Anderson "The 1958 Election in California", Western Political Quarterly v. XII, no. 1, part 2 (March, 1959) pp.276-300.

Fry: with the way it worked out.

Bradley: Rumford never understood the position. [He] always thought that some patronage was going to come his way because of it, which never happened.

Fry: Oh, after he took office?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: But it wasn't a serious thing. Then you had all those marvelous propositions on the ballot that year. I'll just review them quickly. Of course, there was the big right-to-work proposition that was Knowland's main campaign issue.

Bradley: And his main downfall.

Fry: That was Proposition 18. Proposition 17 was put on to counter Proposition 18. It was a tax on primarily the business and industrial community, to raise the taxes there in order to divert some of their funding?

Bradley: I don't remember that. Maybe that's the case. But there also was the parochial school issue.

Fry: Proposition 16, to repeal the tax exemption of parochial schools.

Bradley: That got a lot of attention and that got a big vote out. The Catholics were running a big registration drive, for instance, so that was very helpful to us.

Fry: You had a lot of people getting out the vote, didn't you? The CDC--

Bradley: Probably the best effort that was ever made, that voter turnout.

Fry: Did labor help?

Bradley: Labor helped. Yes, they put up a lot of the funds for it, too. We paid some people. That led to a little trouble. The Autoworkers particularly were helpful down south, but labor cooperated in the drive. It was mainly the CDC that did it.

Fry: Your paying some people reminds me to ask you about where was Unruh in all of this, because I think later on he paid some campaign workers.

Bradley: Unruh was heavy in the Brown campaign. He was an assembly candidate. He had gotten elected in '54, and he was deeply involved in the campaign, but for Brown. I think he was paid by Brown.

Fry: So you didn't have him in yours particularly?

Bradley: Oh, he was fine. We didn't have any problems with him. He liked Clair too. Clair had a personality cult, and he really went out of his way to woo both sides of anything that looked like a stumbling block to him and did very well with it.

Fry: So he was a great bringer-togetherer?

Bradley: He was. The Stevenson experience had helped him, both in terms of knowing a lot of the people, it helped his image and it helped him understand the state and what made it run.

Building Coalition of Support: Labor, Republicans, Minorities

Fry: I was wondering about all of these coalitions that he managed to bring togather. As you look back on it, how would you define it? What sort of groups made up your--

Bradley: A lot of it was individual support rather than groups that he brought together. But labor and the CDC, for instance, he helped bring together. They had always held their nose about the CDC. Some elements of labor were strong in it, but most of it, the old line unions (the building trades and the more conservative unions) never really bought the CDC. They were too radical for them.

Fry: Was Haggerty himself a Republican?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: A lot of the executive committee, were they?

Bradley: I don't know if a lot, but several of them. "Tiny" Small from San Mateo. Connie Werkins was and Harry Finks from Sacramento was. There were some.

Fry: Their type of Republicanism, how would you describe it? As Earl Warren or Hiram Johnson? [chuckles]

Bradley: Well, it was more Goodie Knight. They would play both sides and were perfectly willing to accept--well, they had to in a way to get votes out of the legislature, which had been Republican-dominated forever. So a moderate Republican was a hero to them.

Fry: Do you think that your slate helped in bringing about the historic takeover of the legislature by the Democrats?

Bradley: Oh, sure.

Fry: I think it was the first time the Democrats had had a majority since 1898 or something like that.

Bradley: We didn't have one in the senate. We just broke even, because I remember we had to get Republican votes to end crossfiling. So we hadn't yet organized the place. [pause] We did that with the Republican votes. When Hugh Burns was elected pro tem he had two Republican votes. We only had twenty votes.

Fry: That was within a year after the election.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: What about the ethnic groups that we think so much about today, like the blacks and the Jews and the Mexican Americans?

Bradley: We had wooed them and they were always voting Democratic. They didn't vote in great numbers, but they were on the increase, of course; especially the Filipino community was building up fast.

Fry: Was this one of the first times that you actually saw the Latin community as something to work with?

Bradley: Yes, I guess so. I think they had been taken for granted and bought a lot of the times when leadership was bought. They were emerging. All these sociological changes were taking place. The blacks were somewhat ahead of them in emerging as a political force, but the Latinos were trying to catch up. They were pretty enthusiastic.

Fry: Engle came up from pretty much of a WASP area up there. How was he in handling minority groups?

Bradley: Pretty good, although he had to learn some of it. But part of what he did during the Stevenson campaign was to get to know people and study it. He had to be taught to say Negro.

Fry: Instead of?

Bradley: Nigra or whatever it was that he picked up, wherever it was. He wasn't an illiberal man, but he had not been subjected to a lot of this. It was just a new experience. I'll bet there weren't five hundred Negroes living in his district. But the educational process took place though. He was a very good student.

Fry: He had someone in Chinatown that helped out here. Do you remember that? For the Chinese community in San Francisco?

Bradley: Jack Chow? Probably. We had good Chinese support, although no one was close to the Chinese. Knight wasn't particularly. They didn't see anything in Knight. Knowland had taken a pro-Nationalist position very, very strongly. The community is still largely pro-Nationalist. It's changing some.

Fry: There was a lot of money here from the Nationalist Chinese.

Bradley: Oh, sure. The Claire Chennault influence was still big in politics.

Fry: The what?

Bradley: Claire Chennault was married to--oh, I forget what her name was. Anyway, she was over here lobbying all the time for the Nationalist position and Madame Chiang Kai-shek spread money around too or at least it was allegedly. I never saw any.

Fry: There was a Chinese family who I guess had escaped and had come over here to live that was just tremendously wealthy and still are. I'm sorry I can't give you the name, but I was just thinking, gosh, that would really have been a pipeline to some candidate and it probably went not to yours. [laughs]

Bradley: No.

Fry: You weren't aware of anything like that?

Bradley: No. I presume that Knowland had good support from whatever sources there were. They used to call him the Senator from Formosa.

California Water Plan

Fry: My last question is was the water plan an issue at this point that Engle had to deal with? I got the impression from the San Diego newspaper that they were pretty nervous about having a Senator who was from the source of southern California's water.

Bradley: It was a problem and Clair had been--although he had developed more water programs than anybody in the country through the Interior Committee of the House. He was the mover. Old Man Hayden (Senator Hayden) was in the Senate and he didn't move much so Clair took the movement away and put it in the House. But he would attack Knight for not having solved the water program and said that he and Pat would. That's one of the things that we sort of did together.

As a matter of fact, I remember we moved--they were talking about the water project, the Oroville Dam at the time, and we moved a milk tanker and truck down to San Diego and gave samples of Oroville water away, things like this. Knight criticized Engle about the water plan and Engle really killed him by saying that in his entire career Knight had never built a country ditch--or something. I forget, he had some phrase for it. He said, "As a matter of fact, I don't think he'd know an irrigation ditch if he fell in one." [laughs] But it was an issue and it was an issue that Clair sounded good on so we hit it hard. We tried to create an interest in it.

Fry: All in all, how would you analyze your big victory in this election. What do you think were the most important factors?

Bradley: The most important factor was the switch around, the Knowland-Knight changeover.

Fry: That was handed you on a silver platter.

Bradley: Because I still have a feeling neither Engle or Brown would have run if that hadn't happened.

Fry: Do you think they might have both backed out?

Bradley: I think Pat would have, and if Pat did I think Clair would have; so I'm pretty sure that would have happened. Then the emergence of party designations was a big factor. We already

Bradley: knew that from '54, but this was the first time we were really mobilized with good resources and good candidates to take advantage of. Pat had survived the other system, but he understood too that this was a new era, and the taking advantage of the organizational strength that Stevenson had left and that we had capitalized on. I think those were the big factors in it.

Fry: Thank you very much.

Bradley: You're welcome.

IV THE 1960 NATIONAL CONVENTION AND THE 1962 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

[Interview 4: January 4,1979]##

California Convention Delegate Conflicts

Bradley: I looked at this chronology. Yes, that's my note. [sounds of papers being looked over]

Fry: Well, in 1960 Pat's delegation contested McLain's delegation in the primary. Then when Kennedy won the nomination, the campaign was against Nixon. At the very beginning, in 1959, about two months after Pat Brown had taken office as governor, there was a lot of talk in the newspapers and so forth about Brown being an actual presidential candidate. Here's an exampled, from the Vallejo Times-Herald, March 25, 1959, where they say maybe a Brown-Rockefeller race is a possibility. And then here's one of May 21, 1959, where Jack S. McDowell says that Brown might be the western favorite son.

Bradley: There was a lot of speculation--

Fry: Were you in on it that early?

Bradley: Yes. We were trying to put it out. I thought it was the worst idea I'd heard and was going to hurt Pat.

Fry: Why?

Bradley: Well, because the chances of his being a presidential candidate were very slim anyway, and Californians don't seem to like that sort of thing very well. They don't really like their leaders to be running for president.

Fry: Was this especially because he had accused Knowland of that in the '58 campaign?

Bradley: Part of it, sure. He just finished ridiculing Knowland about using the thing as a stepping stone to the presidency.

Fry: The next thing that happened in '59 was that Los Angeles was bidding for the place to hold the convention.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Did you help any on that?

Bradley: No, I didn't have anything to do with that.

Fry: What about the big ticket flap, where Pauley wanted more tickets than he could get, and Ziffren wanted more--?

Bradley: Oh, to the convention?

Fry: To the convention. They wanted tickets.

Bradley: I remember the controversy. It was very big. Ziffren allegedly wanted them to turn over to the Stevenson forces. He did manage to get a lot of people on the floor and in the hall, whether through the tickets or through other nefarious means, I don't know. But they didn't have any delegates. They did have lots of people in the audience.

Fry: Yes, they certainly dominated some of the media coverage. Did you ever find out how all those people got in?

Bradley: Yes, how most of them got in. They got some guards to look the other way, and they just loaded the galleries. Some had passes. There were a lot of ways. I know some of the people who were involved in it.

Fry: There was a meeting in Denver that I think resolved that in fall of '59, and I've got Elizabeth Gatov Smith's report here. In all, did this have anything to do with bad feelings between Ziffren and Ed Pauley?

Bradley: Well, the bad feeling between Ziffren and Pauley really came from the leaders of Congress, who were unhappy with Ziffren and really with the whole Democratic National Committee operation, who had a policy committee. It was not controlled by Rayburn, who was still speaker, and these people. They were very resentful of that. And it was quite liberal.

Paul Butler was the national chairman, and Ziffren and the national committeeman from Lousiana--his name escapes me for the moment--were the people who really put it together.

Bradley: They all thought Butler was a figurehead, and to a certain extent they were right. Butler was spearheading it, but it really was Ziffren and this other guy who put together the policy committee.

Fry: This was kind of usurping the traditional power of--

Bradley: Of the Congress; that made themselves a spokesman of the out party, yes.

Fry: Which would've been Sam Rayburn.

Bradley: Right. But Lyndon Johnson, who was very much involved in it and very opposed--

Fry: He was involved in which side?

Bradley: In that argument with the national committee. He didn't like it at all. Well, he was pro-tem of the Senate. So he and others, especially in our congressional delegation, Chet Holifield and others, were demanding the removal of Ziffren as national chairman.

Fry: This had an ideological basis, too, that Ziffren's group was more liberal?

Bradley: Yes, it did. That's fair to say, but there were two sides to it. Pat felt that as a national committeeman that Ziffren should be more a spokesman of his and of the party generally, but Ziffren was really sort of off on his own. So there's that argument in it, too. Anyway, it resulted in the election of Stanley Mosk as national committeeman and a lot of bitterness.

Fry: How do you see the national committeeman position? You know, some people have told me that it's just a figurehead and really doesn't--

Bradley: It is. It depends on what the person makes out of it. If the person is a very vocal, active person and wields some power nationally, as well as in the state--and it's all because of personal magnetism. There's no power that goes with the job. They're one vote. Now, of course, there're more, which waters it down even more, for that matter. If there's an incumbent party--it's always completely controlled by the president in the White House. And then for years, it had been that the committee was dominated by the Congress when we were the out party, or when there was an out party. And that's what Pauley and the others set out to beat down. And they had a lot of support. They had support from the

Bradley: liberal unions, the Autoworkers, people like that, who didn't want to see the spokespeople for the Democratic party be Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn.

And of course, we had a congressional delegation that had a lot of old-timers on it, and they were angry about it, too.

Fry: How did Ziffren's handling of his national committeemanship compare with Elizabeth Gatov's committeewomanship?

Bradley: That's an interesting question because Libby also was in favor of a national policy committee being somewhat independent of the Congress, but she didn't seem to draw fire in the way Ziffren did on it.

Fry: Why was that?

Bradley: I don't know. Probably better personal relationships, I think.

Pat Brown's Uncommitted Favorite-Son Delegation

Fry: Who were the people that wanted Pat Brown to run for president? There was a letter from Lionel Steinberg on May 7 about it. I just wondered what faction that would be.

Bradley: Well, you have an article there saying that Roger Kent had said something about it, although I don't think he pushed it. I don't know. I think it was mainly Pat. I think he got the bug a little bit, because definitely the staff and close advisors were saying, "This is really nonsense. It's going to get you in trouble."

Fry: How much of it was press?

Bradley: A lot of it. The press loved to speculate about presidential candidates.

Fry: Can you tell about how the decision was made to run an uncommitted delegation? The Democrats here had so many factions that I guess you were afraid that if any of the other candidates came in to run in the primary, it would just split the Democratic party wide open, and you'd never get it unified again.

Bradley: That's right. That was the motivation. And of course, in order to do that, we had to get, really, the agreement of

Bradley: Kennedy not to come in because he would've won it easily had he come in. And there was a lot of Stevenson, although Stevenson had maintained staunchly that he was not an active candidate and wouldn't become one, wouldn't be drafted. He'd assured all his people, because Roger Kent, Libby Gatov, Paul Ziffren, myself, a lot of other people, would like to have seen him run again. As a matter of fact, at one point Roger went to Libertyville [Illinois] and talked to him about it, and I believe my services were offered by Roger and Libby for a year preceding the convention to line up delegates and one thing and another. He said, "Absolutely not." He did not want to do it.

So he didn't really become active again until during the convention itself. There was some pressure on him. I mean, there was a movement afoot. Of course, it was terrible timing. It was obvious when they had the big demonstration that he had lots of people in the galleries and nobody on the floor--no votes. It was kind of a sad thing to see it happen.

Stop-Kennedy Moves and Compromises

Fry: What made him change his mind?

Bradley: I don't know. He never was a great Kennedy admirer to begin with. And I guess just the accolades that he was getting from people, pressure to run. But at that time, most of the California leadership was for Kennedy or for Lyndon Johnson. Johnson was pushing the Stevenson thing along, too, you know. Johnson, and there were other candidates around--Stuart Symington and others. They were all saying, "The only chance we've got to stop Kennedy," was to get Stevenson nominated, you see. It didn't work.

Fry: Except in my reading, it sounded like some of the strategy was that Johnson that first ballot not--

Bradley: Not to nominate, yes. He did.

Fry: Yes. So he could come in, then, on the second ballot. And he was using Stevenson to create that situation?

Bradley: Using him badly, too. I know some of this is true because George Miller, Jr. was a close Stevenson one, but he admitted that they were playing games with the Johnson forces--and Symington and others. So it didn't work, anyway.

Fry: Was Stevenson aware that he was being used? Did you know?

Bradley: Well, I think he was told, but whether he believed it or not, I don't know. I have no way to know that. I know he was told that, because I was present at a meeting and so was, I believe Libby when Bill Blair told him that he felt he was just being used. Bill didn't want him to make the run.

Fry: This was a meeting about when?

Bradley: Oh, during the convention. Early in the convention.

Fry: Okay, let's go on to another candidate. There was a lot of pressure--

Bradley: There was also an argument, incidentally, that Pat Brown should allow himself to be placed in nomination because the delegation was a favorite-son delegation, pledged to him. Some of the congressmen maintained that that was an obligation on his part, therefore, to allow his name to be placed in nomination and rack up whatever votes California would give him, and that's really not true. I mean, there's no real obligation for them to cast a vote for anybody.

Fry: Was this also a stop-Kennedy move?

Bradley: Oh, yes. So there were bitterly contested caucuses of the delegation--very bitter.

Fry: I hope you can tell me about some of those. But I think we better back up first and go to Kennedy, when he first started making overtures to enter California and run in the primary, and how he was convinced not to.

Bradley: Well, I think that a combination of the Governor and--. Unruh wanted him to come in. Let me close that. [gets up to close door] I guess I had quite a bit to do with that, too, convincing him that it would be hurtful to the party here. He would be much better off if he didn't come in. So finally we prevailed, although they were very doubtful about the operation as a whole, the Kennedy people were. I think Bobby really wanted to come in and just run off with the marbles.

Fry: And Kennedy was running a pretty hard-boiled campaign.

Bradley: Well, his western advisor on this in this stage of it was a guy named Hy Raskin, and Raskin understood California pretty well, and I think he counseled him not to do that.

Fry: Well, you had developed a delegation in accordance with California law by executive committee that met and chose delegates, and as I understand it, each candidate had a representation on the delegation, right?

Bradley: They did, yes.

Fry: So how did you decide how many Kennedy should have?

Bradley: We argued about it.

Fry: Were you in on the executive committee and the choosing?

Bradley: Yes. I was the secretary of the delegation. So I kept track of all this on a big blackboard.

The Kennedy people had a representative down there. Either Larry O'Brien or Kenny O'Donnell was out there, and I believe Raskin was there. They were in a motel someplace and squawking about how much representation they were getting, which was quite a bit.

Fry: Who did they squawk to? I have the vision of everybody in this wedding chapel at Carmel slugging it out, and the Kennedy people kind of keeping out of sight, but they have had some--

Bradley: Oh, they talked to all of us, I guess. They were around, except when we were in session. They were just talking to the people who were on the committee.

Fry: Oh, I see. Did you have to take a lot of different votes, or how did you pick?

Bradley: No, we just argued it out district by district. And then we'd go over and try to decide where the strength was after--. You see, they'd had caucuses in the districts, and we weren't obliged by law to take those recommendations, but we felt obliged to take them. We'd asked for the meetings, and we tried to get some indication of what their preference was. But a lot of them were just friends of Pat's, and felt they would go with him, which a lot of them didn't, which didn't make him very happy.

Fry: Who did Pat really want?

Bradley: Kennedy.

Fry: Kennedy?

Bradley: Yes. He'd indicated his support for Kennedy before that. Not publicly, but privately. Kennedy's father had been out here and talked to some of the people, and Bobby'd been here. Jack had been on two tours of the state and met a lot of people.

Fry: Did they want Pat to come out publicly for Kennedy at that time?

Bradley: Yes. They did, and Pat felt it would just break up the delegation. It probably would've. I think he was right there. Anyway, there was a fair majority of support for Kennedy on the delegation.

Fry: And as time went on, Humphrey dropped out of the race.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: So what happened to the Humphrey delegates and those that weren't--?

Bradley: Oh, they scattered around. I think most of them did go anti-Kennedy, though.

Fry: There were a lot of people who felt that Adlai couldn't win, and there were also a lot of people who felt that Kennedy couldn't win because he was a Catholic.

Bradley: True.

Fry: How did you feel about that?

Bradley: Well, we felt that we could win with Kennedy in California. It turned out we were wrong, but it was very close. I don't know. Stevenson also had run better in California in '56 than he had in '52. So both would've been popular, but we were somewhat influenced by the Eastern politicians who said that another Stevenson candidacy would be devastating to them. They'd lost statehouses and legislatures back there and everything. And they were sincere about it.

Fry: In the spring, was there a lot of Stevenson agitation--while the primary campaign was going on. Was there a lot of overt Stevenson agitation?

Bradley: No, there really wasn't. It formed later, closer to the convention. It was very interesting in that most of the people that were involved in it were not involved in the Stevenson campaigns, in the two campaigns when he ran for president.

Fry: Oh, previously.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: You mean it was a new group?

Bradley: To a great extent, yes.

Fry: Why was that? Was that because they were being manipulated by the LBJ forces, or what?

Bradley: No, I think it was a leftist movement, and they went to Stevenson this time. I knew some of them, and some them were the same that had been screaming at Stevenson to speak out on the issues and all this sort of thing, and then they became complete converts. Of course, Ziffren claimed he was for Kennedy.

Fry: Oh, really?

Bradley: Yes. Everybody knew it wasn't true.

Fry: But that was his public stand?

Bradley: Oh yes.

Fry: Oh, I didn't realize that. Well, you were pro-Adlai. At what point did you change?

Bradley: Oh, early. Before we even thought about putting a delegation together.

Fry: Oh, I see.

Bradley: A year previous to the convention, we were trying to get Stevenson involved, and then gradually it became obvious he just wasn't going to do it. And then we started dropping off to the Kennedy people. Raskin was here quite a bit, and Pierre Salinger was around, and they influenced a lot of people. And of course, Unruh was actually employed, I believe, by the Kennedy people. Or at least he was at the convention.

Fry: Yes, to get out the vote.

Bradley: There had been some support for Kennedy as a vice-presidential candidate in '56. Our delegation was giving him quite a bit of support.

Fry: How did you manage to get out Ziffren? Who did that?

Bradley: Oh, I guess I did. We just called the people and asked them not to vote for him, said there would be complications with it, and it would be better for the party and for the Governor to replace him.

Fry: That was right after the primary, on June 18.

Bradley: Right.

Mosk Chosen State Chairman; Floor Strategies; Vice-Presidential Talk

Fry: And Mosk was put in?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Why was Mosk chosen? Because he was attorney general then?

Bradley: Yes, but he was liberal, which we had to provide in order to--. Otherwise, there would've been a liberal-conservative fight with Ziffren. And he was very interested; Mosk was always very active politically.

Fry: The reason I'm puzzled is that when Earl Warren was national committeeman for the Republicans, and when he became attorney general, he resigned his national committeemanship because he felt he couldn't represent all the people. Was that ever a matter brought up in this business of putting in Mosk?

Bradley: No. Oh, there are arguments all the time about whether office-holders should be party officials or not. But it's not prevailing. We've had lots of party officials as both national and state officials.

Fry: There was a big question about when Pat was to release his delegates.

Bradley: That's right.

Fry: Could you give us a picture of the pressure from the Kennedys for an early release?

Bradley: On the part of the Kennedys?

Fry: Yes.

Bradley: Oh, I don't know. It's not as organized as you'd think, you know. They discussed it. It was coming from inside. Jess wanted a release right away, and Pat wanted more time to convince people to vote for Kennedy, which he was trying to do.

Fry: Was this before the convention or at the convention?

Bradley: No, at the convention. No, there was no pressure beforehand. I don't remember it. It was at the convention, this argument that I got into about those that wanted him not to release it, where also the Johnson people didn't want the delegation released. They didn't have the votes, and they knew it. But we had some fairly influential congressmen there. I recall Holifield screaming about Pat having a lawful obligation to let them cast a vote for him.

Fry: For Pat Brown?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: And there were something like thirty-two or thirty-three votes for Kennedy that came out in the polls of the vote sessions that were held in the caucuses, I guess.

Let me read you--. There was some kind of an early roll call, and the results were released and it showed the delegation was rather badly split. At least, that was some people's interpretation--with Kennedy having thirty-three and a half, and Stevenson thirty-one and a half; Symington eight; Lyndon Johnson seven and a half, and Pat Brown a half. Now, this must've been early on.

Bradley: Yes. We couldn't find the guy with the half vote. [laughs]

Fry: You never did find out who did it?

Bradley: Oh, we knew who it was, but we couldn't get him to change. Pat wanted to talk to him after he cast that vote and say, "Please don't do that," but he was off drunk someplace.

Fry: And then in the selection for vice president, there was some talk of Pat Brown for vice president.

Bradley: Yes, there had been. I don't think very serious talk, however.

Fry: Who was wanting that?

Bradley: Oh, Pat himself and a few of his real close followers that had

Bradley: been his people; but once again, that wasn't very helpful. Obviously it was going to be the choice of the nominee anyway, and it really didn't make any sense for a Catholic nominee to take on a Catholic vice president at the same time.

Fry: Yes. Were you in on some of the conferences beforehand with the Kennedys talking about a vice president?

Bradley: Oh yes.

Fry: Could you tell about that?

Bradley: Well, no. We didn't discuss a vice president, particularly. I did have one session with Bobby where we discussed a vice president. Then, of course, we knew the Johnson thing was going on, but we didn't really have anything to say about it. It was devastating news when it came down that Kennedy was going to ask for Johnson as a vice president.

Fry: Who else was seriously considered when you talked to Bobby?

Bradley: Hubert. And Symington. And others. I don't remember exactly.

Fry: Who was your personal pick?

Bradley: Hubert. There was always a lot of support for Hubert in California, a personal friendship.

Fry: Well, after the convention there was a meeting of the Democratic party that centered on the issue that was on the ballot that would have allowed more legislators from the South. Do you remember that?

Bradley: What was that?

Fry: It was Proposition 15, and it was allowing a larger representation in the legislature for the South. It was a reapportionment issue.

Bradley: Oh, I don't recall it.

Fry: Because the first reapportionment was coming up again in '63.

Bradley: Well, that would've had to change the party structure some way or another. I don't remember that.

Unification Efforts

Fry: What about Kennedy and the CDC? He appeared at the CDC convention in February here, but it doesn't look like he really used the CDC very much.

Bradley: Well, I don't know that they were really all that available to him. I don't think he was that popular with them. They were very much in the Stevenson movement.

Fry: How about during the general election?

Bradley: They were used. They were utilized as much as they would come in. There was some reluctance afterwards to get involved. There was some bitterness about the convention, and that Stevenson had been railroaded out of it and everything. But of course, that was nonsense. He didn't have any votes. I mean, not only California. He had the most votes he had any place in California.

##

Fry: The general election campaign--I wonder what Kennedy did to congeal all of these factions in California for him.

Bradley: We did everything we could. We went right to work trying to pull it back together again and getting a campaign underway, which really we were all set to do, and attempt to recognize the dissident factions and pull in people who had been for other people. Of course, the congressmen coalesced pretty well. Although there was some bitterness, they all got involved, and we tried to see that they were. We conducted a pretty good campaign for him, I think, in California. And it just almost worked. If he'd spent a little more time in the Central Valley, I think he would have made it.

He had a commitment, however, to go to some other states, and he took off from here--just before the election--and wound up in New Mexico. Arizona, New Mexico--I don't know. Some rather unimportant states that he didn't carry.

Fry: Anyway.

Bradley: Yes. But he made it.

Fry: Did Yorty, who came out for Nixon, diminish Kennedy's vote in southern California to a point where it hurt him?

Bradley: I don't think so. I don't think that was a big factor at all. But I think that Catholicism was a factor in it, and it was a factor in the Bible Belts. You could see the pattern--Southgate and Southeastern Los Angeles, and in the Valley, down in the San Joaquin Valley.

Fry: Did you use his famous speech to the Ministerial Association in Houston very much on television?

Bradley: We did, yes. We put quite a bit of money into that, and that had some effect, too. I mean, the polls showed an improvement there. Then Johnson came through, and he made a trip through the Valley and did very well. We really felt it was hanging, which it was.

Kennedy's California Whistle-stop Trip

Fry: Were you on the train ride, the whistle-stop tour that Kennedy took from Oregon down to California?

Bradley: I arranged that, yes.

Fry: Oh, you did?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: What did you think about it? How did you assess it, because Ted White, in his book, didn't think it was terribly effective.

Bradley: Well, I think Ted White was wrong. Ted White wasn't on the train, incidentally. I chided him about that a couple of times. I know he said it was ill-advised, and I don't think that was the case at all. We drew good crowds. He loved it.

Fry: And that took him down the Valley, didn't it?

Bradley: Yes. He loved it. He thought it was great. He wanted to do more of it. But it's pretty hard to whistle-stop for president. Those days are gone. So anyway, it was an early trip, but it was a good trip.

Fry: Yes. I got the impression it was one of Kennedy's attempts at that. Did you think he was good at meeting the crowds, or not?

Bradley: Oh, excellent, excellent. He did a very good job. And he liked it, as I say. But Stevenson had always hated the trains because he wanted to give a different speech in every place, and they come every twenty minutes. But Kennedy loved it. Of course, Kennedy liked to campaign. He really got into the spirit of it very well.

Fry: Did you see any evolution of Kennedy from the beginning of the general election on, as a candidate and as a speaker, as far as his warmth in meeting people or anything like that?

Bsadley: Yes, I think he got better at it. But he was pretty good to begin with. But he had a problem, which he licked finally, which was as soon as he got outside and he got a microphone, he didn't believe in the power of the electronic device, and he'd shout and he'd lose his voice. Going through the Valley, he was taking sugar cubes with nitroglycerin on them or something. He had a terrible time with that. He finally beat that.

But then he just got more enthusiastic. He'd jump on top of cars and things like that. He ruined more cars than any candidate I've ever seen.

Fry: He really jumped on top of cars?

Bradley: Well, he'd get right up on top of the automobile when he was surrounded by a crowd.

Fry: Oh, I see.

Bradley: And reach over. They were all new cars. We'd borrow them from Ford or Chevrolet or something, and they'd go back with dents in the top.

Fry: How do you go about setting up something like that? What are the choices you have to make?

Bradley: Well, you try to see where you think you can influence a vote and schedule him into those areas. Then of course, you're creating a national impression all the time, so you have to make sure there are crowds, and that's hard work. Although toward the end he was drawing big. I guess he would have without any pre-work--without a lot of advance work being done, but we never took that chance.

Fry: You mean by the time he got down South?

Bradley: No, by the time he came back on the second trip. He was drawing very big. But we sound-trucked, and we handbilled, and we tried to move people in groups--get unions to empty shops and things like that to build crowds. Of course, Kennedy was very attractive to young people--I remember the jumpers that they talk about and everything--and the parochial schools let the kids out all the time. But we didn't arrange that. They just did that. So he had kind of a built-in crowd all the time.

Fry: Did you say the young people "in" the jumpers?

Bradley: No, the young people were the jumpers. They talked about them. They jumped up and down when they saw him.

Fry: [laughs] Oh, I see. He also had some people coming out here to help--Admiral Harlee. What did you think about Admiral Harlee's attempts to help Kennedy and stump for him around the state?

Bradley: Well, I had to admire the admiral's spirit, but he wasn't effective.

Fry: Yes, you're not the only one who's felt that way.

Bradley: He's a nice enough guy. He came out here again. He was going to run the Bicentennial celebration. He and Red Fay were great friends. Red Fay had been assistant secretary of the navy, and knew Kennedy in the navy days. I don't know whether he was on the PT boats or not. Everybody was on those boats. [laughs] So he and Harlee were putting together this thing. It was very amateurish. But Harlee was a pretty fair speaker, a very sincere guy, and went around and told stories about Kennedy swimming through the sharks and all that, and he was somewhat in demand. So I think he helped some. He became the head of the Maritime Commission afterwards.

Unruh's Southern California Effort

Fry: What was your exact position in this, and who of the Kennedy "Irish Mafia" did you work with?

Bradley: I was the northern California manager, and Unruh was southern

Bradley: California I guess, or a combination of it. Anyway, Unruh made some kind of an arrangement whereby I wouldn't even go into the South. He didn't want me down there. I dealt with Bobby by phone some. Bobby never came here during the campaign. Teddy was here, was the western states manager and he didn't really know very much. He was quite young.

Fry: He was kind of green, right?

Bradley: Oh, very green. His only real experience had been that he had done a little precinct work in Boston. But he was in my headquarters here. It was also the regional headquarters. And I think we were able to help him a lot. We've been very good friends ever since. I don't know. We had the campaign under way in northern California before they had much of a chance to approve or disapprove it. We were set to go. We just went into operation, which they were grateful for, and I think they thought we did a good job.

Fry: Was that different from southern California?

Bradley: Quite. Very different. They had terrible fights down there about who was going to be what and all the-- The only thing I was doing in southern California was that I did go over schedules with them all the time, getting my opinion whether the schedules were good or bad or indifferent.

Fry: There were so many people in southern California trying to be something big in that campaign. Did Pat Brown try to adjudicate any of that?

Bradley: Yes, I'm afraid he did get involved in some of it. I don't remember the details, but it was an impossible situation. As I recall, they had seven or eight co-chairmen, or something, in the campaign.

Fry: Gee. And Don Rose--according to my notes, he represented the Ziffren-Stevenson-CDC wing down there. Is that right?

Bradley: Yes, I think that's right. Although Don was reasonable enough to get involved in the campaign. He was not a bad guy at all.

Fry: So he helped. I wonder if there was more of an Eastern-type campaign run in the South because of Unruh's connection.

Bradley: I think so. I think so. Because, really, Unruh would have liked politics in California to be as they were in the East and tried to do that to a certain extent, which he would discuss. He is an intelligent guy, and he talked about the use of power and the build-up of power on the part of the party. But it's almost impossible to do here. There's no patronage, you know. We discussed this many times. But he treated people as if they should take orders, and they didn't do it very well. They didn't accept them very well. So he had all kinds of problems.

Fry: Was there pressure from the Kennedys to do that up here?

Bradley: No, not really. Well, Raskin was still around, too. He had a lot to do with it. And he did understand California, which I don't think any of the Kennedys ever did. I don't think they ever understood what it was all about.

Fry: It's interesting that Raskin did and couldn't get the idea across.

Bradley: Well, he tried.

Fry: It's a pretty basic thing, about not having any patronage to speak of. Up here, did you have to raise most of your own money? Was there more Kennedy money put in the South?

Bradley: There was no Kennedy money put in here from the national. We raised our own and separate money.

Fry: Did you use fund-raisers with a Kennedy coming to speak, or a banquet or something?

Bradley: Oh, yes. Oh, sure. But we had fundraisers without them, too, and we did fairly well with the surrogates and others. Stevenson came out and campaigned, too, and we raised money when he was here.

Fry: Was there any problem with any of this money not going into the Kennedy campaign, but going into other campaigns? There were some complaints about that happening down South, and I wondered it it had happened up here.

Bradley: No, I don't think so. I don't recall it. I doubt it, anyway. What other campaigns were there? I forget who else was running.

Fry: There was no Senate campaign that year. So there really

Fry: wasn't very much else going on.

Bradley: Just congressional campaigns then.

Water Bond Campaign: Continuing Frictions

Fry: The congressional was a big thing, and then Prop 15 [senate reapportionment initiative] was a big thing, and of course the water bond issue was on the November ballot. I wondered how Pat Brown divided his time between the water bond issue and stumping for Kennedy, if he did.

Bradley: Well, I don't think there--Pat spoke a lot on the water thing, and I presume raised some money. It was not a big money campaign, though. The papers carried that campaign pretty well, the media did. They paid a lot of attention to it.

Fry: I think Preston Hotchkis ran that.

Bradley: Yes. He was a Republican.

Fry: Why was he chosen, do you know?

Bradley: I think to indicate Republican and conservative support for it.

Fry: He's also southern California, but that was not where you needed it.

Bradley: That's right.

Fry: Did you help any on the water bond issue?

Bradley: Oh, sure. We all did.

Fry: What did you do?

Bradley: Oh, I don't remember exactly. I sat on some kind of a policy committee for conducting the campaign and helped them find chairmen and probably raised some money.

Fry: The main things that you did were organizing--I mean, both for the presidential and the water. It sounds like you had something to do with almost everything that went on in that campaign.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Was organinzing local communities and also helping set up whatever fund raising events went on--is this the right picture?

Bradley: Yes. I'd been doing that right along for the Governor, and I went out into the communties and found people. So naturally I was consulted when somebody else was putting together the bond campaign. I don't remember--I think somebody from staff took a leave, and I helped them. I'd make appointments for them to talk to people and things like that. I was involved in everything--in all those things, including--. Prop 15 was what, the--?

Fry: The reapportionment.

Bradley: I really don't recall that.

Fry: Well, I guess it was a part of a bigger picture, where the Democrats--probably Republicans, too--were quite anxious to be the ones to do the reapportionment in 1960 in the state. The population had grown a lot, and there were a lot of new districts that were going to be formed. Were you at all in on that reapportionment?

Bradley: Yes. I was involved in that. But that came later. I mean, the actual reapportionment was done on the basis of the '60 census. So it wouldn't have been until '61 that they really did the reapportionment.

Fry: Right. But I guess both sides wanted to install a good majority in the legislature. Along with everything else, were you helping on some legislative races?

Bradley: Yes. And in getting support for the reapportionment. I think Tom Rees handled that reapportionment. He was an assemblyman. But Jess was involved in it very deeply, and the congressmen, of course, were interested but couldn't control it.

Fry: The other question, and about the last question I have here is, what happened in 1960 to the Jess Unruh-Pat Brown relationship? What was going on?

Bradley: Well, Jess was pushing Pat around and was vying for power on his own, through the legislature and through political activities. So they were getting further and further apart.

Fry: What about their influence with the Kennedys?

Bradley: They fought over that, too. I mean there was competition over it. Jess had his own access to the White House, and Pat resented it. And the Kennedys never really respected Pat too much because he didn't deliver the delegation the way he thought he could or should, which really they were wrong about. He was doing pretty well with it as it was, when you consider the make-up of it. We were trying to recognize traditional forces in the delegation, as well as their momentary position on president, and that, of course, the Kennedys neither understood nor were sympathetic with. They didn't give a damn about what your contributing relationships with people in Fresno were. They wanted to win. It was a kind of foot-burning campaign.

Poor Teddy was--they gave him kind of orders about how to run things they didn't understand, and he was slogging around trying to put the pressure on people in Idaho or someplace, and they didn't have much pressure to bring.

Fry: With the delegation that badly split, was there a terrible spectacle over "the split delegation" in the convention at Los Angeles?

Bradley: You mean on the floor?

Fry: On the floor.

Bradley: Not really, but the press coverage of the fight and the bitterness in it--. As a matter of fact, they tend to blow those things out of proportion. They made it worse than it was. I remember we had some sincere disagreements, most of which were solved the next day, as soon as there was a nominee. I know people like Helen Pedotti, who voted for Stevenson finally and was really torn about it, but once Kennedy was the nominee, immediately became the chairman of Santa Barbara for him, and went back and went to work for him. There was a lot of that, and that is ignored by the press. They don't pay any attention to that. They love the battles.

And then we had some closed delegation meetings and wouldn't let the press in, and they didn't like that at all. So they'd hang around the fringes and grab whoever would shoot off their mouth, and make a big story of it.

Fry: This was when you were what, trying to poll the delegation?

Bradley: Yes. Well, we knew what the delegation was, but we didn't

Bradley: have to sit down in there to find out. We also had a very good idea where the national votes were. I remember Fred Dutton and I putting up a board in the lobby of our hotel, the Hollywood Knickerbocker--I think that was it--but nobody belived it. They were talking about second and third ballots.

Harry Gevetz from Santa Barbara, who was kind of leading some of the Stevenson forces, had a bunch of fortune cookies, and they said "Switch to Stevenson." So he had them inside the convention area, and he was going to pass them around, but he decided to do it on the second ballot, which I kidded him about for many years. Dick Tuck and I always used to holler at him about where his fortune cookies were. [laughter]

Fry: It was too late. Do you have time to go ahead and start on 1962?

Bradley: Sure.

Brown's Early Re-election Decisions and Strategies: Kennedy and Warren Support

Fry: Okay. 'Sixty-two was a little bit less of a monolithic campaign. Pat Brown was running for re-election as governor versus Richard Nixon, and in the primaries Nixon had to run against Joe Shell; and you had Max Rafferty, who ran against Ralph Richardson for state superintendent of public instruction; and Richard Richards ran for Senate, but Tom Kuchel won re-election for U.S. Senate. So we might start way back, about were there other ideas early on, like why didn't Pat Brown decide to step up and run for the U.S. Senate?

Bradley: Well, your presumption that that's a step up isn't neccessarily true. [laughter] Some states consider it that, but I don't think it's considered that here. I think the governorship is more important than the senatorship.

Fry: My impression is that there were some people who wanted him to do that.

Bradley: Yes, I think so. I think Bernice did, too--his wife.

Fry: Oh, really? Why?

Bradley: I don't know.

Fry: Did she want to go to Washington?

Bradley: Well, the pressure of being an administrator is tougher than that of being a legislator. But it was never very serious. And Pat very much wanted to complete his things that he'd started. Most people don't give Pat credit for being as programmatic as he was, but when he zeroed in on a program, he really wanted to do it, very, very much. He felt he was just learning the job and needed another term to complete some of it. And of course, he was very low in the polls after the Chessman reprieve situation, and very disturbed when Nixon got in the race, as a matter of fact. He thought that Nixon could beat him, I think.

Fry: Yes. Well, the polls didn't look good. The polls from 1960 didn't look good.

Bradley: I worked a long time getting ready for that campaign. We formed something called the California Democratic Coordinating Committee, or something, and I worked for that. That was a front, really, so we could raise money and start operating for Pat. Right after the '60 campaign I went to work on that. Anyway, we did a lot of good work, and I think helped the situation. But Nixon was ideal. He obviously felt that it was a little demeaning to be running for governor, and he got that idea across pretty well. So he was an excellent foil for the charges of just using the governorship as a stepping stone.

Fry: Did Fred Dutton help in the early days of trying to organize the direction of Pat Brown's re-election campaign, before he went to Washington to work for Kennedy?

Bradley: Not really. He didn't do anything about it. As a matter of fact, Fred left early with the Kennedy administration, and there was speculation that he might've just taken off because he didn't think it was winnable. As a matter of fact, he kept telling people in Washinton that Pat was in deep trouble, and then we kept getting bad national stories. Libby and I finally ran down the source. So I think he may have taken a duck on it.

But Hale Champion came in then as the executive secretary, and he was very interested in the re-election situation. He immediately got a hold of me, and we had long sessions and decided how to proceed with it. Clair Engle was also helpful, very helpful.

Fry: What did he do?

Bradley: Oh, just sort of put some spirit in it. He was a good strategist, really, and he talked it up with everybody and said, "Now, we can win this thing. The mid-term things always happen, where we go down," and just generally was very, very helpful--and very influential on Pat. He could get Pat to do most anything.

Fry: When we were talking about 1960, we really didn't talk much about what Fred Dutton did for Kennedy in that campaign. Did he do a great deal?

Bradley: He was involved. I don't know how much he did. He wrote some speeches, I know. He generally was quite involved in things.

Fry: He became very close to the Kennedys?

Bradley: Fairly. Not real close, I don't think, but fairly close. He'd send long memos to Kennedy. He was a great memo writer anyway.

Fry: Once Nixon entered the race, I think the Kennedys were very anxious to see Nixon lose.

Bradley: Very. They were very helpful.

Fry: How were they helpful?

Bradley: Well, they did the usual things a president can do. He came out. He campaigned for Pat. He had announcements made of awards of contracts and things, and Pat would announce--. He told the cabinet members to help when they could, and they did. Especially Udall and people like that were very helpful to Pat.

He told money sources that he wanted to see them help Pat when he got a chance, or they were told by staff or others. He was very good about it. He did not like Nixon. But then, neither did a lot of other people, including Earl Warren, who was helpful to Pat behind the scenes--very much so.

Fry: What did he do? He was Chief Justice then.

Bradley: Well, all of a sudden we found out he had a son named Earl Warren, who decided that he would change from being a Republican to being a Democrat and campaigned almost full time for Pat. Then when they asked him if his father knew about it, he said, "Yes, he knows about it."

Fry: Was Earl Warren, Jr. brought into it, or did he just come up and volunteer?

Bradley: He came up and volunteered. He simply appeared one day. Of course, we exploited the heck out of him. He was a good draw. And some of Warren's traditional fund sources came around, and we got newspaper support that we probably wouldn't have gotten and one thing or another. He was not without--. He came out here once or twice a year, and he'd talk to his friends. He did not like Nixon. But of course, a lot of people didn't like Nixon. So that was helpful.

Fry: Was Kennedys dislike of Nixon just plain old political or was it something under that?

Bradley: I don't know. I don't really know the answer to that. I remember he said to Pat, "I killed the guy. All you have to do is bury him." That remark got out, and Kennedy was angry with me because he thought I'd done it, but it must've been Pat. There were only two of us there. [laughter] But what could I say?

Press Coverage; John Birch Issue; the Question of Debates

Fry: I wanted to ask you about the newspapers because in the spring of 1960, the L.A. Times had suddenly lost its traditional head, and the son, Otis Chandler, had taken over, and then you had the New York Times out here in '62. Both of these were--

Bradley: We got a lot of national press coverage. Lots of national press coverage; they were here all the time.

Fry: What about your local press coverage? Did you see any changes because of what happened in the newspapers?

Bradley: I think maybe they did cover more. The Times, for instance, for the first time assigned constant coverage to the governor's campaign. I don't remember at what point, but it was a long period. They always did it in the last two or three weeks, you know, but they did earlier than that. So they would alternate reporters with us, but we always had an L.A. Times reporter around.

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Fry: You said there was more interest in press. Was that because of Nixon coming in?

Bradley: Oh, I think so. I think so.

Fry: And if you could compare it with '58 in your mind, did you find more support for Pat Brown already?

Bradley: I guess so, but the situation was somewhat similar, in that both times the opposition support was disintegrating. Knowland in '58 had been dispersing his support by foolish moves of going all out on right-to work and seemed to be fumbling about his campaign, and so was Nixon. And Nixon was going down in the polls. So the situations were somewhat similar. They got pretty good coverage in '58 because Knowland also attracted some coverage.

Fry: As time went on, the John Birch issue kind of reared its head in 1962.

Bradley: Well, we helped that along a little.

Fry: How did you help it?

Bradley: Oh, by grabbing their stuff. We sent people out to headquarters and picked up Birch literature in Nixon headquarters, and then we had a big press conference to expose it. It was there. I mean, we didn't manufacture the issue.

Fry: Yes, and there were some smears.

Bradley: But I don't know that Nixon really had that much to do with it. More had to do with the fact that the local headquarters in Fullerton, let's say, is populated with people who were Birch Society types and who brought that stuff in. It was no policy of the campaign, I don't think. But we did blow it up as much as we could. Harry Lerner worked on that.

Fry: Did you do anything with billborads in this campaign?

Bradley: I don't even remember whether we had them or not. We probably had some, because the candidates always want billboards. But Pat didn't need any name identification, and that's mostly what billboards are good for.

Fry: There was a debate of sorts that happened between Pat and Nixon.

Bradley: And Pat didn't do very well in it, either. Pat did very poorly.

Bradley: That was up here, before the UPI national editors' convention. Pat sort of stumbled around it. So then there was talk about debates later, but we never quite got around to it.

Fry: I gather that that wasn't really an official debate, but Warren Christopher had been working very hard to either not bring it about or--

Bradley: No, that was later.

Fry: Oh, that was later?

Bradley: Yes. Pat accepted the UPI thing early in the game. Early in the game there was a debate, but later on there were challenges for debates and one thing or another, and that's when Warren Christopher, who now negotiates our war and peace, was negotiating for the debate.

Fry: As I read the correspondence on that in the Pat Brown papers, between Warren Christopher and Robert--oh, who was doing it for Nixon? The man who became lieutenant governor.

Bradley: Finch?

Fry: Finch, yes. I kind of got the idea that each of them were looking for reasons not to do it.

Bradley: Yes, that's true, although Pat personally wanted to debate. We had arguments with him about it. Candidates oftentimes feel that if they refuse a debate that it's somwhow mixed up with their manhood [laughter], and they don't like it.

Fry: You can't refuse a duel.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Other people have said that Nixon is a natural debater because of his collegiate training in that and so forth; that Pat came across as a good guy, and a lovable one in that, and that maybe he really picked up some votes.

Bradley: In the debate they had?

Fry: In the UPI, I think.

Bradley: Well, I don't know. I doubt that. I've heard the theory, but I don't think he did well. Pat stood accused of being a bumbler and a fumbler and this sort of thing, and the debate

Bradley: in my opinion tended to prove that theory, or to give more weight to that theory.

Fry: Oh, because of the way he responded to questions?

Bradley: Yes. And when Nixon went after him personally, or whatever he did--turned to him and confronted him; he didn't handle it well.

Fry: Yes, that was against the rules that had been agreed upon.

Bradley: Well, Nixon wasn't a great observer of rules. But at the end, when we were talking about debate, we were really playing it safe. Things had been going our way, and we appeared to be winning, and we appeared to be building momentum with what we had going. And taking a chance with a debate the last minute didn't seem to make any great amount of sense.

Campaign Techniques; Training for TV

Fry: What was your main focus of campaign techniques that you decided upon then?

Bradley: Wel, we tried to keep it to issues because Nixon really wasn't knowledgeable about a lot of it, and never became very knowledgeable about a lot of the state's problems. The more we could get into issues and technical things--water development and one thing or another--the better off we were. Pat showed better. Pat had had three and a half years as governor and knew his subject and had some good things under way. So that's what we tried to do, and at the same time trying to prove that Nixon didn't know enough or care enough to learn it.

Nixon was very hostile to the press earlier, before the after-the-election blow-up that he had with them. He was really disgusted because in the Times--he was really angry with one reporter on the Times, who's still there. Carl Greenberg covered him part of the time and covered us part of the time, and so did Dick Bergholz. Dick Bergholz is kind of a picky writer. He picks on little things all the time. So he was reporting that Nixon kept slipping and saying "the Presidency" instead of "the governorship", and he'd report the little things that weren't working well in each campaign. He did ours, too. He really was--. And that bothered Nixon because the Times was supporting him, see, and he thought therefore the news columns should support him.

Bradley: If you recall, when he made his "You won't have Dick to kick around any more" speech, he exempted Carl Greenberg from it, which meant that--. They alternated covering us. They'd cover us for two weeks or a week. I forget what it was. I think it was two weeks. And then we'd get the other one. Greenberg was a nice guy, who wrote interesting stories--better stories from our standpoint than Bergholz did.

But Nixon was mad at Bergholz anyway because early in the campaign, he chartered a plane, and he had the press on board. They were flying around the state, announcing or something like that, and held what they called a "backgrounder." A backgrounder in Washington parlance is where the president or the vice president want to hold a press conference, but don't want the things attributed to them. So they have a background conference, in which they're allowed to say, "A source close to the vice president said," or something of the kind, but they can't be quoted.

So Bergholz said, "You know, you're running for governor of California. We don't have backgrounders here. That's not an accepted procedure, and if you want to call the press together, as you have now, it's on the record." He was the senior member present, and the guys backed him up in it. And, oh, it made Nixon furious. So from then on, he didn't charter a plane. He'd charter a little plane and let them get their own plane. Even buses. They were on a separate bus. They didn't have any access to him because he was grumpy with them about it.

Fry: Did Pat ever have to charter a plane for the press? Is that an expense of the candidate here?

Bradley: They pay. It's an accepted procedure, but the newspaper people pay a proportionate share. We bill them for it.

Fry: In Pat's situtation, did they have access to Pat? Would they fly on the same plane?

Bradley: All the time. All the time. Plus, they always had access to Pat when he was governor, too. And they treated him quite well because of it, actually. But Pat was never inaccessable to the press, or to anybody, really.

Fry: What do you think Pat learned about television appearances during all these years?

Bradley: Well, quite a bit. We had some very good help with Pat in television appearances. We had a little committee down in Southern

Bradley: California who took him in to a tape studio. They had done a very interesting process. They had reviewed everything that they could get a hold of in terms of tape and film, of things that he'd done, and the committee reviewed it, and they decided they would show him things--what he was doing wrong and what he wasn't. It wasn't an effort to change his spots or anything, but they said, "Now, you develop a good humorous situation with people and they laugh, but you don't tell a joke very well," and they would show it. And he could see that.

They also had make-up people, and they showed him where he made some bad gestures, and they showed him where he wound up a statement and he'd always add a little bit more and go into notes at the end of it. They said, "If you just stopped here--" just sort of things like this. So he became much better. He really did.

Fry: Pat tells about going on a very strict regime of losing weight and playing golf with Bernice every morning and all of this sort of thing. He was really getting himself ready for this fight against Nixon.

Bradley: Yes, he was.

Fry: Was this something that was just with Pat, or was this kind of an attitude of the whole campaign?

Bradley: I would say it was the whole campaign. I think we knew we were in for a tough fight, and we did get ready for it. But it was a good campaign, and there was good cooperation among the people involved, and we had some good talent.

Roy Ringer, for instance, was an excellent writer. He's now a Times editor. I think he's the head editorial writer for the Times. And Lou Haas, who's still around; he works for Alan Cranston. He was involved. We had a good campaign. We did good sceduling and worked hard on making sure we'd get good crowds and everything went well.

We also paid a lot of attention to the press and made sure that they got good opportunities. It's all standard procedure, but it was a good campaign that way.

Other Races; Suit Against Nixon Campaign; the Missile Crisis; the Chessman Case

Fry: Well, it came out well. The results were that Brown got 3,037,000 votes and Nixon got 2,740,000 votes. So it certainly came out well. I wonder what happened in Richard Richard's campaign against Kuchel. Was there very much effort put in on that?

Bradley: No. Kuchel was a different fellow. He fitted the Warren image more, of the moderate Republican, and not unpopular. He got unified press support around. Nobody was going to beat, I don't think. But the answer is, no, there was not as much effort put into it. No question. Richards did not have much money.

Fry: Did Richards himself want to run, or was he pressured into it?

Bradley: Oh, no. He wanted to run. Did Sam run against him in that primary? Sam Yorty did, didn't he?

Fry: Yes. Right.

Bradley: They went to CDC, and Richards got the nomination and Yorty blasted CDC. But Richards wanted it.

Fry: Was there much hand-wringing about Yorty, or did you just shrug him off, because he was always doing wrong things, from your point of view?

Bradley: Just shrugged him off. You get used to it after a while. He ran a presidential delegation one of those times. I forget which one it was. But we got so we sort of ignored him. He was sort of built-in opposition.

Fry: Then Max Rafferty ran against Ralph Richardson. Now, what--?

Bradley: Well, Richarson came on as being too liberal, mainly. And he also let Rafferty get him in a series of debates that was very unfortunate. And Richardson was a very vocal fellow, you know, but he didn't handle well. It seemed like Rafferty would lie and make up statistics and one thing or another. Richardson would get indignant with him about it, but Rafferty threw out so much of this junk, he didn't know which parts of it to answer. He shouldn't have been having the debates, but he did.

Fry: At the time, did you see Rafferty as having a good chance to win?

Bradley: I think we did. I think we thought that that was a problem.

Fry: What about efforts made by Pat Brown to appoint somebody to the state superintendency before the election to fill this position, which had been held by one person for so long, and then he could run as an incumbent.

Bradley: The governor doesn't have appointive powers for that position, does he?

Fry: I think he does if the--

Bradley: If it's vacant?

Fry: Yes.

Bradley: I didn't know that. I thought the State Board of Education filled it, but maybe the governor does. I don't remember anything about it.

Fry: Well, it may be, actually, State Board of Education filling it, but I guess there were some rumors out that that might happen.

Bradley: I don't remember anything.

Fry: Unruh was again in charge of "get out the vote" in Los Angeles, and he had a lot of money.

Bradley: Yes, he did.

Fry: Was this money that he had raised, or money from the Kennedys, or what?

Bradley: No, some of it he raised. Some of it we gave him, I think. As I recall, I think we gave him--. It was a very controversial thing because he paid people, and the CDC people were jumping up and down about it.

Fry: Yes. He was paying people to go around and get the vote out.

Bradley: Labor put up a good part of that money, too.

Fry: How do you think that worked out? Was it worth all that money? I've forgotten the figures, but I think it was around a million dollars.

Bradley: Well, if you win it's always worth it [laughs]. I don't think it was a million dollars. I think those numbers were exaggerated. But anyway, he did a pretty good job.

Fry: I'll have to check on them. I mean, it may be a hundred thousand. The other thing that happened was Nixon's phony Committe for the Preservation of the Democratic Party. Can you tell me about that?

Bradley: They did have some Democrats involved in it, but they purported to be trying to save the party, and they asked for money, which they can't do without permission of the party. So Roger Kent really bulldogged that thing. He really went after them on it. He got their money impounded, what little there was, and pushed until he finally got them to concede that they had violated the law and enter into an agreement to do something about it. It became bigger as Nixon got more--probably than it was at the time, but Roger was properly indignant about it, because it was an attempt of one party to usurp the function of another.

Fry: Yes. It was a mailing of postcards to Democrats asking for money.

Bradley: Yes. And we proved in depositions and one thing or another, it did come right out of the Nixon campaign, and that actually Nixon had approved it. Whitaker and Baxter put it together.

Fry: Leone Baxter, in the depositions, tells about the meetings that they had in Fremont or somewhere. Was that followed to its logical conclusion?

Bradley: Not entirely.

Fry: They did get a court decision on it.

Bradley: They did, yes. Then there was a court-approved settlement of some kind.

Fry: What about the Cuban missile crisis that struck on October 22?

Bradley: I remember we had the President scheduled into Los Angeles, and we canceled that because of the--. We didn't know that the crisis was going on. We knew something was going on that Kennedy canceled his schedule.

Fry: Really?

Bradley: Yes. But it didn't really affect us too much, I don't think.

Fry: Pat Brown went back to Washington.

Bradley: I know he did. I guess because he was called back.

Fry: Yes, because he was in civil defense. Did you see that as helping or hindering the campaign?

Bradley: I think it helped. The country was very much unified behind Kennedy's actions. I think it helped, if anything. I don't think it affected it an awful lot, though. I think we were in pretty good shape by then.

Fry: I don't know whether that caused it or not, but the polls showed Pat Brown and Nixon neck and neck in October, and then after the missile crisis, Pat Brown was ahead a few points. Maybe other things went on, too.

Bradley: Our own polling didn't show that. They showed us ahead before October. I know the California Poll didn't, but we were using a guy named Don Muchmore--California something-or-other Research--and we had shown in September that we were ahead--not substantially but somewhat ahead, and we were moving along. We polled quite often. It may have been a factor. It may have been a helpful factor, but I think we were doing all right without that.

Fry: Just for our education, could you explain the difference between polls? Because they were becomining increasingly important at that time as not a reflection of the campaign, but as actually an influence on campaigns.

Bradley: That's unfortunately still the case. I mean, in 1958 they showed Mosk in bad shape, and he couldn't raise any money. They do affect campaigns, but it's something we have to live with. They're not going to eradicate polls because of that, I'm sure.

Fry: What was the difference between Don Muchmore and his polls and the California Poll?

Bradley: I don't know. We used him quite often, and he was quite accurate. Of course, we take polls for different purposes than the published polls. We try to find out what arguments we have that are working, how they're affecting people. We look for small-area support so we know where to turn out the vote and things like that.

Fry: Yes. And these are not things that the public's interested in.

Bradley: No, they're just interested in how you're doing.

Fry: But you do get predictions, too, I assume.

Bradley: Oh, yes.

Fry: Do you know of any cases where polls were used to influence an election by having it look optimistic?

Bradley: Oh, sure. Lots of them. But they're usually not by reputable pollsters. But even pollsters--you should talk to them--they get very angry because people release the information that the poll sells to them selectively. Most of them, you sign an agreement not to release anything unless you release it all.

For instance, if you remove the factor of those most likely to vote, you may get a completely different result. You release that, you see, and it shows you winning, when actually you're losing. It's a hazard, but a lot of that is done. The press get pretty smart about it after a while. They want to know--

Fry: The whole picture.

Bradley: Yes. They don't buy it as much. And then there were people around that did little postcard polls and things, and no scientific background and no check on whether they really did the poll or not. I've seen a lot of that used in publicity.

Fry: How did you make the selection on Don Muchmore, back in when, '58 or whenever it was?

Bradley: Oh, I had been working with Muchmore for years.

Fry: You just knew him.

Bradley: Yes. Well, he published. He did the L.A. Times polls, and he also worked for the Ritter papers. But he was also a friend. And he not only polled, but he sat in on most of our strategy conferences, too. He was very good.

Fry: To advise on--?

Bradley: Yes, on the use of it.

Fry: Issues? Do you remember what issues were advised for '62?

Bradley: No, I don't really remember.

Fry: You mentioned Chessman. I think it was in the spring of 1960 when Chessman was finally executed, which was just before the primary, and Pat Brown's popularity was at an all-time low then.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: I wondered what light you can shed on the decision that Pat made to give Chessman a two-month reprieve and then toss it into the legislature to get the law changed.

Bradley: I think Jerry had something to do with that. As a matter of fact, I'm sure he did. He influenced Pat quite a bit on it.

Fry: The phone call that night?

Bradley: Yes. But he'd seen the Chessman case forever as attorney general, and didn't really want to execute Chessman or anybody for that matter. But he managed to anger everybody concerned. Eventually Chessman went to his death, and the people were blaming Pat for it, when actually he had exhausted his remedies. He didn't have any way to go.

Fry: In 1962 did you have to deal with this a lot in the campaign as an issue?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: How did you do that? Because Pat was adamantly against capital punishment.

Bradley: We tried to focus on something else, but we had to deal with it. It just diminished. Other things became more important. If we'd had to run close to the time of the Chessman case, it would have been harder.

Fry: Well, thank you very much. Is there anything else you want to wrap up on these two elections?

Bradley: No.

Fry: Then I guess next time, upward and onward to '64 and '66.

Bradley: Okay.

V THE 1964 SENATE RACE AND BROWN'S THIRD CAMPAIGN FOR GOVERNOR IN 1966

[Interview 5: January 16, 1979]##

Senator Clair Engle's Illness and Resignation

Fry: We left off at the end of '62. Somewhere in this period you moved to Los Angeles. Was that between '62 and '64?

Bradley: I moved down there after '64. I'd been living down there anyway, but I officially moved down, I guess, it was '65. It was after the '64 election.

Fry: What do you mean you had been living down there but then you officially moved down there?

Bradley: The head office of the campaign was down there, so I was down there most of the time.

Fry: I see. Then you moved your resident staff.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Does that mean that this campaign in '64, you were really running it from southern California?

Bradley: Yes. Also the Brown campaign in '62, I ran from southern California.

Fry: Before the '64 campaign got under way, of course, there was Kennedy's assassination.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Could you tell me what happened with you when he was assassinated and then the impact that that had on some of the maneuvering among California's political groups.

Bradley: It had no particular political impact on me until Salinger, who didn't really like working for the Johnson administration, decided to run for Senate. I was credited with having talked him into it, but that's not true. He decided to come out, and I finally made a decision to go with him.

Fry: It's the why's of those two moves that are the main questions of '64.

Bradley: He was an old friend. I was not happy about the Governor's treatment of Stanley Mosk's candidacy. Stanley Mosk wanted to run for the Senate. Between Hale Champion and the Governor--Hale wanted to be controller--they sort of forced Mosk out of the picture. I didn't like that very well.

Fry: Hale wanted to be controller.

Bradley: Yes, and had something of a commitment from the Governor to make him controller if Cranston were elected to the Senate.

Fry: So that was why Hale wanted Cranston to run for the Senate instead of Mosk.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Why don't we back up and try to take it chronologically. Earlier, when [Lyndon] Johnson was obviously the candidate, then there was a question about whether Johnson should run in the state. What was your position at that time? Were you looked upon as the head of the Pat Brown delegation?

Bradley: I was the executive secretary, yes. I don't think Johnson put up much of a battle to run in California. Do you mean in the primary?

Fry: Yes, the primary. Did he not want to run?

Bradley: I don't think he saw any reason to. I don't think he was worried about the California delegation.

Fry: Did you expect Yorty to enter a delegation at that time?

Bradley: No, but you could never predict what Yorty was going to do. Well, you could pretty well. Yorty's idea of a good campaign, I always said, was one where you collected more money than you spent. [chuckling]

Fry: Some of the money he collected would come out of the same coffers, I guess, those that Pat Brown and the more regular Democrats would get.

Bradley: Not really. Well, yes, a little bit of it, but not a lot. Because he was mayor Yorty had some lever over some people that would give him money. But, generally speaking, they were pretty well separated.

Fry: In the question of Lyndon Johnson running in California, there was a big push on, headed by Carmen Warschaw--

Bradley: Yes, I know.

Fry: --to get him. She said that you needed him for unity.

Bradley: She was dissatisfied with Pat. She had run for state chairman and lost. She was very unhappy about that. She thought Pat didn't back her enough. So she wanted a delegation headed by Johnson. She was very close to Johnson people in Congress and some of the congressmen.

Fry: How did that happen? She did seem to rely--In the papers there are some things, telegrams from large hunks of the California congressional delegation supporting her.

Bradley: Her father, through the Harvey Aluminum Company, supported a lot of congressmen, and therefore they gave her a lot of support.

Fry: Sometimes I wonder why she didn't put her emphasis, for instance, on California senators or something like that instead. But, it's because her pipeline to Congress was an easy one.

Bradley: Yes, very easy.

Fry: The CDC convention came along, and that was when Mosk--at that time Mosk was running pretty far ahead in the polls.

Bradley: Yes, that's right.

Fry: So that on the surface of it you would think that Mosk would be the one that everyone would gather around.

Bradley: There was still a lot of Engle sentiment at the time of the CDC convention, which was in February in Long Beach, as I recall. Engle was still alive and his wife was maintaining staunchly that he could run and would run. They piped him

Bradley: into the convention, and Joe Wyatt asked him some questions which he couldn't answer. It was a horrible thing. He couldn't really talk.

Fry: One of the things I sent you in the mail which didn't arrive was a transcript of that telephone call.

Bradley: I was not part of that. I had started to run Clair Engle's reelection campaign. Jim Keene and I--he was a longtime public relations man who had been involved in Clair's '58 campaign--we went back to Washington at Lou's request and talked to Clair Engle. Lou was his wife.

Fry: About when? Before he announced?

Bradley: It would have been in '63, late in '63. We felt that he was incapable of running a campaign and that we weren't capable of running one for him under the circumstances. Lou promptly sent us a letter saying our services were no longer required, signed by Clair, but it really wasn't. I think she signed it. I've always thought she signed it.

Fry: Because she had gotten the idea that you didn't want to run it?

Bradley: No, because she thought we were disloyal because we raised these questions about whether Clair's health was adequate for it or not. And it wasn't; obviously it wasn't. The poor man couldn't say anything. He couldn't write anything. Pretty hard to run a guy like that for the Senate, in that condition.

Fry: She felt quite strongly apparently that he was going to get well, right up to the end.

Bradley: Oh, that's so phony. She knew better than that. She knew he was dying really. She enjoyed being the Senator while he was a vegetable.

Fry: Jerome Waldie also said that he was going to be just fine, right? Why was that?

Bradley: It was a power play, just so they maintained control. Waldie may have had ambitions himself. I don't know. But, he knew that was phony.

Fry: Why did Pat Brown not want--I mean I know why he didn't want Engle--but why didn't he want Mosk? Because obviously Mosk would've had the votes.

Bradley: I don't know that he didn't. But, Cranston had--there was some scandal about Mosk, having a girlfriend or something of the kind, which I didn't think was enough for him not to run.

Fry: A political liability?

Bradley: I presume that Hale got excited about that and got together with Alan, about how it would be terrible and it would come out and we would lose the senatorship over it. So he supported Cranston. Of course, both Cranston and Mosk had been good friends and supporters of his. So he just made that choice.

Fry: Is that why he then appointed Mosk to the supreme court in August?

Bradley: Well, I don't--yes, I guess so. I don't know. I wasn't a part of that, that understanding. I presume that's why.

1964 National Convention Delegation

Fry: Before Pierre Salinger entered, were you very deeply involved in the Pat Brown delegation, or were you dealing more with the senatorial campaign?

Bradley: I can't remember what I was doing. I don't remember that delegation very well. I don't remember where we formed it or anything.

Fry: Let's see what I've got.

Bradley: Yes, I was involved. I remember it now. That was Atlantic City, wasn't it?

Fry: Yes, the Democratic convention was in Atlantic City. There really wasn't a lot of brouhaha this particular year, I guess, over the formation of the delegation in California, like there had been four years before.

Bradley: When would that have been, the Democratic national convention?

Fry: It was kind of late that year. It was in August 24 to 27, in Atlantic City. That was when Hubert Humphrey was the vice presidential--

Bradley: And Salinger was the nominee already.

Fry: And Salinger had already been appointed.

Bradley: I wasn't involved in the delegation at the point that they were deciding who was going to run and that sort of thing. I don't think we got at that till later.

Fry: You mean in California?

Bradley: Yes. See, we wouldn't have formed that delegation till sometime after the primary, between June and August.

Fry: Were you involved in the CDC convention on February 22, when Cranston was endorsed for Senator?

Bradley: No, I wasn't. As a matter of fact, Kennedy was in the state and was at Palm Springs. I was with him. I had made arrangements for him. I flew back.

Fry: That would be Bob Kennedy?

Bradley: Oh, no, it was Johnson. Kennedy had planned a trip to Palm Springs to meet with the president of Mexico, and his death stopped that. It was resurrected, and we did it at the same time as the CDC convention.

Fry: What were you meeting with Johnson--tell about that.

Bradley: I was just making arrangements for the meeting. I saw the President a few times, incidentally.

Fry: At that time had he decided pretty much that he didn't want to run in California, or did he--

Bradley: You keep saying that, and I don't think that was involved at that time at all. You know, we wouldn't have formed that delegation until after the primary, at which time the decisions were made.

Fry: Yes, but that was February, so if he was going to enter he should have been thinking about it.

Bradley: He didn't run in any primaries. Well, I don't know what all this is about. Carmen had some wild-hair idea, I think. There was no fuss over it.

Fry: Okay. That's important to know.

Salinger's Decision to Run; Primary Campaign; Contention with Cranston

Fry: Then Pierre Salinger entered suddenly on March 19.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Then on March 31, you decided to join his campaign and lead it, be the executive on that.

Bradley: I think I decided as soon as he got in the state. I went up to talk to the Governor about it. He apparently gave it his blessing, but later he issued a statement kind of blasting me for it, which I think Hale Champion engineered. Hale was really heavily involved in this thing. He very much wanted to see Cranston elected.

From there on the Governor's forces got into the Cranston campaign. So there was quite an estrangement there, for my part.

Fry: Yes. Pat Brown's press statement didn't sound very good. This was the clipping that I sent you. What he said was, "Don Bradley informed me today that he is severing his political relationship with me to manage Pierre Salinger's campaign. This was not done with my approval and in no way reflects any change in my full support of the candidacy of Alan Cranston. I did not participate in or approve of his decision."*

So it sounded like it was really all over between you, and yet by the end of the summer you seem to have been reconciled.

Bradley: I don't think that it ever took place. That was a statement that I think Hale got him to put out by telling him that it would be interpreted that he had switched his support from Cranston to Salinger, my leaving. So I guess he was convinced that that was the case, enough to put that statement out. But, I used to see him all the time and there was never any real estrangement.

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* See "Brown's Lieutenant Quits to Join Salinger Camp," Sacramento Bee, April 1, 1964.

Fry: So personally it was all right.

Bradley: Later in that primary I put together a kind of a compact whereby, both campaigns being in the hole (just at the tail end of it--I mean maybe two days before the primary election) that the winner would pick up part of the campaign deficit for the loser--which was, press-wise, interpreted as some terrible deal. The Governor put that together, at my request. He got agreement on it.

Fry: Was that agreed upon because one of the big problems of this campaign was that big deficit?

Bradley: Yes. Oh, it was a problem, all right.

Fry: The two big deficits.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: So that actually then was followed through afterwards?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Before we proceed could you explain more about why Pierre Salinger decided to do this? Did he call you before he came in and announced, or get your advice or anything?

Bradley: Yes, he called, but he was on his way out here. We had talked about it when he was out with President Johnson at Palm Springs. I thought he had given it up. I thought he had forgotten it. But evidently he got all steamed up in the last week. That was just before filing. He had to come in and file.

He called from Washington to say, "Well, I'm going to do it." He didn't really--I didn't really advise him to do it. And he asked would I meet him. I met him at the airport, and we discussed it from there.

Fry: Did you advise him against it? Is that what you meant? Or you mean you just didn't--

Bradley: No, I did in a way. I told him it would upset things politically terribly, but when he asked me the question did I think he had a chance, I had to tell him I thought he did. We were good friends. And he did; obviously he did have a chance. But he had to get on the ballot through a lawsuit, because there was a question of residency.

Fry: It was interesting because Mosk was the attorney general who--

Bradley: No, he was on the supreme court then I think.

Fry: Not in March. He wasn't on the supreme court until September 1.

Bradley: Oh, okay.

Fry: I think it was an attorney general's ruling.

Bradley: No, it was a supreme court ruling. It was prepared by Quentin Kopp and his law partner.

Fry: Oh, it was?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Who is now supervisor [San Francisco Board of Supervisors].

Bradley: There was no hearing on it. The supreme court just decided.

Fry: That it could happen, he was eligible to run.

Bradley: Right:

Fry: So, then you took off and started managing the campaign. In northern California you had Joe Eichler as the northern California chairman.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: It was kind of interesting--when you try to reconstruct this campaign by reading the newspapers, Joe Eichler said he didn't know it would represent a political cleavage with Pat Brown. That was in a letter to Pat Brown on April 7.

Bradley: Right. I don't recall the letter. But, oh sure, a lot of people joined without feeling that they were leaving the Governor. They wanted to support Pierre. He had a lot of friends. He knew lots of people here, and the closeness to Kennedy, of course, was helpful and all that.

Fry: Cranston, of course, wasn't very happy about this. The impression I get from his statements in the press was that he really took out after Pierre. Is that true? Was that your impression.

Bradley: Yes, the campaign was contentious. I was trying to de-escalate the contention all that time, and then kept Pierre from really blasting very much.

Fry: On Cranston.

Bradley: On Cranston. He finally got angry--one night he made a speech against the Young Democrats for some reason or another, where they had endorsed Cranston or were attacking him. He got angry and made a pretty contentious speech. But, generally speaking, he didn't say any of these things. It was coming from the other side. I just felt it hurt to drive those wedges any deeper.

Fry: Cranston did wind up levying a lawsuit against Pierre and, I think, you. Were you a party?

Bradley: What was it--about a mailing?

Fry: It was that $2 million libel suit because--I've got it written down here somewhere; we can get it exact. One of you had charged that he pressured county appraisers for campaign contributions.

Bradley: Well--did I say that? I remember that, I think.

Fry: Then, in a UPI article, Salinger charged that Cranston gave inheritance-tax appraiser positions to CDC officers, like treasurer Alan Parker, vice president Roy Greenaway, and John Strahan who was the husband of a vice president. Then there was a John O'Keefe--

Bradley: Whose wife is now married to Jim Keene, Virginia Strahan, who was helping me with the Salinger campaign. Very interesting.

John P. O'Keefe was a guy who came forward and said he'd been pressured for contributions.

Fry: It says there were <u>two</u> former tax appraisers.

Bradley: I don't remember who the other one was.

Fry: There was another one besides O'Keefe, but I didn't get the name of the other one.

Bradley: I guess so, yes.

Fry: Anyway, how did this suit figure in?

Bradley: I don't know. I've just forgotten, I guess.

Fry: Do you have any sense about whether it was political--

Bradley: Oh, it was just a--

Fry: --Politically effective?

Bradley: I don't know whether it was or not. I don't think I cared much for that whole go-around.

I didn't mind that, but what I didn't want to get into was the liberal versus conservative fight between Cranston and Salinger. There really wasn't that much difference, but it tended to go that way. I was trying to de-emphasize it because I knew we were going to have a tough race in the general election; you get too stratified it's very difficult to win.

Some of the Salinger people criticized me vigorously for immediately making rapprochement with the Governor, but I thought we needed everything we could get to win. And we did; we needed more than that. The Governor had called Pierre a rookie during the campaign. Right afterwards he called him the rookie of the year. [Laughter]

Fry: What were all of the charges that Cranston brought against Salinger, which later were used then by Murphy in the general election?

Bradley: That was all that business about whether or not he was a bona fide resident of California, the carpetbagger thing was the main part of it.

Fry: Did that die down for a while and then get picked up again when Bobby Kennedy decided to run in New York? The things that I read kind of blamed the revival of the issue in September or so on Bobby Kennedy's entry.

Bradley: I don't think that's true. I think Murphy's people seized it right away as being a vulnerable spot.

The funny part about that was that Bobby Kennedy was a thoroughing carpetbagger, going into New York where he had never really lived. Pierre really was a Californian. He left here to join the president's staff. Unfortunately he had registered in Virginia for some school board fight, which he never should have done. But actually he was considered a Californian in the White House and was the contact of many Californians to the White House.

He had been active in politics here and worked in the legislature for the party, had taken leaves to work on--I think we mentioned it before--the Graves campaign, and special elections, and things like that. So he really had tickets and not only as a Californian but as an activist, a political activist. But yet it seemed to stick, the charge of being a carpetbagger. Bobby, meanwhile, sailed through his election in New York without any trouble.

Campaigning Against George Murphy; Proposition 14

Fry: Another big problem in the post mortems of the election, after he lost to Murphy, was looked upon as being the very strong position he took on No on 14 [repeal of the Rumford fair housing act]. Do you think that was really one of the problems?

Bradley: Yes, I do. I think that was one of the problems.

Fry: During the election did you ever consider his soft-pedaling that?

Bradley: Yes, but we were reckoning without the guy. He wanted to do it. During the campaign, as I mentioned before, the primary campaign had tended to make Salinger look more conservative than Cranston. He didn't like that. Pierre didn't like that at all. It really wasn't true. I mean especially now when you view Cranston's record; he's a moderate. He's not a wild liberal, as his people were saying he would be.

Fry: But at that time he was Mr. CDC, and CDC was taking very ultra-liberal positions.

Bradley: That's right. Yes, I stayed away from that as much as we could during the campaign because I didn't want to tag him with that because I knew what we were going to have to live with. I didn't foresee Fourteen, which was really the first manifestation of the blue-collar rebellion against--they thought that everything was geared towards blacks and, you know, that they weren't getting anything; the backlash, as they called it in those days. I think he suffered badly from that, because the vote showed that he lost the Bible-thumping, the redneck areas badly. That's where he lost the campaign.

Salinger wasn't a totally controllable candidate. Having decided he wasn't going to debate with Murphy, the first time a newspaperman asked him if he would debate, he said yes. He didn't hesitate at all.

Fry: Would you have advised him otherwise?

Bradley: We did. We did advise him otherwise, and he agreed at that time.

Fry: That he would not debate.

Bradley: But people get debates hung up with manhood, I maintain. They think they're being a coward if they don't debate. He was certainly articulate and able to debate. He knew the issues well.

Bradley: But what we were afraid of happened, that Murphy was the nice guy and said, "Oh, I don't know anything but what I read in the paper," and Pierre came on kind of too glib and looking like a cigar-smoking pol. The net result was that Murphy probably won that debate. I don't think that was crucial. I think it was all these other things you're talking about.

But, anyway, Salinger went out on the hustings, was against Prop. 14--

Fry: And No on Prop. 14 meant you wanted fair housing.

Bradley: Yes, and he liked the accolades that he got for--the cheers that he got from partisan audiences, so he stressed it even more. I think that was a mistake. There was no question about his being against it. I mean he had to be against it, and he was. He had been against it from the beginning. But emphasizing it was a mistake. We never emphasized it in advertising, but he did when he went around, and he would get good press coverage. It was always featured that he had spoken out against Fourteen.

Fry: I got a dissenting voice on that in the Pat Brown papers. There was a letter written after the election by a lot of people who were in the legislature. They were asking Pat Brown to do everything he could to reunify the Democrats after this.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: They pointed out that blaming the disunity and the senatorial campaign debacle on the fact that Pierre Salinger had come out against Prop. 14 couldn't be right because the election results showed that all the imcumbents who had run and come out strong against Prop. 14 in the legislature had won their campaigns. Therefore, they felt that--

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Bradley: I don't know. I probably was in favor of that argument, but it really doesn't hold a lot of water because most of the Democrats in the legislature at that time had districts that were so safe they couldn't lose anyway.

Fry: Yes, they were talking about the incumbents who won.

Bradley: No on Prop. 14 had fared better in the north than it had in the south anyway.

Fry: I guess these were southern candidates, because the numbers of the districts were in the twenties and thirties. Would that be southern California?

Bradley: That's southern California. But, anyway, they were dealing with very safe districts. So, I don't know; it's a great argument.

Southern California Splits

Fry: One of their points was that southern California Democrats were in sort of a shambles--that you could almost not tell from day to day what all the alliances were. I wonder if, since you were on the scene and very much into this, if you could explain what was going on down there.

Bradley: The major split was in Unruh versus CDC forces. Unruh had come in with Salinger, not immediately but after a while. The battle was still going on; that's all. There was a deep battle. Unruh did have some strength, especially in Los Angeles. It was just kind of an open warfare situation within the party.

Fry: Who were the people on each side?

Bradley: Unruh, Carmen Warschaw--I don't remember all of them, who they were. Then on the other side there would be Cranston's people and to a great extent the Governor's supporters.

Fry: Gene Wyman?

Bradley: Gene Wyman.

Fry: Would be--

Bradley: Was anti-Unruh, very strongly, and he was a combatant in it.

Fry: How was he in the senatorial campaign--Or because he was the southern California chairman, was he not taking sides?

Bradley: Yes, he was pretty neutral in it. Actually, he was quite friendly towards Salinger, but didn't take any public position and did try to keep the lid on the battles that were underway. We were in complete agreement that we shouldn't be throwing rocks at each other if we could help it, and he did his best to try to keep that going.

Fry: It looked like Wyman was put in as southern California state chairman earlier when he had never really had any position in Democratic politics.

Bradley: That's true, but he had been active. His wife was very active.

Fry: His wife was?

Bradley: Ros[alind], yes.

Fry: Is that why he was put in?

Bradley: I think we were looking for somebody. The existing leadership wasn't very good or very aggressive, and he had raised some money for the Governor, and some things like that. The Governor liked it very much.

Fry: That brings up the question of why wasn't his wife put in.

Bradley: Well, he wanted to become active, and I presume they were in agreement on it. I don't think he and his wife were fighting about it. I think she was very pleased to see Gene get more active.

Fry: That was in the times, too, I guess, when those things were frequently done, and the wife did an awful lot of the work.

Bradley: She did. She was deeply involved in it. He was very effective.

Fry: I remember Helen Gahagan Douglas told about how effective his wife was in her campaign. I think that was one of Mrs. Wyman's maiden voyages in politics.

Bradley: Yes, it was. I knew her from those days. But Gene had been active in the '62 Brown reelection. That's when they first became acquainted. He raised a lot of money in that thing and became something of a spokesman in the campaign too, '62. So he wasn't that much of a novice.

Also, you know, there was a battle over the presidential campaign in the fall of '64. I ran both those campaigns. I was the campaign manager for the President and for Pierre.

Fry: Oh, you were.

Bradley: Yes. That was a battle with the Unruh forces. I regret that battle, but--

Lyndon Johnson's Campaigns

Fry: There was something that said--Johnson came out here. May I read that to you too? I think it's something else I sent you that you didn't get. Okay, here it is. "After the convention Pat Brown appointed Unruh to co-chair the presidential campaign with the national committeeman designate, Eugene Wyman." This was in the south, I guess. Is that right?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: This lead to trouble according to the August 19 Examiner, which said, "Governor Brown says personality clashes are hurting the LBJ campaign in California. It's part of the power struggle with Unruh." (This is another quote.) "So a six-hour strategy session in San Francisco failed to bridge differences between unhappy southern California factions. It was attended by Kenneth O'Donnell. Wyman says he thinks Unruh agreed to co-chair and said, 'It's a ridiculous quarrel over titles.' Unruh and Bradley have disagreed in past campaigns. Unruh seems to resist Bradley taking orders only from Brown. Brown was miffed when Bradley left to manage the Salinger campaign, but that alliance is now renewed."

So what was going on? What caused all this?

Bradley: Oh, I don't know what caused all this. It started back in the legislature with Brown and Unruh, and Unruh just tried to lead other people from Brown. He wanted the job himself. He wanted to be governor. He didn't want Pat to run in '66.

Fry: Right. And more specifically in '64 this came at a time when Unruh had had his famous lock-up of the legislature, which really had not worked out for him.

Bradley: It hurt his image, yes.

Fry: And his slush fund had already been written about and was public knowledge, the slush fund for the assemblymen's campaigns, right?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: So, did this make him not quite the power that he had been, or was he still--?

Bradley: Well, he still--you see, his power when he got the speakership came through the Governor, not on his own as much. He was able to get the Governor to appoint the previous speaker, a man named Brown from Modesto who the Brown Act was named after (the secrecy in government act) to the bench, so that there would be an election for speaker so that Jesse could get that. Then immediately after that or almost immediately after that you could see the rift widening. Jesse wouldn't program with the Governor, and there was lots of strain, and it found its way into everything, but not so much in northern California, mostly in southern California; somewhat here but not as much.

Fry: Did you feel that you bore the brunt in southern California of Unruh's antagonism toward Pat Brown?

Bradley: Part of it, yes.

Fry: How did this manifest itself in the campaign? Did Unruh not take orders--?

Bradley: He wanted to control the presidential campaign, which he had done with Kennedy. Obviously, from that lineup there--Wyman and Unruh--we sold them some sort of a compromise, which didn't work very well. There was an upstairs and downstairs in the headquarters. Some of the staff were Unruh people. It was a horrible campaign, but it was never in trouble anyway, so it didn't make any difference.

Fry: You mean Johnson was going to make it anyway?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Did that affect Salinger's campaign?

Bradley: Only to the extent that I spent some time on the presidential campaign which I regretted. I don't think it would have made any difference, no. I felt a little guilty about it because I never really was anxious to do that dual job anyway. But, the Governor felt it was important for his relationship with the White House and everything, to see that a good campaign was conducted for the President, and so we did it. It was a pretty good campaign, despite all the mess, the fighting.

Salinger's Appointment to the Senate

Fry: There was a lot that went on down there. It kind of contrasted with what I had picked up on the Salinger campaign in general, but that may not be the correct picture. Let me back up to, say, right after the primary election, which Salinger won over Cranston by a little bit. Then Clair Engle died in late July. How did Pierre's appointment to that vacancy immediately afterward come about? Did you have a hand in it?

Bradley: Yes, I did. I talked to Pat about it. Pierre was in Indonesia, I think. He was someplace away. I know I had an awful time getting ahold of him. He wanted it very badly. We discussed the possibility before, but I don't think he had ever discussed with the Governor. Anyway, he was the nominee, and the Governor wanted to appoint him, which I think was a mistake now. But I didn't think so at the time. So, I was really dead wrong about it. One, Pierre wasn't employed and needed the money [laughter] from the job.

Fry: Oh, he just needed a job.

Bradley: Sure he did. He had gone off payroll when he left the White House, and he hadn't had any income since, and he wasn't that well off. There was a little talk about a caretaker, about appointing a caretaker to the unexpired term. But I don't think we gave that much thought.

Anyway, I got ahold of Pierre who immediately flew back and was appointed by Brown. I think that was a mistake because I think people resented his being the Senator without ever being elected.

Fry: I guess all the post mortems could see that, but it was pretty hard to see at the time.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: So, he was already then in the Senator's seat. One thing that I read was that he didn't get out here after that very much to campaign, that out of the four weeks left in the campaign, or whatever it was, he only campaigned two weeks.

Bradley: It's true he could have campaigned more. He got involved immediately in the business of the Senate. He knew everybody, and I think he would have been a good Senator for that reason.

Bradley: He really was involved. But it became hard for him to campaign, and he didn't put as much time as we would have liked or he would have liked, but he felt some responsibility to the job. But I don't think that was a big factor.

Fry: You don't?

Bradley: No. Johnson certainly supported him vigorously. He came out here and campaigned with him and all that. We had enough money really. We weren't--I think we were outspent but I don't think we were winning. I think we were losing; that's all.

Fry: Some of the things that I read said that there were a lot of resentments against Pierre Salinger because of the rather grim event of Clair Engle's death and the pressures that had been brought on Clair Engle to resign early, and that there were all those northern counties that Clair Engle had had before, when he was a congressman, where people were very loyal to him. Did you sense this, that there was a problem up there?

Bradley: Yes, there was a problem, but that wasn't really getting to Pierre. Pierre was not involved in the pressuring, or in getting Clair not to run or anything.

November Campaign

Fry: No, but then when he was appointed to take Clair Engle's seat.

Bradley: I'm sure there was some, some resentment. But then that's not a great populous area. It's only one congressional district out of--I think at the time we had thirty-four or something like that.

Fry: Where did you lose the campaign, in Los Angeles County?

Bradley: In Los Angeles County, and in Bakersfield and, you know, the lower Valley. It's the Bible belt. It's well-defined.

Fry: Do you think if you could have gotten things more unified in Los Angeles County that he could have won there?

Bradley: No.

Fry: What do you see that you could have done that might have saved that campaign?

Bradley: I don't think it could have been saved. I don't think that party unity would have done it either. You know, Murphy didn't hit--the reporters love fights in a party. They play them up to beat hell, but I don't think it affects people very much.

Fry: It's pretty much an in-group thing, isn't it?

Bradley: Yes. It's almost incestuous, it's so small.

Fry: Was it largely due to things that were happening on the Republican side?

Bradley: No, there wasn't much happening on the Republican side. I think we just ran into a voter rebellion, the backlash, as I explained before. I think that was the reason he lost.

Fry: There were some vulnerabilities that Murphy had, and I wondered if you took advantage of those any. Like he had some business failures and he had some connections--though they were a little remote--to Las Vegas. He had income-tax evasion charges.

Bradley: That was never--Yes, well, I think we took advantage of them as much as we could. The connection with Vegas was kind of weak anyway. It wasn't a good case. He just came on and reassured people that--

They'd had it. And, of course, Pat ran into it strongly in '66. They just dumped him. I think we were up against a trend.

Fry: Salinger's lead was 18 percent right after the primary.

Bradley: Twenty-two percent, I think.

Fry: Oh, was it?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Then right after the appointment it fell to about 12 percent. Did this give you pause?

Bradley: I think that's natural. No, not then; it was when we started--That happens all the time. Somebody who wins a contested primary always looks good because the other side hasn't done anything. See, Murphy didn't have any battle or anything. So the winner of a contested primary always looks better and then drops down some. That just [1978] happened to Evelle Younger. See, he looked pretty good right after he won the primary--they were all saying [Edmund G., Jr. (Jerry)] Brown was in trouble, it was narrow, and everything. But that happens all the time.

Fry: One of the things that political scientists are always trying to assess is how important is the publication of a poll in affecting a campaign. As the poll starts down a few points, do you think that this causes it then to go down even more?

Bradley: I don't know. It has several different effects. I've heard this argument, been through it myself, and I don't really know what I believe. It hurts fundraising if it looks like you're in trouble, but it also causes a rallying of the clan and quite a bit of help when it looks like you've got a contest. If he had stayed at twenty-two points ahead, people would have said, "Ho-hum, who needs help." So I don't know what the effect of those things are.

Fry: Television was awfully important in this campaign, I guess.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Did Pierre Salinger get enough television?

Bradley: You mean paid television?

Fry: Paid television.

Bradley: I think we had enough, yes.

Fry: What do you think about him, compared to George Murphy, as a television candidate?

Bradley: Well, he was poor. He was jowly and heavy and very quick and very--He had a great sense of humor, which didn't come over at all on television. He was kind of ponderous about it, kind of a smartass, which we discussed many times.

But it's difficult when you're running a friend. You see, I couldn't imagine nobody saw the spark that this guy had. He's kind of a pied piper. Pierre's a very interesting guy who always creates excitement, and people follow him. He's just a fascinating guy, and it wasn't coming through on TV at all. We had a lot of sessions. We went to tape studios and things and went over it with experts and one thing and another. But it never really improved much.

Fry: You mean you would video-tape and then watch the performance and criticize it?

Bradley: Yes, and watch it.

Fry: It didn't change anything?

Bradley: No.

Fry: It sounds awful--like I hear you saying that Pierre Salinger really doesn't take advice too much.

Bradley: No, he's a little headstrong. A lot of candidates are. It's very difficult to change spots of people anyway. What we were asking him to do really was to change his whole TV personality, and that would have come hard. He probably would have been uncomfortable with it. It's not a good idea to change anybody too much.

Fry: Oh the other hand, I can think of a couple of Republican candidates who you might not have had that much trouble with if you had run their campaign.

Bradley: True.

Fry: Such as Reagan or even--what do you think about Murphy?

Bradley: Murphy just came through as a nice warm guy, you know. He didn't have any great personality. He just seemed like a--"Well, he's all right," sort of thing.

Fry: Who was running his campaign?

Bradley: I don't even remember.

Fry: Was there a--?

Bradley: One of the L.A. firms. Spencer-Roberts, I think. But it was being run primarily out of one of the studios. Walt Disney was very helpful to him. What's the name of the color process? Technicolor people were all deeply involved in it.

Fry: You mean as technicians?

Bradley: They were involved in the fundraising and everything too. They were really his friends and supporters.

Fry: Who down there were Pierre Salinger's main friends and supporters, money-wise?

Bradley: A guy named Gene Klein. Well, Wyman was the key to his financial support. Gene Klein of National General Corporation and, oh, the guy from MCA, Music Corporation of America, Lou Wasserman. They were big in it.

Fry: Was Pierre Salinger married at this time?

Bradley: Yes, to his second wife. It was in Washington. She only came out a couple of times. That was another kind of difficult thing. They were in the throes of divorce or threatening it. It wasn't a good arrangement. It kind of got around some.

Fry: That's right. I did read that was one of his vulnerabilities. In this same campaign Rockefeller had lost in California against Goldwater in the primary, and one of the reasons given there was his divorce. Do you think that's right?

Bradley: Well, I do. But there's a very peculiar reason for it. He married a woman who left her kids to marry him. That's what I heard the most about. Happy--she left her children with her former husband to become Rocky's wife. I think that did have a lot to do with it. People didn't like that.

Fry: Then she had a baby during the campaign, which reminded everybody of the whole thing.

Bradley: Yes. The specter of her having another child and having left the previous ones, it was pretty hard for some people to take, I think.

Fry: The other vulnerabilities that I read that Pierre Salinger had were his--he had a drunk arrest on his record and a state income tax evasion?

Bradley: No, I don't think so. I don't think so. He may have owed some taxes. I don't think he had any evasion. He did have the drunk arrest, but they didn't do much with that. Murphy didn't run a dirty campaign.

Fry: I found in the Pat Brown papers a letter from someone that was outlining these, but it was after the general election was over. They also mentioned his mother's leftist associations here in San Francisco. That could have really been blown up into something big.

Bradley: It wasn't though.

Fry: No red herrings?

Bradley: No, I don't think that was a factor at all.

Lu Engle; Jesse Unruh

Fry: Let me check over this and see if there's anything else that I need to ask you. Do you have anything to wrap it up with, that I haven't asked you that you'd like to talk about before we move on?

Bradley: No.

One of the fantastic chapters--if you wrote the Engles' story it would be rejected by the fiction publisher. It was really hard to believe when it was happening, with Mrs. Engle really being the Senator and obviously liking it. It was a fantastic thing. Everybody had the knowledge of what really Clair's prognosis was. I mean inside they had the knowledge of it.

Fry: How did they get that?

Bradley: Dan Kimball, former secretary of the navy, who was a great friend of Clair Engle's, really was his staunchest supporter and friend, he knew and he told us. He didn't want to see it happen. He didn't want to see Engle run. He was trying to arrange for Clair or Mrs. Engle to get a good job or something of the kind, that he really felt it was a terrible thing to do to Clair.

Libby Smith Gatov and Roger Kent and I were in talking to Clair and then came out. Mrs. Engle had been terrible to Libby who she considered, or said, was just trying to get Clair out of there. She rallied support on the Hill from other Senators to support the theory that he was going to be all right. Most of them knew that he wasn't.

Fry: They even campaigned for him, didn't they, back here in the primary. Was Waldie in there?

Bradley: Yes, he was involved in that. Of course, Mrs. Engle eventually supported Salinger just before the primary.

Fry: Who else did you get support from? What about Yorty?

Bradley: Oh, I'm sorry. Just before--yes, well it was just before the primary, yes.

Fry: Let me see. Engle withdrew on April 28.

Bradley: Right, and she came out for Salinger.

Fry: Yes, so there was a whole month, more than a month until the primary election.

Bradley: Right. Waldie really was influential in getting her to come out for Salinger. And Jesse. Waldie and Jesse.

Fry: Did Jesse at all talk to Salinger about coming out? Do you know?

Bradley: No, he didn't. That was rumored all over the place, but it wasn't.

Fry: Yes, the impression was that Salinger was an Unruh ploy.

Bradley: It was not true. As a matter of fact, it was quite a while after Pierre was out here before Unruh decided he would support him.

Fry: You had trouble getting his support?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: That's funny, because he sure wouldn't have supported Cranston. He was really--

Bradley: Well, he was trying to make deals for his support. Right after the primary Pierre and I flew up from Palm Springs to have a dinner with Unruh and the publisher of the Long Beach newspaper, in which he tried to get Salinger to say that he would not support the Governor for re-election in '66.

Fry: Who tried to get him to say that?

Bradley: Unruh tried to get him to say it and the publisher of the Long Beach paper. The Long Beach paper then went against Salinger because he wouldn't agree to that. They were for Murphy.

That was loaded with intrigue that year. That's the most I've ever seen. Of course, I was deeply involved in it myself.

Fry: So, Unruh was trying to line up his ducks for '66 for the governor's race.

Bradley: Right. The Governor having come out and supported Salinger--this was immediately after the primary, like three days--Salinger wouldn't agree to it. Pierre had always liked the Governor anyway, despite the fact that he wasn't for him in the primary. Pierre never really was angry with him. There was no real strain there.

Fry: What did Pierre Salinger do when this was over?

Bradley: Ritter was the publisher of the paper. I forget which one. There were several Ritter brothers involved--Walter.

Fry: What newspaper support did you have, because Pierre had been the news spokesman for the White House. Did you have a lot of good press, or did you still have problems?

Bradley: No, editorially we didn't get a lot of support.

Fry: What did the L.A. Times do?

Bradley: They supported Murphy. Pierre always thought he was going to get more newspaper support than he did. It just wasn't forthcoming.

Fry: What did the San Francisco Chronicle do?

Bradley: They supported Murphy too, I think. I'm pretty sure.

Fry: In the primary, did you have any?

Bradley: I think they rode that out. I don't remember. A lot of newspapers took a position in the Democratic primary and then went for Murphy afterwards. Some of them supported Salinger and then supported Murphy. Newspapers justify that and say they've got a duty to point out who the best man for each party is.

Fry: Yes, because in the primary they were also taking positions in the Republican race too.

##

National Convention Maneuvers

Fry: There was this big flap about who was going to be the national committeeman and national committeewoman that was handled, I think, in the election of August 15. Warschaw wanted to be national committeewoman, and she would be coming from the south. But Pat Brown wanted Libby Gatov and Gene Wyman as committeeman and committeewoman. Do you remember all of that?

Bradley: I remember that.

Fry: Did you have to take sides?

Bradley: Oh, probably. I don't remember what I did. I'm sure I did.

Fry: That was when Warschaw put out her pens and so forth that said, "Get it in writing," because she said Wyman had promised her that he would support her and then he backed down.

Bradley: Yes, I remember that. It was a big public fight, but it wasn't a strong fight in the party. Let's see if I have one of those pens. Somebody gave one to me not long ago. Oh no, oh no.

Fry: One of those that says, "Get it in writing. Love, Carmen"?

Bradley: No, I gave it to Joe Cerrell. I had it. That's a Pierre Salinger pen.

Fry: Did you go to the convention?

Bradley: Oh, yes.

Fry: What do you know about the move for Pat Brown--There was a little story about Pat Brown for vice-president.

Bradley: Just some people having some fun, I think The whole convention was waiting with bated breath to see who Johnson was going to name. So, there wasn't any real--

Fry: I thought Pat was one of the more serious contenders. You don't think he was.

Bradley: I think Pat had talked to Johnson. I think he was a little hopeful Johnson might reach out for him as a vice-presidential candidate. But within the convention there was no real support for that. I think they would have accepted him if Johnson had named him, but he wasn't really in contention. It was down to a couple of Senators, I think, at that time.

Fry: And Humphrey got it.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Pat was given the job of being one of the two people to nominate Johnson, however.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Did you have anything to do with that?

Bradley: I think so. Yes. We negotiated that a little, asked for it. Then Pat went on nationwide TV and they interrupted it because Johnson was coming in on the floor or something and nobody ever heard it. [chuckling] I was the secretary of that delegation too. I went back there in advance and put it together in that decaying place [Atlantic City, New Jersey].

We had a hotel--it's just recently been bought for a gambling casino--which had been elegant in its day but was falling apart. People got in the bathrooms and the doorknobs would come off, and they couldn't get out. [laughter] Plaster fell on people. It was really awful. It became a joke, fortunately. If you couldn't laugh, it would have been tragic.

Fry: What about the main issue of that convention, which was the seating of the Mississippi freedom delegation? Which side were you on? Did you want the moderate side, which was to provide for a more democratic election of these people in Mississippi the next convention?

Bradley: I was for that position. Legally they were entitled to be seated. The Mississippi freedom delegation really had no legal claim on being seated at all. But I wasn't deeply involved in it.

Fry: You had some pretty fiery speeches on that, like Richard Richards.

Bradley: Yes. That was kind of a knee-jerk position for Richards to take anyway. I don't really remember that. It wasn't a huge fight. That's the only thing they had to write about, because Johnson's nomination was a shoo-in. They were simply awaiting his word on who was going to be vice-president. That's about all they had to battle about.

Fry: I'm just curious--did the delegation break up along its expected lines on that, between your liberals and your moderates?

Bradley: I think so, yes.

Fry: The other thing I wanted to ask you was, on that delegation did Pierre's winning of the primary then--how does this work--did that mean that other people were brought into the delegation after the primary who otherwise might not have, because of Pierre's strong showing?

Bradley: Yes, I think it did. Although, you know, there was a complete and immediate accord with the Governor, so there was no real battle over that. Pierre was aligned with the Governor.

Fry: Did that mean that some of the Cranston people didn't support Salinger?

Bradley: Yes. We were doing all we could to see that the Cranston people came back in to support Salinger. So, there really wasn't--Outside of Carmen's dissatisfaction, with the world at that time--she was dissatisfied with everything and mad at the Governor--it was pretty harmonious, the selection of the delegation and the conduct of it. It was all fairly harmonious.

Fair Housing Backlash; Vietnam Issue

Fry: When you look back on it now do you see things that anticipated the problems of '66, where everything seemed to kind of fall apart?

Bradley: With the voters, certainly, it was the beginning of the backlash period.

Fry: Then when Prop. 14 really did pass, did you see this as something that you thought you could get over and somehow deal with if the supreme court [of California] acted?

Bradley: We were hopeful of that--and of course the thing was knocked down. The whole episode of fair housing in retrospect was a mistake. We pushed to put fair housing through the legislature hard. The Governor really worked hard at that. I was handling his liaison with the senate at the time, and it was difficult. We had a terrible time getting it through.

Then, of course, it caused the immediate backlash of having an initiative put on, Proposition 14, to nullify it. Meanwhile the Congress was moving. So it never really was effective, never really was the law. It was the law, but it was so contested that it was never put into effect, fair housing wasn't. Then Prop. 14 nullified it. Then the supreme court knocked that down. And by that time there was a federal housing law.

Fry: Yes, Johnson's civil rights act had gone in by '64.

Bradley: Right. So, in effect we had fought a battle over nothing, and it was a hurtful battle. It really divided people in this state.

Fry: There was another issue that was just raising its ugly head, which was the Vietnam war, and Berkeley had had its sit-it with the 801 students hauled out from Sproul Hall. Did Pierre and you see fit to bring this in as any kind of stand that he should take in the election?

Bradley: No, we didn't. I don't think we got into the Vietnam war to any great extent.

Fry: Do you know what his personal opinion was of the Vietnam involvement?

Bradley: Yes. He had great misgivings about it and thought we were pursuing maybe a losing course. I think really Kennedy had started having misgivings about it, although he was throwing troops and money at it in increasing amounts. I think Salinger shared that. I don't remember how strongly he was involved in it though. But he went on that tour. He went to Vietnam after the primary.

Fry: Between the primary and the general election?

Bradley: Right. He was on that trip when we called him back to get his appointment as Senator. He was traveling for Look magazine and was doing an article on that trip for them.

Fry: To make some money?

Bradley: To make some money, yes.

Fry: Did he ever write that article?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: He actually got to Vietnam?

Gradley: He was someplace in Southeast Asia. My recollection is it was in Indonesia when we called him back. He was in Jakarta, I'm pretty sure. Then I had to wait twenty hours to get a phone call through to him. It was wireless.

Fry: That article would have come out in Look then shortly thereafter, right, if we wanted to find it? Was he doing anything else to make money for himself in this period?

Bradley: No, I think that was his--it was a difficult problem. You know, you don't like to take living expenses out of campaign money. He had accumulated back pay from the White House which lasted him for a while. The whole thing was a problem. He had a family to support and a bunch of kids. It was tough. So he was looking forward--As a matter of fact, I think he got an advance on that story from Look magazine.

Fry: It intrigues me what you said about Kennedy having some real reservations about it.

Bradley: That's my understanding. Humphrey told me that once, too, that Kennedy had had reservations about how deep our involvement was getting. Of course, everybody was frustrated by our inability to control the situation militarily. We always thought, "Oh, we've got enough power and resources and everything to do that," leaving aside whether we should have or not. We just never made a dent in it, with all that we threw at it.

Fry: So you got this both from Pierre Salinger and Hubert Humphrey.

Bradley: Hubert was much later. In '67 or '68 I saw Hubert in Saigon and he told me parts of it that he--I don't know whether you got it from Roger Kent or not, but Hubert had tremendous reservations about Johnson's Vietnam policy but was unable to really express them without being disloyal. He had an awful problem with that.

Fry: That was one of the things later on that seemed to go against him.

Bradley: Yes, that killed him, I think.

Salinger's Defeat and Deficit

Fry: What did Pierre Salinger do after he lost?

Bradley: That's a good question. He was still Senator for the rest of that year. I forget what he did in January.

Fry: He went to Paris fairly soon, didn't he?

Bradley: Oh, I'm darned if I remember. I know he had met his wife when she came out to cover for--I think Paris Match she was working for, one of the news magazines in France, and toured with us part of the time.

Fry: Is that where he met her? During the campaign?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: They're still married, right?

Bradley: Yes, Nicole. They have a son, too, by that marriage.

Fry: Her name is Nicole?

Bradley: Nicole, yes. She just wrote a book with--Arthur Schlesinger, I think it was who collaborated on a book with her. She's a very bright girl.

I remember what Salinger did now. He stayed in Los Angeles, and he worked for Continental Airlines. First he worked for Gene Klein, I think, at National General and then Continental Airlines. Then he went to work for one of those offshore funds. That's what took him overseas. Gramco was it. It was a real estate investment fund much like IOS was. They all got into trouble later on. International Overseas Services or something like that. Anyway, it was IOS. There was a big scandal with IOS.

Fry: Is that the same one that James Roosevelt was in?

Bradley: Yes, that's the same one.

Fry: Was that the connection that enabled Pierre to--?

Bradley: Roosevelt was IOS. Pierre was in one called Gramco, which some guy who had worked in the White House at one time formed. I don't remember his name.

Fry: I see.

Bradley: He became vice-president of that and became an immediate millionaire on paper, but it never quite worked out that way.

Fry: There was a rumor after the election, in about February of 1965, in the Democratic Volunteer, which is a Democratic newsletter, that you would replace Joe Cerrell as national committeeman?

Bradley: Joe Cerrell wasn't national committeeman.

Fry: I know. That's why I was a little bit disturbed about this note because the national committeeman at that point was Wyman. Did you ever consider being national committeeman?

Bradley: No, I never was interested in elective or party office. I was the paid guy. We don't pay any of our officeholders.

Fry: Right. [laughter]

Bradley: I couldn't have accepted. I couldn't afford it.

Fry: You can't be--Could you be an officeholder and also a pro?

Bradley: Some states do that. They pay a salary to their state chairman. I never heard of a national committee person getting paid though. How much time do you have? I have an appointment coming in at eleven o'clock.

Fry: We've got five minutes. So after this was over, what did you do?

Bradley: I started preparing for Brown's reelection in '66

Fry: Was there a big to-do about that?

Bradley: We re-formed a thing called the Democratic Coordinating Committee, and I went to work for them. Then I had deficit problems, trying to raise money for the Salinger deficit. I was still involved in that.

Fry: Alan Cranston wrote a big article that came out in Fortune on the million-dollar candidate who lost. How did you go about making up that enormous deficit?

Bradley: We did some fundraisers. Bobby came out and helped. I know we did a fundraiser with him. We took some money and settled parts of it, paying people off partially. A lot of it was in loans, big loans, and there was some forgiveness of them, partial forgiveness in some cases and complete in some others.

Fry: Were those personal loans or bank loans?

Bradley: No, they were bank loans. Pierre was on the loans himself, as well as other people. He went on a speaking tour and raised his part of it and got himself out of it.

Fry: You mean he managed to pay off some.

Bradley: Yes. I think the last thing we had was an event with Bobby which raised some money. We used that to settle the last of it.

Fry: So you could start with a clean slate on Pat Brown's campaign?

Bradley: Well, Pat didn't owe the money, but Pat did help get rid of it, yes.

Fry: I know, but I suppose these would be the same sources that would be asked to also--

Bradley: The same sources and the same creditors too.

Fry: Yes, give to Pat.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: So you had what, the Democratic--What was the name of that--?

Bradley: Democratic Coordinating Committee.

Fry: Who was that?

Bradley: That was Pat.

Fry: Who was on it?

Bradley: Oh, I don't know. It wasn't much of a committee. Gene Wyman and Libby, Roger. It was a front really to--the official party is not supposed to get involved in primaries, you know.

Fry: In the meantime, Pat was becoming more the antagonist toward the CDC. You had to do something to--

Bradley: Not really. Pat was never antagonistic. We tried to control some of the resolutions that they were--in the mid-term, when they didn't have nominations, some of the resolutions would get a little wild, but Pat never went away from the CDC.

Fry: No, but there was a big fight over getting the president out.

Bradley: Si Casady, yes. Si Casady was running around the state making speeches about things that were somewhat embarrassing to Pat.

Fry: Did you help in getting him out?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: How did you do that?

Bradley: I don't know. You call people and talk to them about it, tell them they're not being responsible and things like that.

Fry: So it was really getting votes on your side from the CDCers.

Bradley: Right. See, I was involved in the formation of CDC. I knew those people very well.

Fry: Also, along about this time Roger Kent was seeming to lose some of his power. I don't know why. I've talked to Roger and I still don't know why.

Bradley: I don't know that he was. I think he had been in office an awful long time, but I don't think he was losing power in northern California.

Fry: You don't.

Bradley: No.

Fry: Well, why was he--

Bradley: Fred Dutton had wanted Roger not to run again. I can't remember when that was, whether it was '66 or '62. I remember we had a battle about it.

Fry: I think it was '65 when Roger was replaced, and he was given the job as chairman of Pat Brown's campaign.

Bradley: That was Roger's choice though. He wanted to get out at that time.

Fry: Did he?

Bradley: Yes. But there had been a fight before that, and he had stayed in. Well, he had the votes; it was very easy. I don't think it went very far. I remember Dutton asked me if I would ask him not to run and I told him I didn't agree with it at all. I guess that was prior to '62.

Fry: Why didn't Dutton want him to run?

Bradley: I don't know. He had some idea that we should get new leadership. Actually Roger was being very effective. I disagreed with that thoroughly.

Fry: At any rate, he did step down before 1966 as the Democratic chairman. Was this a real change in his role or just one on paper? Did it really make a change?

Bradley: No, it was really pretty much on paper. Bob Coate took over at that time, and they were very close, and he helped Bob. I think he just thought it was time for him to get out.

Fry: Do you have time to tell me what you saw early as the major strategies for the campaign? Who did you think Pat would be running against?

Bradley: We were pretty sure it was going to be Reagan. He and Christopher had a battle in the primary, but I don't think Christopher ever really was in contention. He didn't run well at all.

Fry: You thought that you wanted to kill off Christopher because--

Bradley: No, I didn't. That was an argument. That was a horrible campaign. A guy named Harry Lerner developed this old case against Christopher, which had been played many times, about his having been arrested actually for diluting milk. I never wanted to bring it up, because I never thought Christopher was a threat. But I used to say that campaign policy depended on whose day off it was.

I was away one Sunday, and Hale Champion, who was for doing this, and Harry got to Pat, and they agreed that they would try to get this out. They got some guy from the state finance department to go down and investigate it, and they got caught using a state employee to do the investigation. It became known that we had promoted this expose, which wasn't a very good expose anyway.

Fry: How was he investigated? It was a matter of public record, wasn't it?

Bradley: He found some witnesses or something like that. I don't remember.

Fry: You said, "go down to do it." Where?

Bradley: San Rafael. This happened in Marin County.

Fry: Did you consider that Christopher was the candidate on the Republican side that you wanted to preserve? Did you see Reagan as being easier to run against or harder?

Bradley: Harder, but what we really thought--I'm sure Roger brought this up if you discussed this. Roger had been making great efforts to get the people who were supporting Christopher who couldn't buy Reagan because he was too right wing--Christopher was more moderate--to agree that if Christopher didn't make it, that they would switch over to Brown.

This destroyed all that. Roger was furious about it. Most of Christopher's support was in northern California. Roger had contacted these people and knew them personally. He had done an awfully good job, and we had planned--because we were pretty sure Christopher was going to go down the tubes--right afterwards to form a committee of Republicans for Brown that would really have some substance to it. Of course, the attack on Christopher laid at our doorstep, which was true, destroyed that. We never did get those people, or we got a few maybe but not very many. They just sort of stayed out.

Staff and Funding

Fry: There was quite a lot written in the press and quite a lot made of the fact that there was so much dissension on Pat Brown's staff between you and Dutton--

Bradley: Dutton and Champion, yes.

Fry: --who was brought in later, and Champion.

Bradley: Yes, there was a lot of dissension.

Fry: Why was Dutton brought in? He had been in Washington all this time.

Bradley: Sending memos. He sent along memos, and of course he second-guessed the primary pretty heavily and said Pat was in trouble, which was obvious, and he was brought in.

Then Hale Champion and Dutton and I were sort of a troika in the thing. But Champion and I were usually in agreement, so Dutton didn't really affect the campaign too much.

Fry: So, it was sort of a Dutton versus Champion and you.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Again, this was run largely from southern California.

Bradley: Yes, it was run entirely from there really.

Fry: I read that in the '64 campaign there was some enormous amount--like 80 percent of the funds for Salinger's campaign was used in southern California.

Bradley: And raised in southern California.

Fry: And raised?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: What about Pat Brown's '66 campaign. How did that--

Bradley: It would have been much the same, you know, 75 to 80 percent. That's not abnormal. There's a lot more money in the south for politics.

Fry: We've kind of set the stage. Why don't we stop there. Then I'll try to get a few chronologies and things in the mail. Do you need that? You seem to remember things pretty well.

Bradley: It's a little helpful, but I don't really need it.

Fry: You do awfully well without it.

VI CHANGING DEMOCRATIC FORTUNES: ISSUE CAMPAIGNS, 1966-1978

[Interview 6: January 30, 1979]##

Senate Reapportionment Impact

Fry: Last time you had discussed the importance of southern California in political campaigns and the fact that most of the money comes from there anyway. This business of the southern California growth and the impact on campaigns might have another corollary here that I wanted to ask you about. In Anderson and Reeves' write-up on the 1966 election in Western Political Quarterly, they say that [reads] "of equal or perhaps more lasting historical significance was the impact of the 1965 reapportionment of legislative districts under the Supreme Court ruling of one-man, one-vote. For the first time since becoming a state, the balance of political power in the California legislature had been relocated from northern to southern California."

Now, put that with what I have been told about the most powerful viable political organization in California is that of the legislators, and I wonder what impact that had on the '66 campaign. Can you cook all that together for me?

Bradley: I don't think it had much impact on the '66 campaign because it was just coming into effect. It was done on a court order, rather than at the end of the census, and it hadn't had the effect yet.

It did in party politics, of course. It just increased the amount of control that the legislators had on the party, which has always been a little too much.

Fry: And that was felt not so much in '66?

Bradley: No, I think it was felt quite a bit more afterwards, when the senate changed very much as a consequence.

Fry: Yes, you had thirteen or sixteen new senators to elect from L.A. county only, in the '66 campaign.

Bradley: And really, the strength of the party legislatively has been from having liberal senators from the rural areas. California, unlike any other state--where the reapportionment probably bettered the legislature--I don't think it helped it particularly from the Democratic standpoint. As a matter of fact, I'm sure it didn't. We'd had very dedicated legislators from small counties in senate districts, and they had done magnificent work because they were freer of pressures from their constituencies and were able to take on big jobs.

For instance, Senator Arnold, from Modoc, Lassen,and Plumas, took on and over a period of four years revised the whole penal code for juveniles. They took on jobs like that. Because their only constituent service was to watch out for the local irrigation districts or the smaller things. They weren't subject to the same kinds of pressures that the urban legislators were.

And of course, we've made great strides there. We got up to thirty members of the senate, mostly by winning those small districts, and then as soon as it switches back to the urban thing, it becomes very much the formula of registrations--you know, if it's fifty-six or seven percent, it'll probably be represented by a Democrat. If it isn't, it'll be represented by a Republican. But we were holding districts that didn't have that kind of registration, or we did for a long time.

Fry: You mean that kind of proportions?

Bradley: Yes. Out in the small districts. The personal contact and being known is so much more important there. I think that one of the greatest things we did in the party was to ferret out and encourage people to run in those small districts. We had some wonderful legislators--really first-class.

Fry: And after reapportionment, the legislators that are elected in those districts are what--they have less power when they get there, or they're all combined with the urban?

Bradley: There aren't any of those districts. There's only two or three. There had to be at least one senator from every three counties, was the base requirement. So if you take counties like I just mentioned--Modoc, Lassen, Plumas, Sierra, Amador--small counties like that, you had a lot of the senate came from rural California.

Fry: Let me ask you one more question on that. Can you think of any urban liberal Democratic senators who were able to take the place of the reform element in the legislature for the Democratic party?

Bradley: Oh, yes. There were some, but there just weren't as many. There was a whole force of these people. We had maybe twenty top-rate legislators, and with reapportionment a lot of them didn't even run again. There was no way they could--they would be three and four in a district, incumbents. So Pat appointed some of them to the bench--Senator Rattigan from Santa Rosa and Senator Arnold and Senator Cobey and Senator Regan are some that come to mind. I think there were others that went onto the bench because they no longer had districts that they could represent.

Fry: That's really interesting. In the campaigns themselves, did you miss their influence?

Bradley: Oh, very much so. They were very party-oriented, but they had been helped by us. In most cases, we had gotten them to run and had provided funds and technical help for their campaigns.

Fry: And it sounds like you ran a different type of campaign in the mountain and rural counties.

Bradley: Oh, very different, yes. But they also were people who were inclined to help and had strong feelings about the party. That's why we got them.

The Watts Riot and the Backlash: Influences on the Gubernatorial Campaign

Fry: Also, in setting this scene for 1966, there were--in between '64 and '66--the Watts riots that occurred, I believe, in August of '65. So that was supposed to have had an impact on Pat Brown's race in '66. Did you see it that way, as something to worry about?

Bradley: Yes, I think the unrest was something to worry about because once again we had the unrest of the blacks and the backlash from the majority, blue-collar people, which we never overcame. They just didn't vote for Pat.

Fry: Because of a feel for the need for law and order?

Bradley: Yes, and a kind of general feeling that the blacks [gets up to close door]. There was a feeling that the Democrats were separating the blacks and giving them special attention, that they were getting things that the others weren't, which they resented. That's what the backlash was.

Fry: You also had expectations that there might be other riots. Everyone had expected Oakland to have a riot.

Bradley: Well, there was another riot.

Fry: And there was another Watts riot, yes.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: Which was sort of downgraded, I guess, from the first one.

Bradley: Yes. It wasn't as bad.

Fry: And you did have Hunter's Point, too.

Bradley: Yes, that's a--.

Fry: What about the blacks themselves? Somewhere in my notes I have the fact that Pat Brown during the campaign had held a meeting in Watts, with uneven results.

Bradley: There was no uneven result in the black vote. The black vote supported him as well or better than they had. I don't remember the incident you're talking about--a meeting in Watts?

Fry: I think what he did was go down and held a meeting with some of the Watts leaders.

Bradley: During the riot or during the campaign?

Fry: No, I'm talking about during the campaign now.

Bradley: I don't remember. I don't think so. Maybe. I don't remember that. I think we were trying to de-emphasize that. I doubt if we would've held a meeting, but maybe we did.

Fry: It may not have been very public. I'll have to look and see what that note is.

Fry: As you got started then, you were lined up for Pat to run against either Christopher or Reagan, and the polls showed Pat in the lead at first, but I believe he lost his lead in the polls in April against Reagan. That's when he would be put up against Reagan.

Bradley: Our polls never showed him in the lead the whole time. I don't know what polls did. I don't remember that.

Fry: This would've been the California Poll.

Bradley: He's often wrong, you know. I don't know how he gets by so well with his reputation. He's so damn wrong so often.

Fry: What polls were you using?

Bradley: We were using a guy named Don Muchmore--he polled for us.

Fry: Oh, yes. And Muchmore showed that Pat was having trouble.

Bradley: Sure did, yes. From the beginning.

Fry: What was your main strategy then in the primary?

Bradley: Well, [laughs] that's a good question.

Fry: You know, Yorty was messing it up.

Bradley: Yes, but we didn't play to Yorty. Well, he may have helped fan the discontent of the backlash some. He played to that. But I don't remember what our express goal was. We were trying to get some more support for the Governor, and also we were doing some negative things, obviously, with the Christopher thing, which was a mistake.

Fry: How were you handling the Vietnam riots issue?

Bradley: We didn't go into it from a campaign standpoint. The Governor had gone down, as I recall, to the University, where they had some disturbance at Berkeley and waded into the situation, but it wasn't a campaign issue, particularly.

Fry: Are you referring to the Sproul Hall sit-in, when he called out the gendarmes?

Bradley: Yes. [Brief discussion about heat in room.]

Fry: Also, Unruh was apparently in control of a lot of campaign money. He had a group called Committee for Better Government, and he gave dinners and he had raised $200,000, according to one article I read, to pay some 1964 debts. Was that Salinger's?

Bradley: No, I don't think he raised any money for Salinger. He didn't even support Salinger in the run-off. He didn't leave him publicly, but he didn't do anything for Salinger. I already told you the story about his asking Salinger before the '64 campaign to agree not to support the Governor, which he wouldn't do. From there on, there was no support.

Fry: Then in '66, what was Unruh doing? Did you get his undying support? [Laughs.]

Bradley: No, I think we had his very superficial support.

Fry: Did it interfere with your raising money in the South?

Bradley: No, we raised plenty of money. We didn't lose that campaign for want of money. As a matter of fact, it was quite a tribute that we were able to raise that much money in face of polls which showed that they were losing. But we spent about $3 million.

Fry: It's also surprising--I would've thought that the competition would've been so fierce with forty senate seats contested that the money could've been spread rather thin.

Bradley: I don't know. The sources of money are different. We didn't have any problem anywhere. As a matter of fact, we helped some of the legislators, in that we supported a senator in Los Angeles, for instance. I think we gave him about $10,000.

Fry: Wedworth?

Bradley: Yes. It turned out to be a horrible mistake. Jess had been talking about running for the senate at that time, you know. As a matter of fact, he filed for the senate. Or he took out an intent to run for the senate. But he didn't do it. He backed off.

Fry: Is that the state senate?

Bradley: Yes. You were talking about all the new districts.

Fry: Last time you said that, as you can remember, you were always aiming at Reagan, not Christopher, as the one that the Democrats wanted to kill off in the primaries. Did I understand that right?

Bradley: Yes, that was my attitude, you see, but--

Fry: Oh, but you weren't agreed with.

Bradley: No. As a matter of fact on Christopher, which was laid at out doorstep--that was really just a big disagreement, and I think a mistake.

Fry: It looks like it proved that way.

Bradley: Well, it was obvious to me that Christopher didn't have enough support to win the primary. So therefore, the more votes he took away from Reagan, the less impressive his victory would be. Taking all the other elements of potential support out of it, that just seemed to me to be obvious.

Fry: Who were some of the other helpers in this campaign? Did you have Baus-Roos hired to help you?

Bradley: Yes, they were brought in to run a Republicans for Brown campaign.

Fry: How did that work out?

Bradley: It cost a lot of money. [Laughs.]

Fry: Were they worth it?

Bradley: No. No, I'm not hitting at their professionalism, but it just wasn't worth the effort.

Fry: How about the Guggenheim campaign?

Bradley: Guggenheim did the film work in the TV commercials. They also did a half-hour film for the Governor, which had a line in it--. I must admit, I didn't see the danger in the line, which had the Governor kidding, talking to some children, and saying he was running for governor. He says, "I'm running against an actor, and you remember that it was an actor that killed Lincoln," or something. But he was laughing, but that didn't show later, and the indignant screams came from all over the place.

Fry: That was run toward the end, wasn't it, of the campaign?

Bradley: Oh, Guggenheim also filmed some negative spots on Reagan, which we ran earlier than our pro spots, which had actors saying, "Reagan's a good actor, but he's not competent to run the government." They were kind of funny, some of them, and I thought they were very effective, but nothing changed anything.

Bradley: We lost the campaign by the same margin we were behind when we started. So we never really made any dent in it. Labor did a magnificent job, in terms of raising money and propogandizing their own members, but we didn't get the votes.

Fry: There was something in this that was bigger than you all were. What was it?

Bradley: It was the backlash, I think. It was there strongly. And people were tired of Pat. Immediately after he lost it, he became a great folk hero. Everybody loves Pat today, and they did about two weeks after the election, but he didn't get enough votes.

Fry: There was something else, too, in the Democratic ranks, a general disaffection going on that in its extreme was represented by demonstrations against the Vietnam War, and against anyone who was in power at the time, sort of, wasn't there?

Bradley: I don't think they defected as a vote, though.

Fry: You don't?

Bradley: No.

Fry: Well, not in the long run. I guess they wouldn't have wanted Reagan, but there was the Peace and Freedom party. Did you see them as siphoning off anything?

Bradley: No, I don't think they got any greater percentage than they had at any other time.

Fry: I guess Robert Scheer--wasn't he kind of the head there?

Bradley: Yes, but that didn't result in our losing votes. We lost votes, not with those people, but we lost votes with the conservative Democrats. I'd say the backbone of the party, the blue-collar majority worker.. That's who we lost. As a matter of fact, we did better in the suburbs than we'd done. Reagan did not appeal to a lot of suburbanites. We upped our percentages in the suburbs and lost it in the traditional Democratic areas. It wasn't from the radicals, and it wasn't from the Peace and Freedom people. It was from those people that we lost.

Fry: That's interesting, because shortly after this 1966 election I heard an analysis of the whole radical movement from one of our history professors, and his thesis was that the radicals bring about the defeat of their own allies by their actions.

Bradley: You mean their actions in repelling other people.

Fry: And put Reagan in power, yes.

Bradley: Well, that might be. In other words, that the people who we lost were voting against them; that's possible. You know, your historians and political scientists tend to take elections after the fact and find their reasons why they went the way they did.

Fry: That's why I'm interviewing you. [Laughs.]

Bradley: I understand. [Laughs.] There was a school of thought that Pat Brown had deserted the liberals, and therefore he lost, and I just don't believe that. I think it was the other way around. I think that he maybe gave more support to the liberals than a lot of people would have liked him to.

Fry: At the Democratic party in September of 1966, Pat said that he wanted to appoint a commission to reconsider the fair housing law, to see what changes should be made in it, and a lot of people saw this as a threat to equal housing opportunities. Do you remember that?

Bradley: No, I don't remember it.

Fry: That was in his speech before the Democratic State Central Committee meeting.

Bradley: September would've been just an executive board meeting.

Fry: Well, maybe it was August. But you don't remember that?

Bradley: No, and I doubt if it was very important.

Fry: I thought maybe at that point Pat was trying to appeal to the more middle-of-the-road Democrats and the more conservative Democrats and recapture some of the ones that seemed to be drifting away to Reagan.

Bradley: Yes, that's possible. We were trying to do that.

Fry: There were two things that were done in an attempt to show that Reagan was not the moderate Republican that he appeared to be in this race. Cranston wrote a paper on Reagan's right-wing extremism--

Bradley: That's right.

Fry: And so did Bob.

Bradley: Well, Bob Coate had a series of press conferences showing Reagan's connection with the extreme left. He was just acting as a spokesperson for the Brown campaign. You know, we made a considerable effort to establish the right-wing connections Reagan had, and Reagan was making every effort to keep as far away from it as he could. That was the major battle.

Fry: Obviously most voters felt that Reagan was middle of the road. Is that right?

Bradley: They felt he was within the acceptable limits, I guess. But they were making a move to the right. They knew that. They felt that need at that time.

Analyzing the Defeat: The Emergence of Issue Politics

Fry: Besides race, on what other issue? Law and order?

Bradley: Not as much. Law and order wasn't a big concern, but the riots were a big concern, if you want to call that a law-and-order issue. And the student unrest was an issue.

Fry: Then you had this business of Reagan as an actor who had never held public office. In the campaign, were you able to trip him up on issues that he didn't know anything about?

Bradley: Yes, several times. He was up in the redwood country and made some real slip. I forget what it was.

Fry: Was that his famous, "If you've seen one redwood, you've seen them all"?

Bradley: Yes. And he obviously didn't know about the reclamation projects and things like, but it didn't seem to make any difference. We were able to point this out, and the press pointed it out religiously, that he was making these kind of mistakes, but it didn't have much effect.

Fry: How about his comparison with Brown on television? That's what a lot of people write about as the thing that put him in.

Bradley: Maybe it did, I don't know. He's good on television, there's no question. But Pat wasn't too bad, and Pat came through as sincere. They just disagreed with him, that's all.

Fry: Do you know if Pat got any added instruction on his television appearances because of Reagan?

Bradley: Not particularly because of Reagan. We went through--. What we'd done before in '62 was to take him to a workshop on his television appearances. I think we were doing rather well. He was the same guy that got elected before, only maybe he was a little better instead of worse. So that wasn't really the issue. I'm sure Reagan was able to sell his personality.

Fry: Did you ever get Yorty to come around during the general election and help you much?

Bradley: Well, Yorty never helped anybody very much. I don't remember whether he came around or not. I think he did. I think he endorsed Pat, but it's only a recollection.

Fry: What about registration? Were there less efforts for a registration of Democrats this time? It was a lower percentage of Democrats who voted this time.

Bradley: Yes, but we made every effort in registration. We really did an extensive registration effort. We worked at it all summer, and we worked at student registration. We worked at everything. We did a very good effort. We had good results on registration. It was just votes we needed. The turnout wasn't as good.

Fry: In the other parallel elections, was anyone a particular liability or a help to you? For instance, Glenn Anderson was running for lieutenant-governor again.

Bradley: He wasn't any great help.

Fry: Against Finch.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: The results look like he might have been a liability, because Finch defeated him with a higher vote than Reagan's vote.

Bradley: If you study a little history, you'll see that always happens. [Laughter.] The lieutenant-governor always wins by more than the governor when the party goes in.

Bradley: We had, of course, a complete reversal this last time, but Butch Powers won by more than Knight did, and it goes like that. Anderson won the election by more votes than Pat won in '62. That happens all the time.

Fry: So that's not a reflection on Anderson?

Bradley: Not particularly, although he wasn't a very charismatic guy. He didn't do much for us. He tried. He did everything he could. He was totally cooperative. He just was never very great shakes with the public.

Fry: Basically, was Anderson more middle of the road than Pat?

Bradley: No. If anything, more liberal. As a congressman, he tended to go toward the middle, but he didn't as lieutenant governor. He'd been in the legislature, elected with the Olson administration in '38, and he'd been a staunch liberal-cause supporter.

Fry: There had been some tax scandals, and it seemed like that became one of Reagan's issues.

Bradley: I don't know. In what regard?

Fry: It was the assessors. One of them down in Hayward was the first one to be discovered, and they discovered that this was really happening all over the state.

Bradley: I don't think that was a factor. It certainly wasn't the responsibility of the Governor. They were county assessors. I remember that scandal.

Fry: Another thing was the third-term issue.

Bradley: That was an issue. But that's one of those nice handy issues, like calling Salinger a carpetbagger. It's something you can hang on to, and people who are disaffected for other reasons will say that's the reason they use--the no third term. But it was something we had to combat all the time.

Fry: How do you combat it, because it's there?

Bradley: Try to change the subject. [laughter.]

Fry: The Oakland Tribune and the Los Angeles Times came out for Reagan. How was your other newspaper support?

Bradley: The Bee supported Pat, but he didn't have a great amount of paper support, and he had--

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--and I think the San Jose paper. On the whole, the major papers were supporting Reagan. The San Diego papers did. I think both the Examiner and the Chronicle supported Reagan.

Fry: Eugene Wyman came out with a statement that "as licensees of the federal government, radio and television stations shouldn't be allowed to use the public airways to endorse a candidate."

Bradley: Did he?

Fry: And I wondered if you agreed with that.

Bradley: No, I don't agree with that. Although the net effect of TV station endorsements isn't great, I don't think. There's no way to gauge it. But they come out with an endorsement--let's say two weeks before the election--so the following week, the week before the election, you get a chance to rebut their endorsement, on the same time schedules, and it's hard to tell which is more effective.

I personally think that we make better rebuttals because we're able to pick our speakers, rather than using the executive vice-president of the station, who often isn't the most winning person in the world.

Fry: [Laughs.] Yes. There was a statement, too, in the L.A. Times "West" magazine, December 11, 1966, right after the election, in one of the post-mortems, where the PR man, Roberts--

Bradley: Spencer-Roberts, yes.

Fry: Let's see, I guess his firm was handling Ronald Reagan during the campaign, right?

Bradley: I think so.

Fry: He said if you had wanted to effectively combat Reagan in the campaign, you should have played him up primarily as a decent, fine person, but maybe should start at the local level, and that that should have been your theme. Because he said you could've killed him off with that.

Bradley: That's very interesting.

Fry: Yes. You know, one of Pat's strong points has always been that he's just a decent person and a lovable guy, and I wondered if in this campaign you were trying to show the contrast between that characterization of Pat Brown and an opposite view of Ronald Reagan.

Bradley: We were. And it didn't work. So Roberts is entitled to a second guess. See, you just take the opposite of what was done in the campaign that loses, and you say that was the right way to go.

Fry: It was the August 14 State Democratic Convention where Pat said he would name a bipartisan commission to consider amendments to the Fair Housing Act. I just wanted to get that on tape.

Bradley: Oh, yes. Well, that's before the law changed, and we had the state convention after the primary election. Now they have it in the next year.

Fry: Some academic analyzers said that that put Pat effectively out of the liberal wing of the party.

Bradley: We didn't have any problem with the liberal wing of the party. I just can't buy that.

Campaign Fund Raising: Prelude to the Political Action Committee

Fry: There was one other little specific that I wanted to ask you about. There was a thing called a "California Compact," and I don't understand what brought it about, but in May, the two state party chairs--Parkinson and Bob Coates--announced it together. The compact called for the formation of a California Good Citizenship Committee, with a professional staff, to raise money for both parties. The example was the Aerojet General Corporation, which reported that 12,835 of 20,000 employees contributed over $82,000.

Bradley: Yes, I remember that a little. There was an effort made to encourage that kind of giving; that was before the federal law prohibited it. It's prohibited now. They have to form a political action committee, a PAC, in order to give any money.

Aerojet was an example where Dan Kimball, who was the president of it, personally encouraged the contributions and built up a lot of it. It was used as a way of promoting

Bradley: corporations later, and strongly used that way. So it was decided that wasn't a good way to go. I don't remember that they had any professional staff. Oh yes, they did. They had one guy. Nothing happened. It didn't come off.

Coate was a great theoretic politician. Most of his things didn't jell that well. Great guy, but--.

Fry: You still had your fissions and fusions going on within the party. Carmen Warschaw was still running. She ran against Warren.

Bradley: Charles Warren?

Fry: Charles Warren, yes. That was in August, and in the previous March she had, I think, run for national committeewoman against Anne Alanson. Anne Alanson was elected in March, and Charles Warren was elected as party chairman in August. So she lost both of those.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: What I have lined up here is the people who were Warren supporters--I'd like to check with you. I've got George Miller, and I have your name down. Is that right?

Bradley: Not really. I voted Pat's proxy, and I voted for Carmen Warschaw. He was supporting her. She said he didn't support her enough. I wasn't unhappy to see it go to Warren, however. Carmen accused me of doing that, but I didn't--that I was trying to run a double game on her.

Fry: And the CDC types were mostly for Warren, I guess. Is that right?

Bradley: Yes. She was a checkbook Democrat to them.

Fry: And Gene Wyman was for Warren?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: And Anne Alanson and Cranston.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: And the CDC president. But on the other side, Warschaw had Unruh's and Yorty's support?

Bradley: Yes, and most of the legislators, or a lot of the legislators.

Fry: And Dutton?

Bradley: And Dutton, yes. We had some big fights there.

Fry: So Pat Brown really did back Warschaw, but did he help Warren?

Bradley: He didn't help very much, no. That's what the argument was about. Dutton wanted us to go all out to get her in position, and I didn't see that as being that important.

Fry: What was the theory of putting her in as party head? I mean, why?

Bradley: Mainly, it was friendship I think. Possibly they're talking about contributions, but it didn't affect it that much.

Fry: The big hassle there was the fact that she charged that there was a meeting called the night before on whether or not the vote the next day on the party would be secret ballot, and it was five to three for a secret ballot, which meant that nobody had to face Unruh afterwards on the way they voted. Is that right?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: And this was obtained by a [reads] "hastily convened rules committee Friday night, when two of Carmen Warschaw's supporters were unavailable." This was from one of the columns that I read.

Bradley: I don't remember that.

Fry: Was that one of the strategies?

Bradley: No, I don't think so. Every time they have an election, they fight about whether it was a secret ballot or open ballot. I know both arguments by heart. I can take either side at a moment's notice. [Laughter.]

Fry: Which side did you take that time?

Bradley: I don't remember being in that group.

Fry: Or maybe you weren't on the rules committee.

Bradley: No, I wasn't. I'd never serve on any committees.

Fry: Oh, okay. What was Pierre Salinger doing at this time? He surfaces a couple of times in the proceedings.

Bradley: He was there, I think, but losing candidates in California don't seem to maintain much party control.

Fry: You had the Drew Pearson column that came out, obligingly, with a story on Christopher's milk scandal.

Bradley: Right.

Fry: He also came out with a story that Unruh never accounted for the revenue from his political dinners.

Bradley: Yes, I remember that, sort of. I didn't plant that story. As a matter of fact, I didn't plant either one of them, but the Christopher story definitely was a plant from us, but as I told you, I didn't participate in that.

Drew Pearson had a son-in-law who was out here deeply involved in Democratic politics, a very liberal guy. I can't remember his name. He married his daughter--yes, son-in-law. Son-in-law and daughter were involved. So he kept printing a lot of California stuff that I think they fed him. That's probably where the Unruh story came from.

Fry: Apparently, this particular column did not run in California.

Bradley: Which, the one about Unruh?

Fry: The one on Unruh never accounting for the revenue from the political dinners.

Bradley: Oh, really? No place in California?

Fry: That's what it said. But what I wanted to ask you, Don, is when a person like Unruh raises money through political dinners then, or when he did. I know that this was ruled out later as a method, but at that time, didn't he have to account for it? Or was that not necessary?

Bradley: No, he would have had to account for it, even under the old laws I think. I don't remember the story that well, but he had to file where he got the money.

Fry: And what he spent it for?

Bradley: And what he spent it for, yes. It came under the general filing law. You had to file who were contributors to the fund. You didn't have to file how much. That was a loophole.

Fry: Okay. So that would eliminate a certain amount of bookkeeping.

Bradley: But he put money into legislative races, quite a bit of it. Including some senate races, incidentally. That was--

Fry: He was spreading out?

Bradley: Partially that, and partially it was because his supporters in the assembly, many of them, were running for the senate under reapportionment. You see, you had all these urban districts open up, so assemblymen ran for them. And it was part of his idea that he took care of his own.

Fry: I see. You know, in many states that's par for the course.

Bradley: I think more so here than any place, though. I don't really know other states that create personal funds and then pass them out. Although nationally, on several occasions, the Senate and House re-election committees--Democratic committees--have been taken over by people who were furthering their own aims with it, like Lyndon Baines Johnson and people like that.

Fry: And I suppose in a place like Chicago this might have gone for legislators, but it would be handled outside, by party figures.

Bradley: Yes, by the party. No, this is a totally different concept. It's still going on. It's still legal, as a matter of fact, that the speaker has a fund, and he portions it out to who he thinks are the better candidates for the assembly. Moscone had a fund when he was the Democratic floor leader in the senate.

Fry: How do they raise the money now? It's no longer these dinners to honor someone?

Bradley: Oh, sure.

Fry: Is it that kind?

Bradley: Sure, they still do that. And some of it's direct contributions. The only thing that's changed is they're not able to accept lobbyist contributions, but that doesn't mean that the principals

Bradley: can't contribute. I mean, if somebody's up there representing the Coca-Cola Company, he can't contribute, but the company can contribute--and does.

Fry: So it really doesn't make any difference, then--that law against lobbyists not contributing.

Bradley: It makes some difference.

Fry: A lobbyist would just tell his client to write the check.

Bradley: Well, for a while that was prohibited. They weren't allowed to tell their principals who to give to, which is a ridiculous law.

Fry: [Laughs.] How can you ever--

Bradley: It finally was knocked out [laughs], I think on a court decision. I'm pretty sure that was knocked out in a court decision. No way to enforce that. If he does have communication with his employers, and you presume that he does, it is possible for him to say, "Joe Jones is a good guy and did quite a bit for us." He didn't say there, "Give him money," but--

Fry: But they got the message.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: On the other side, what did you think of Gaylord Parkinson and his work? This was the campaign where they had the "eleventh commandment" that--

Bradley: Stopped Republicans from criticizing each other.

Fry: Yes.

Bradley: I think he was fairly effective. I mean, that was about as good leadership on the Republican side as I've seen--effective. And he did enter into some compacts, and he was perfectly willing to enter into any kind of agreement on fair campaign tactics with Democrats as well as his own. I personally liked the man. I don't know what's happened to him now. He put in a lot of his own money and time in being chairman.

Fry: All in all, how did you assess Reagan's rather rapidly developing background in the state government issues during the campaign?

Bradley: A lot of it was pretty fuzzy. We got into all kinds of arguments about policy, and his method was to pick some small aspect of something, and with his dramatic ability, build it up into one of the most fiendish crimes that had ever been committed on the people, and he did it very effectively. They weren't very interesting, really, but he made them fairly interesting. He was very effective with that. He'd come up with all these statistics about "88,000 unwed mothers," and things like that, and he did it quite well.

Fry: Pretty strong images.

Bradley: He didn't attack Pat, particularly. There was no really vitriolic attacks on him.

Fry: Afterwards, what did you do? After it was all over.

Bradley: I took a year off, practically.

Fry: Where did you go?

Bradley: I worked for the Tishman Corporation in establishing some building things with Dick Graves, who'd been the candidate for governor in '54.

Fry: Oh, yes. He was building--what was it?

Bradley: High-rise office buildings. He was developing commercial property. I worked with him for a year.

Fry: Was that down in southern California?

Bradley: Yes, mainly. But I spent most of the time in Bolinas. I didn't really have to work all that hard.

Fry: When did you move to Bolinas?

Bradley: I've had a place there for thirty years or more. Just as a second place. But I moved over there during that year.

Fry: And it became your first place, your residence.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Is that where you are now?

Bradley: I still have a place there, but I live in the city. It's too long a commute.

Fry: Let's see, when were you living in southern California?

Bradley: I think we maintained our residence in southern California through '67, and then we officially moved up to Bolinas.

Leaving California: Managing the '68 Arizona Gubernatorial Race

Fry: Did you work in the '68 campaign?

Bradley: Yes, I did. In '68 I ran a campaign for governor of Arizona.

Fry: Governor of Arizona?

Bradley: Right.

Fry: In Arizona?

Bradley: Yes. I was down there for several months.

Fry: How did you switch states like that?

Bradley: Well, a very nice guy named Sam Goddard, who had been governor before and had been defeated, came and asked me. I knew him from party politics. He was a Democratic national committeeman and something else. And he asked me to come down there. He made me a very nice proposition, so I did. It was kind of fun.

Fry: Just off the top of your head, what sort of adjustments did you have to make for Arizona politics after working all this time in California?

Bradley: Well, quite a bit. It's a very different state. But it was small, and it wasn't that hard to learn. I mean, there were only three congressional districts, for instance, in the whole state. I had to study a little--the government form and one thing or another, but it was interesting, and I found a lot of things that we'd done here that they had never done that were very innovative things to them.

Fry: Like?

Bradley: It's like a southern Democratic party--very pervasive, and at that time controlled most everything except the governorship. Everything's elective. It's a very different state. They elect

Bradley: the public utilities commission, they elect the supreme court--they really let them run an open election. It's an old-time party operation. A lot of patronage. On the state level, they had a lot of patronage. It's less now. It's been reformed a little.

Fry: What was your opponent like? Was he part of the Goldwater network in Arizona?

Bradley: Yes, in a way.

Fry: Who was he?

Bradley: His name was Williams. He'd been a fōlksy radio announcer, with a kind of an old-time show where he interviewed people and read poetry--a strange guy. But he'd been governor for two terms, and he made it one more. We lost the election.

Fry: Why did you lose it?

Bradley: I don't know. He was a not unpopular governor. He was an incumbent governor who had already beaten my candidate once, and he beat him again.

Fry: Oh, I see. It was the second time around.

Bradley: They have two-year terms there.

Fry: Two-year terms, oh. Did he have a lot of money, Williams?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: More money than you had to run your campaign?

Bradley: Well, Goddard personally had a hell of a lot of money, so that we weren't short of money.

Fry: What sort of Goldwater political structure existed in Arizona at that time?

Bradley: There was a structure. There's no question. It was heavily in the business and corporate establishment. The Democratic force as we know them here--labor's very weak over there, and they have a lot of these transplanted individuals who don't join unions, and don't like the Indians--what do you want to say--self-determination-type people.

Bradley: But Goldwater was running himself at that time, in the same election, when he won handily.

Fry: Did you try to team up with his opponent?

Bradley: Yes, we did a little. But he was staffer. He'd been in Washington with Senator Hayden, and he wasn't very strong. As I remember, he ran for Hayden's seat and lost it, and then ran again against Goldwater. So he didn't do very well.

Fry: Why don't we just finish this by bringing you up to date? After '68, what did you--?

Bradley: Then in '72 I did some issue things. Or was it '70?

Fry: In '70 Reagan ran again for governor and was re-elected against Unruh coming in.

Bradley: Yes, I didn't participate in that at all. Incidentally, in '68 I also served on the strategy committee for Cranston. I used to fly over for meetings. That was a no-pay, a freebie. Pro bono.

Fry: That was the biggie in California.

Bradley: Yes, that was the big race.

Fry: Could you just hit the high points and tell us what the main strategies were and the problems?

Bradley: Well, that was very interesting because his opponent--what was his name? The superintendent of public instruction.

Fry: Max Rafferty.

Bradley: Max Rafferty--was screaming for a debate. I remember we had a great argument over that. And Max Rafferty was effective in the debates, in that he wasn't inhibited at all by fact or anything. He devastated a guy named Ralph Richardson, who ran for superintendent of public instruction against him, who was a very articulate, fine guy, as a matter of fact. So we had tremendous arguments--

Fry: You mean you and Cranston did?

Bradley: No, Cranston just sat aside and let the committee decide it, but his campaign management firm--Weiner--was going to challenge Rafferty to a series of debates. Eight of them, I think, and a very complicated thing. I was utterly opposed to this, supported strongly as I remember by Paul Ziffren, who was on my side, and some others.

But we finally won the argument. As a matter of fact, the ads were set for this thing. They were going into the paper--these big ads.

And the staff were never included in the policy committee, which I considered a mistake, because Lou Haas, who's still with him in southern California as his administrative assistant, was strongly in favor of not debating and just going after Rafferty.

He's the one that finally came up with the "white cane story"--that Rafferty had stayed out of the draft by using this phony white cane; he was blind. But I felt all the time that Rafferty was a ridiculous figure and that the press would buy Cranston's not debating him on the basis that it just didn't serve any purpose. You couldn't keep the guy on a subject. He made scurrilous charges and used false figures and everything all the time. And just say, "No, he's a liar, and I'm not going to dirty up the airwaves with such a debate," and he did it successfully. In the meantime they just ridiculed Rafferty out of a good job.

Fry: In '66, Cranston was running for controller--I'm switching back to the other campaign. Was there any connection between Pat and Cranston? Did they do any joint--?

Bradley: Yes, they did. As a matter of fact, Cranston turned over the remainder of his campaign funds. He had some surplus, and as I remember he gave me a check for the whole--whatever it was. He figured out what it would cost him to finish the campaign and gave us the rest of the money. He was concerned, and I think he knew well that if the head of the ticket didn't win, he wasn't going to win either.

But they were close. As a matter of fact, there was a book on Reagan's right-wing connections and everything which was circulated during the campaign that was all part of his assistance.

Fry: Oh, it was? He helped on that one?

Bradley: Yes.

Post-1968: Managing More Issue Campaigns

Fry: Are you saying that after '68 you more or less were in issue campaigns rather than candidates?

Bradley: Yes. I handled such glamorous things as earthquake-prone schools and things like that.

Fry: What else? Just give us a laundry list of what you can remember.

Bradley: I handled a local campaign against district elections in San Francisco. That was in '71, because it was the municipal elections.

Fry: That was the issue of making each supervisor represent a district, rather than at large.

Bradley: Right. And in '74, I was going to stay out of the gubernatorial thing altogether, but Bill Roth, who was running, was a good personal friend and asked me to get involved in it. So I spent the last two and a half months, I think, in his campaign.

Fry: Oh, you did?

Bradley: Yes. Which was a hopeless cause, but for a great guy, a really fine man.

Fry: Why didn't that get more off the ground?

Bradley: Well, nobody was doing well against Jerry. Jerry was really out there racking up the votes, you know. And you had a choice that ran the complete spectrum, really--Jerry Waldie and [Joseph] Alioto. A lot of strong figures running, but Jerry just surpassed everybody. And I don't think Roth ever really came across the way he should. Roth would've been a much better candidate for United States Senator than he would've as governor--more concerned with the larger issues. He was probably better qualified for it.

Fry: Roth didn't run for anything after that. Why was that? Did that wipe him out financially?

Bradley: It took a lot of his available money. He spent a lot of money.

Fry: I wondered why--

Bradley: I don't know what he would've run for. It's nice to want to run, but you have to have a place to go. So he wouldn't have run against Cranston.

Fry: What became of your relationship with Pat Brown?

Bradley: It's still very good.

Fry: Is it, even though you didn't support Jerry Brown?

Bradley: I talked with him about Jerry Brown. As a matter of fact, I helped a little bit. I helped his brother, Harold Brown, put together a Republican committee for Jerry. But it had nothing to do with Pat. Jerry never had any of Pat's people around him, particularly, and none of his close advisors or his professional staff came from his father.

Fry: I know, but in some other cases, Pat has continued to be unhappy with people who didn't help Jerry in the primary.

Bradley: Oh, I see. It wasn't that important. I don't know. Pat and I get along very well anyway.

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I had also bought the bar and motel over in Bolinas and was involved in running it.

Fry: Oh, you had? That was really different for you.

Bradley: Yes. I don't know that I actually did anything in 1970.

Fry: So you may have just run your bar and hotel in Bolinas.

Bradley: Yes. I may have just skipped that one.

Fry: You don't remember working against Reagan or anything in that campaign?

Bradley: I wasn't involved in it professionally. Unruh and I were never close friends, as we've established, I think. Well, he did ask me to get involved in the general, but I refused.

Fry: As an observer in '70--that was even more dismal for the Democrats than '66--what factors would you say contributed to that?

Bradley: I think the party varies, and the state varies in its affection for parties, and I just think we were down. The registration hadn't changed that much, but sometimes the party is in the state that you'd call normally Democratic, and sometimes it's in a state where you would say it was Republican. That was not an attractive, and Unruh was not an attractive candidate. Reagan was popular--still wowing them. It just wasn't to be.

Fry: What are some of the other issues that you handled? I know you had some very interesting ones.

Bradley: I've handled a lot of stuff locally, and I handled airports, the sewer bonds, which was the largest bond issue ever passed here. They're very uninteresting things, bond issues. I've done statewide ballot propositions for housing money--bonds for housing money.

Fry: That's public housing?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: For low income?

Bradley: For low-income housing, yes. And rehab money, money so that you can rehabilitate a house or apartment house. Unsuccessfully, I might add. We lost it.

Then I handled Moscone for the senate re-election in '74, and then spent all '75 working on his mayoral campaign. We never got into the Shelley thing in '63, but I came in and ran Shelley's campaign in 1963, for mayor.

Fry: I wish we could have another whole session just on San Francisco politics with you, but I think that we can't because we're having to be very strict with our time and our budget.

Then in this last election--wait, am I skipping one? 'Seventy-four, '75, okay, '76.

Bradley: What happened in '76? Oh, they had a senatorial election, but not gubernatorial. And presidential, which I didn't get involved--oh. Well, '76, we had the recall on [George] Moscone,

Bradley: Proposition B, which was sort of a recall, and that took a good part of the time. And I ran [Robert] Mendelsohn for the state senate against Milton Marks, and a bunch of other smaller campaigns.

Fry: Like supervisors, you mean?

Bradley: Yes. A supervisor in Mendocino county, who was a personal friend, and school board, and I handled several propositions at one time, again for housing money for the city--enabling legislation so that they could collect housing money for rehab. I forget the letters on them now.

You asked me about '70--I guess it was '72. In the municipal elections, several times I handled things for the retirees to try to bring their retirement up to the present, or close to the present level. Some of them retired without Social Security, and they were getting a real pittance on retirement.

Fry: These were government retirees?

Bradley: San Francisco government, yes.

Fry: So in handling these smaller ones, sometimes you handled more than one in the same election?

Bradley: Oh, yes. But I don't handle more than one big one. I just don't think it's proper.

Fry: Then you handled some state-wide propositions in '78, didn't you?

Bradley: Yes. The No on 6, which was defeated [initiative against homosexual teachers]. Before that I'd handled opposition to this limitation on abortion funding, but they didn't qualify.

Fry: But you were geared up to handle that.

Bradley: That's right. State-wide.

Fry: Both of those propositions were put on the ballot by--?

Bradley: Initiative.

Fry: Yes, but on the initiative of this fellow in southern California who was running?

Bradley: No, the abortion thing was a different situation. It wasn't [John] Briggs. Well, he was supporting it. It was done by the pro-life movement, but they weren't successful.

Fry: He wasn't doing it just to get out the votes for his own supporters?

Bradley: No, he was trying very hard, and both of the propositions that he got on the November ballot he was trying to qualify for the primary ballot, but he didn't make it. He misprinted the forms for the homosexual schoolteacher issue, and they ruled him off.

Fry: So Six was the only one that qualified that you handled in '78.

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: Where did you get your support and your money, and how did you deal with things like TV stations?

Bradley: The money was primarily gay money. The support came eventually. It wasn't easy to get the support at first, but it came almost universally from officeholders, both Republicans and Democrats. Primarily the campaign was won with the free media. We encouraged the newspapers and stations to give time to the issue because we thought just an absolute impartial view of that issue was a winner, would defeat it, and I think it did.

We had some good paid media, but we never had that much money. We only spent $800,000, which is not a lot of money in terms of state-wide propositions.

Fry: No, it's not. Didn't that one look kind of grim at first? It looked like you were losing.

Bradley: Oh, it did. It did. Poll-wise--our own polls, too, did a tremendous turnover.

Fry: Right at the end, right?

Bradley: No, it was before that. That's another Field thing. He had a bad poll. He disagreed with every other pollster in the state. Then he reports "the greatest surge in voter attitudes" he's ever seen, you see. Which just meant that he now agreed with the other pollsters.

Fry: Oh, I see.

Bradley: But it started in September or late August--it started to switch. And of course, Briggs never mounted much of a campaign. He wasn't able to. And he personally was a great foil for anyone to do. He was kind of a bumbling, foot-in-the-mouth guy.

Fry: Wasn't there an organized effort to get more free, public-service-type media things toward the end? I think that was one where there was an organized protest.

Bradley: On whose part?

Fry: On the part of the No on 6 people.

Bradley: No, we were--

Fry: Okay, then I have the wrong one.

Bradley: Yes. In this case, I have absolutely no complaint about the amount of free media that was given us. They just gave the issue tremendous amounts of time. And that's what I think won it.

Fry: And now you told me that you're going to help Dianne Feinstein.

Bradley: No, I didn't.

Fry: Is that right?

Bradley: No, I didn't. You read that.

Fry: I read it in Herb Caen, but either you or Mary had mentioned it to me that morning. But that's not right?

Bradley: No, we don't have any agreement yet. She hasn't even decided whether she's going to run yet or not. So that's really getting the cart before the horse. I presume if she runs, I would handle it.

Fry: Maybe by the time I get this transcript to you for editing you'll be too put on--

Bradley: We may start an initiative for handgun control.

Fry: Oh, really?

Bradley: Well, if I'm successful with it. There's another pro-bono thing. I'm trying to get one started. Because the public's in favor of handgun control. The legislature won't pass it. I

Bradley: think that's what the initiative is for, when you have that kind of a situation. It's a toughie, though. There's a lot of money against it, and it's hard to find money for it.

Fry: And instant money, isn't it? It's amazing how fast they can mobilize their money.

Bradley: Oh, yes. The National Rifle Association is the big one in it.

Fry: In your work, do you take many of these pro bono publico? Or how do you feed yourself?

Bradley: Well, I always manage to come out with enough. I do a lot of pro-bono work, though. I really do.

Fry: Any of these you just told me about pro bono?

Bradley: The gun-control thing will be--or virtually. It depends how much time I spend on it. But I'm willing to give quite a bit of time for nothing on it. And I always try to take issues that I'm compatible with.

Fry: Let me ask you about the gun-control thing. One of the problems there has been that if one state has a gun-control law, then it's very difficult because the states around it can provide guns.

Bradley: That's true. I'd much rather see a national law. But the states aren't all that available here. We have a big state, and it's a long ways to Reno from here--or Oregon. And fortunately, you have to drive across the desert to get to Arizona. So I'm sure it would cut it down.

Two states have it. Well, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts have it, and it's cut the murder rate down considerably--thirty-one per cent in Massachusetts. That's really pretty good. So I think something can be done. I'd much rather see a federal law, though.

Fry: How did you decide on this, Don? Did Moscone's death have anything to do with it?

Bradley: Yes, it had something to do with it. I've always been there, but it just accentuated the--.

Fry: Isn't there a fellow--I think he's in California--whose young son was killed by somebody with a handgun, and he's devoting his life nationally to the pro-gun-control forces. Do you know who I mean?

Bradley: I don't know who that is, no. I'm just beginning to find out who the players are, and one thing or another.

Fry: I just wanted to ask you another thing on this. How have you selected what issues you're going to work on and what side you take? Is it always compatible with your personal beliefs, or do you look at it professionally as a--?

Bradley: No, it's always compatible with my personal beliefs.

Fry: Because a lot of PR people will simply look at it as a job to do.

Bradley: I know, and I understand that. I'm not condemning it. It's just not for me. I don't think I'd do a good job if I wasn't in sympathy with the issue.

Fry: You have to have that gut feeling of support, too.

Bradley: Yes. That's also why I'm poorer. [laughter]

Fry: That's why you're not living in a $500,000 house?

Bradley: Yes.

Fry: [laughs] Or maybe you are, now. With the inflation on your Bolinas place.

Bradley: Oh, maybe so.

Fry: Who's been your major assistant over the years? Do you have any people that have really--in your professional firm something.

Bradley: No, there's been a whole coterie of people. I don't maintain a firm, with the exception of an office manager, Mary. I don't maintain anything permanently. I just make an ad hoc organization. But there are a lot of people that worked for me at various times, including most of my competition.

Fry: Oh! [laughs]

Bradley: Weiner, for instance, and Butcher-Ford and all those people. They all worked for me at one time or another. Bernard Teitelbaum worked a lot of campaigns with me. There's a lot of people around. And I collaborate some with Joe Carrell in Los Angeles. We split campaigns at times, state-wide campaigns. He handles the south and I handle the north.

Fry: How long has Joe Cerrell been in this professionally?

Bradley: Since 1967, I think. Oh, professionally? He worked for me before that. He worked for me first in 1964. And his wife was my secretary for ten years, I guess, or eleven years.

Bradley:

Fry: We have an allotment in our budget to interview a PR person on the conservative side, in southern California--well, at least he's got to have done some kind of conservative work. We were thinking of either Spencer or Roberts.

Bradley: Stu Spencer's a much more interesting guy.

Fry: Okay.

Bradley: And probably more available to you. I don't know where Roberts is at the moment, but he was always the behind-the-scenes guy. I think you'll get a lot more out of Spencer. Pretty nice guy, Stu Spencer, and I think very competent.

Fry: Do you feel like you've been covered? Would you like to have one final statement? [laughter]

Bradley: No.

Fry: You've certainly given a lot of your time, and I appreciate it.

Transcribers: Michele Stafford, Bob MacCargar, Teresa Allen
Final Typists: Karin Rosman, John McPherson

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Amelia R. Fry

Graduated from the University of Oklahoma, B.A. in psychology and English, M.A. in educational psychology and English, University of Illinois; additional work, University of Chicago, California State University at Hayward.

Instructor, freshman English at University of Illinois and at Hiram College. Reporter, suburban daily newspaper, 1966-67.

Interviewer, Regional Oral History Office, 1959--; conducted interview series on University history, woman suffrage, the history of conservation and forestry, public administration and politics. Director, Earl Warren Era Oral History Project, documenting governmental/political history of California 1925-1953; director, Goodwin Knight-Edmund G. Brown Era Project.

Author of articles in professional and popular journals; instructor, summer Oral History Institute, University of Vermont, 1975, 1976, and oral history workshops for Oral History Association and historical agencies; consultant to other oral history projects; oral history editor, Journal of Library History, 1969-1974; secretary, the Oral History Association, 1970-1973.


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